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This thesis investigates how low-functioning children with autism and language- 
matched typically developing children comprehend symbolic relations between 
pictures, words and the objects they represent. Using a series of cognitive-behavioural 
paradigms, this research documents how these developmental populations use 
pictures as a source for deducing information about the world and whether they differ 
in their understanding of what fundamentally relates pictures and referents. Study one 
tests whether children’s mapping of referential picture-object relations is facilitated 
by iconicity (the extent that a picture resembles its referent) and/or verbal labelling, 
and study two examines the perceptual cues that direct the generalisation of labels 
from colour photographs. The third study addresses the factors that influence 
children’s ability to contextualise pictorial symbols and use them to adaptively guide 
their behaviour in real time and space. Study four investigates the relative importance 
of artists’ communicative intentions and perceptual resemblance to children’s 
mapping of word-picture and picture-object relations, and study five examines 
whether representational status (as determined by artists’ intentions) influences 
children’s naming and reproduction of ambiguous shapes. The findings of this thesis 
indicate that children with autism can recognise perceptual similarities between 
pictures and objects, but they do not understand the rules that constrain symbolic 
word-picture-object mapping. Across studies, iconicity emerges as an important factor 
that mediates symbolic picture comprehension in autism. Furthermore, unlike their 
typically developing peers, children with autism do not reflect on the social- 
communicative intentions underlying pictures when naming, drawing or identifying 
referent objects. Instead, they derive meaning based exclusively on resemblance, 
making them naive realists. Theoretically, this thesis contributes to the field by
informing our understanding of how low-functioning children with autism, an 
extremely under-researched population, comprehend symbols. At an applied level, 
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1Chapter One: General Introduction
Over thousands of years, human culture has evolved through the increasingly 
sophisticated use of symbols (Corballis, 1999; Deacon, 1997). The ability to create 
and comprehend symbols is arguably uniquely human, and the natural selection of 
these skills is largely responsible for the evolutionary gulf that has emerged between 
our species and other primates (Deacon, 1997). Over time and across disciplines, the 
meaning of the term “symbol” has varied dramatically (see DeLoache, 2002 for 
overview), thus, it is important to clarify my use of the term. In contemporary 
psychology, a symbol is defined as an “entity that someone intends to stand for 
something other than itself’ (DeLoache, 1995, p. 67). While some symbols, such as 
colour photographs and scale models, have a close perceptual correspondence with the 
things they represent (referents), others, such as abstract art and company logos, relate 
to the world in an almost arbitrary fashion. Unlike most 3-dimensional entities which 
can be unequivocally identified through the analysis of their defining features (e.g. 
size, shape, physiology, DNA), there is nothing intrinsic to symbols that ‘links’ them 
to their referents (Browne & Wooley, 2001). The one condition that is both necessary 
and sufficient for something to symbolise something else is the human intention to 
communicate. Each and every symbol is created with the intention of transmitting 
meaning to other members of one’s culture, and recipients derive meaning by 
inferring the communicative intentions of the symbol’s creator or user (Callaghan, 
2008).
Throughout our daily lives we are exposed to an enormous variety of symbols, 
a point which is beautifully illustrated by Ittelson: “As I sit at my breakfast table, my 
morning newspaper has printing on it; it has a graph telling me how the national 
budget will be spent, a map trying to tell me something about the weather, a table of
baseball statistics, an engineering drawing with which I can build a garden chair, 
photographs of distant places and people, a caricature expressing what the editor 
thinks of a political figure, and an artist’s rendition of what the city will look like 20 
years from now... On the wall in front of me hangs an abstract painting. Next to that, 
there is a calendar. Above the calendar is a clock. All this and more, and I haven’t 
even turned on the TV or the computer” (Ittelson, 1996, p. 171). Via these symbols, it 
is possible to learn about specific things, categories of things, distant places, past and 
future events, abstract theoretical concepts, the emotions and attitudes of others, things 
that existed long ago and things that may never exist. Indeed, the ability to infer 
meaning from the myriad symbols that surround us bestows an almost limitless 
capacity for intellectual development (DeLoache, 2004).
If children are to become effective communicators and navigators of the 
modem social world, it is crucial that they learn to master the many symbol systems 
that pervade our environment (Happe, 1995; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & Cohen, 
2002; Wetherby, Prizant & Schuler, 2000). Alongside words, pictures are a class of 
symbols that play an extremely important role in children’s early learning. Pictures 
visually represent objects, or states of affairs, that exist independently in time and 
space. By viewing pictures, we can learn about reality without directly experiencing it 
(e.g. most people know what a unicom looks like, but nobody has seen a real one; 
DeLoache, 1995) and through the creation of pictures we can transmit our knowledge 
to future generations (e.g. through cave paintings and books; Langer, 1942; Vygotsky, 
1962). In modem cultures, pictures play a vital role in children’s education and, for 
some children with linguistic impairments, they also provide an alternative means of 
communication. For these reasons, it is important to study how typically and 
atypically developing infants and children comprehend pictorial symbols.
3As picture experts, adults spontaneously generalise labels and information 
between pictures and their real world counterparts. For example, if you were to 
encounter a picture resembling a tiger, you would effortlessly interpret the picture as a 
representation of ‘a tiger’, and thus refer to the picture with the verbal label “tiger”. 
You would also extend any information that you learn about the picture to its real life 
referent (e.g. if someone points to the tiger picture and says “this has sharp teeth”, you 
would automatically apply that fact to any real tigers that you encounter). Although 
we are immersed in visual representations from early infancy, children’s exposure to 
pictures increases dramatically at around 1 -year of age when they begin to spend 
considerable time engaged in joint picture-book reading interactions with adults (e.g. 
DeBaryshe, 1993). In this context, adults name and provide facts about pictures with 
the good-faith expectations that children a) understand that pictures represent real 
things, and b) that they will generalise information to depicted objects in a manner 
consistent with mature symbolic understanding. These expectations are based on 
adults’ implicit knowledge that pictures are referential, that they are intended to stand 
for things in the world. But, are we correct to assume that symbolically inexperienced 
children understand the referential relations that exist between words, pictures and the 
objects they represent?
Important research has shown that picture comprehension is surprisingly 
challenging for infants and young children. Studies have documented a complex 
developmental trajectory that gradually unravels through early childhood (DeLoache 
& Bums, 1994; DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren & Gottlieb, 1998; 
Pierroutsakos & DeLoache, 2003; Preissler & Carey, 2004; Salsa & de Mendoza,
2007) and culminates at around 5-years when children’s symbolic understanding of 
pictures has more-or-less fully matured (Jolley, 2008; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005).
4Interestingly, it has been revealed that the emergence of children’s ability to 
understand and utilise pictures as symbols is intimately related to social cognition 
(Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005) 
and language (Callaghan, 2000; Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Kirkham, Stewart &
Kidd, 2012). These meta-findings have important implications for the symbolic 
development of populations who are impaired in these two domains, most notably, 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Lord & Paul, 1997; Tager-Flusberg, 
1992; Volkmar, Klin & Cohen, 2000).
To date, relatively few researchers have investigated how children with ASD 
comprehend pictorial symbols. Consequently, we have little knowledge about how the 
profound linguistic and social-pragmatic impairments (Anderson et al., 2007; Baron- 
Cohen, 1995; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Gliga et al., 2012; 
Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Lord, Risi & Pickles, 2004; Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, 
Schultz & Klin, 2004) that characterise autism might impact on this crucial ability.
The existence of this gap in knowledge is surprising given that pictures provide a 
solitary means of functional communication for many low-functioning children with 
ASD (e.g. Frost & Bondy, 2002), and are ubiquitously used as communicative 
supports in classroom settings. When we consider the factors that are thought to 
underpin pictorial development -  namely social-cognition and language -  we may 
expect low-functioning children with ASD to be impaired in this domain. More 
positively, however, empirical studies -  such as those reported in this thesis -  can 
shed light on what properties of pictures, or aspects of interactions involving pictures, 
mediate whether or not children with ASD successfully comprehend pictorial 
symbols. By identifying the factors that facilitate symbolic understanding of pictures 
in children with ASD, we can optimise the way in which pictures are used with this
5population in clinical and educational settings, and provide data-grounded guidance 
regarding what types of pictures are most (and least) likely to be understood.
Before discussing symbolic understanding in children with ASD in greater 
detail, the following sections review the developmental trajectory of pictorial 
understanding in typically developing (TD) children, and the factors that influence 
their picture comprehension.
1.1 Picture comprehension in typically developing children
1.1.1 Early understanding o f pictures in typically developing children
Historically, the question of whether picture comprehension is an innate ability 
has been hotly contested. Gibson (1971, 1979) argued that pictorial representations 
present more-or-less the same higher-order invariant information as their 3- 
dimensional referents, meaning they can be analysed in the same way as equivalent 
scenes in the viewer’s environment. Accordingly, he proposed that the processes 
underpinning picture interpretation are the same as those used to derive meaning from 
the “real world”, thus negating the need to develop a specialised picture processing 
skill-set. However, on the other side of the fence, Gombrich (1974) and Goodman 
(1976) argued that pictures are a cultural convention, and that the rules governing 
their comprehension and usage must be learned through experience. Ultimately, 
contemporary picture research has shown that there is no simple answer to the ‘innate 
vs. learned’ debate, as both perspectives are correct in part. The issue is complicated 
by the fact that picture comprehension is not a single all-encompassing ability, but 
rather the outcome of multiple processes that emerge and consolidate at different 
stages of development (Jolley, 2008).
In order to fully understand the symbolic meaning of a picture, a viewer must 
meet several cognitive requirements. First, they must recognise what a picture
represents. This simply requires sensitivity to perceptual similarities between visual 
representations and objects in one’s environment. Next, they must appreciate that 
pictures are fundamentally different from their referents, and that these differences 
mediate how we interact with pictures and the information that we can glean from 
them (e.g. a real watch can be picked up, worn on one’s wrist and used to tell the time, 
whereas a picture of a watch has none of these properties). Viewers must also 
understand that pictures can serve both general and specific referencing functions. 
That is, the purpose of one picture may be to communicate general information about 
an object category (e.g. a prototypical line drawing of a car in a child’s picture book), 
whereas another may be intended to inform the viewer about a specific exemplar or 
current reality (e.g. a colour photograph of a Porsche 911 in a car enthusiast’s 
magazine). In addition, viewers must be aware that pictures are not intrinsically linked 
to their referents -  they are independent objects in their own right. Thus, if a picture 
(or referent) undergoes some kind of transformation, the referent (or picture) is not 
automatically subjected to the same change. Finally, and most importantly, a mature 
symbolic understanding of pictures demands that all of these components are 
considered simultaneously; a viewer is not restricted to thinking about a picture as 
either a representation of a symbolised referent or as an object in its own right -  they 
can reflect on both identities flexibly and concurrently.
Studies investigating pictorial understanding in TD infants and young children 
have found that the above components emerge at different stages along a 
developmental trajectory. In line with Gibson’s theory that picture recognition is 
effectively the same as object recognition, research has shown that the ability to 
identify depicted referents is unlearned. For example, Hochberg and Brooks (1962) 
famously reported that their own child was perfectly able to name photographs and
line drawings of familiar objects and people despite having negligible experience of 
pictures prior to testing at 19-months. Other studies have shown that 5-month-olds 
look longer at photos of novel dolls (DeLoache, Strauss & Maynard, 1979) and novel 
faces (Dirks & Gibson, 1977) than familiar exemplars. For example, DeLoache and 
colleagues (1979) showed 5-month-old infants a toy doll until they displayed signs of 
habituation. At test, they were presented with a picture of the doll they had become 
familiar with, and a picture of a novel doll. An analysis of looking preferences 
revealed that the infants spent longer gazing at the picture of the new doll, suggesting 
that they recognised the familiar doll and continued to habituate to its 2-D 
representation. Even more impressive are the findings that 3-month-olds can recognise 
their mother’s face in a colour photograph (Barrera & Maurer, 1981) and neonates can 
recognise a 2-D version of a simple 3-D pattern (Slater, Rose & Morison, 1984). 
Although these studies tell us nothing about infants’ symbolic understanding, they do 
suggest that the ability to recognise the referents of pictures is present extremely early 
in life.
However, in spite of their precocious recognition abilities, it appears that 
infants do not initially understand the meaning of 2-dimensionality. More specifically, 
their sometimes unusual behaviour towards pictures suggests that they fail to 
recognise that pictures are merely representations of their referents, and therefore 
should be treated as “objects of contemplation” rather than objects of action (Werner 
& Kaplan, 1963, p. 18). Throughout the literature, there are numerous anecdotal 
reports of young children attempting to interact with pictures as if they were the 
symbolised referents (Church, 1961; Murphy, 1978; Ninio & Bruner, 1978; Pemer, 
1991). For example, Church (1961) recounts watching a child try to stroke a picture of 
an animal, and Pemer (1991) describes his child’s efforts to step into a picture of a
shoe. In an attempt to make sense of these accounts, DeLoache and colleagues 
systematically investigated and formally documented this curious phenomenon 
(DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren & Gottlieb, 1998). In Experiment 1 of 
their classic study, 9-month-olds were presented with picture books containing colour 
photographs of novel objects and the infants’ behaviour towards the pictures was 
video recorded. The authors found that every single participant manually explored at 
least one picture, often attempting to grasp at the depicted image as if it were a real 3- 
D object. In a subsequent experiment, they observed that young children living in 
rural West Africa behave in an identical manner when presented with colour 
photographs. In stark contrast to the middle-class American children in Experiment 1, 
these African children lived in a severely impoverished and largely nonliterate society 
where pictorial representations were extremely rare. Thus, the manual exploration of 
pictures by young children is a robust cross-cultural phenomenon. In another 
experiment, DeLoache et al discovered that the frequency of manual explorations 
decreases significantly between 9 and 15-months, and has virtually disappeared by 19- 
months of age. Conversely, the 19-month-olds responded to pictures in a culturally- 
normative manner -  by pointing, vocalising and looking up at the experimenter as if 
trying to initiate an interaction.
Behavioural errors, such as those reported by DeLoache and colleagues 
(1998), suggest that young infants do not fully understand the differences between 
pictures and objects before 19-months. One interpretation of these findings is that 
young children mistake highly-iconic pictorial representations for their 3-D referents, 
and make genuine attempts to interact with depicted objects based on the incorrect 
belief that they are “real”. However, this is an unlikely explanation, as the same study 
showed that 9-month-olds will reach towards a novel object 86% of the time when it
9is presented alongside a colour photograph of the same object (DeLoache et al, 1998). 
This reliable preference for 3-D, rather than 2-D, stimuli demonstrates that those 
children who engage in the tactile exploration of pictures are also sensitive to 
dimensionality, and are aware that pictures are somehow different from objects. 
Perhaps, then, what young children do not understand from birth, and must learn 
through experience, is precisely how pictures differ from the objects they represent.
As a category of objects, pictures “are unique... for they are seen both as 
themselves and as some other thing, entirely different from the paper or canvas of the 
picture” (Gregory, 1970, p. 32). Typically, viewers spend most of their time reflecting 
on the symbolised referent of a picture (this is the intended purpose after all) without 
paying much attention to the picture as an object in its own right. This point was 
famously made by Rene Magritte in his painting “The Treachery of Images”. The 
painting consists of a realistic representation of a smoking pipe above the paradoxical 
scripture “Ceci n ’estpas une pipe ” (translation: This is not a pipe). Upon reading this 
statement, it is natural for the viewer to enter a state of mild confusion, perhaps 
thinking to themselves “Of course it’s a pipe, it looks just like a pipe. How can it not 
be a pipe?” The answer to this question is startlingly obvious, although our 
overwhelming tendency to view pictures from a symbolic, rather than concrete, 
perspective may prevent us from realising it initially. Magritte’s painting “is not a 
pipe” because it is a representation -  it possesses none of the physical qualities 
associated with a real pipe. Like all pictures, The Treachery of Images possesses a 
“dual nature” (Sigel, 1978), and conveys two different streams of information -  the 
first stream corresponding to the symbolic content of the picture (the symbolised 
referent), and another stream corresponding to the “real-world surface on which the 
picture appears” (lttelson, 1996, p. 175). If a viewer is to appreciate the
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representational function of a picture, they must acknowledge and simultaneously 
represent both the picture’s symbolic relation to its referent and its status as a concrete 
surface (DeLoache, 2002; DeLoache, Pierroutsakos & Uttal, 2003).
To summarise, although young infants are able to process information relating 
to a picture’s symbolic identity (as evidenced by their impressive recognition abilities; 
e.g. Barrera & Maurer, 1981; DeLoache, Strauss & Maynard, 1979; Dirks & Gibson, 
1977) and information relating to its surface (as evidenced by their ability to 
discriminate pictures from objects; e.g. DeLoache et al, 1998), they are initially unable 
to represent both streams of information simultaneously. It has been suggested that 
this failure to dual-represent prevents young children from “decoupling” referential 
information from a picture’s surface (Ittelson, 1996), causing them to be “captured” 
by the symbolic content of the picture. In other words, they “see through” the picture 
to its referent, without seeing that the picture is a picture. Hence, the transition from 
grasping to pointing at pictures between 9 and 19 months (DeLoache et al., 1998) may 
reflect infants’ growing awareness that pictures are merely representations.
1.1.2 Contextualisation o f pictures in typically developing children
Once children develop an understanding of what pictures are, their next step is 
to begin using pictures as a source of information about the world. This ability 
requires the awareness that pictures correspond to real-life referents, even if those 
referents are not present at the time of viewing. Given that children rarely view 
pictures in conjunction with their referents (e.g. in picture book reading interactions), 
the question of whether young children can contextualise the symbolic information 
communicated by pictures is an intriguing one. This aspect of pictorial understanding 
was investigated by DeLoache and Burns (1994) using the former’s famous “search 
task” paradigm. In this task, an experimenter concealed a toy in one of several hiding
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places in a room, and then communicated the location of the toy by showing children 
a picture of the toy in its hiding place. Children were then allowed to enter the room 
and search for the toy. Crucially, children never saw the depicted room and the real 
room concurrently. In order to solve this task, participants needed to a) recognise the 
depicted objects (toy and hiding location), b) perceive the relation between the 
depicted objects (e.g. recognise that the toy is behind the chair), c) construct a 
meaningful “mental model” of the depicted scenario (Pemer, 1991), d) discriminate 
between their mental model of the picture and their mental model of reality, and e) 
realise that the picture represents a current situation, and use the symbolised 
information to guide their actions in reality.
In their first experiment, DeLoache and Bums (1994) found a significant 
difference between the abilities of 24- and 30-month-olds to succeed at the search 
task; the older children searched the correct location first-time in 72% of trials, while 
the younger children’s mean errorless retrieval rate was just 13%. These contrasting 
success rates suggest that children aged 24-months failed to represent any relation 
between the depicted room and the real room, whereas children just 6 months older 
were competent at using the picture to guide their actions in reality. The inability of 
24-month-olds to use pictures as a source of information about a current situation was 
affirmed by several subsequent experiments that included various manipulations 
intended to facilitate their mapping of picture-referent relations. For example, in one 
experiment, children received an extensive preliminary orientation, during which they 
were introduced to each hiding location, observed the toy being hidden at every 
location, were shown all of the test photographs and had the experimenter explicitly 
point out the relation between each photograph and its corresponding referent. In 
another, the experimenter highlighted picture-referent relations by taking photographs
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of hiding locations using a Polaroid camera. Surprisingly, neither of these procedural 
adjustments significantly improved 24-month-olds’ errorless retrieval rates. However, 
in their final experiment, 24-month-olds were highly successful (83% correct) when 
asked to place (rather than retrieve) a toy at a specific location depicted in a 
photograph, demonstrating that there is at least one situation in which 2-year-olds can 
make use of symbolic information communicated by pictures.
Overall, DeLoache and Bums (1994) showed that children aged 24-months 
can make use of pictures when they symbolise the recipient of a future action (i.e. in 
placement trials), but struggle enormously when required to comprehend pictures that 
symbolise a current reality (i.e. in retrieval trials). This discrepancy was explained in 
terms of their contrasting abilities to mentally represent current and future states of 
affairs (with the latter being significantly easier than the former). But the really 
interesting question is why young children are unable to use pictures as a source of 
knowledge about a current situation. The authors claim that 24-month-olds fail the 
search task because they have yet to leam that pictures can be contextualised (i.e. that 
they can refer to specific elements of current reality). Despite explicit instructions and 
demonstrations suggesting that the pictures of hiding locations should be 
contextualised, their corresponding mental representations maintained a rigid 
decontextualized status. Consequently, the young children viewed the pictures as if 
they were non-informative depictions of a random or generic room, rather than highly- 
informative representations of the specific room they were required to search. Thus, 
between 24- and 30-months of age, children’s ability to flexibly use pictures as 
symbols improves as a consequence of learning that pictures can be contextualised; 
that they can refer to current real-life referents, even when those referents are not 
immediately present at the time of viewing.
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However, an alternative explanation for 24-month-olds’ poor performance in 
the search task was explored by Suddendorf (2003). He points out that 24-month-olds’ 
inability to suppress a mental representation of a picture that was formed on a 
previous trial may prevent them from flexibly modifying their behaviour on the basis 
of a new symbol-referent relation. In line with this hypothesis, the most frequent 
mistake made by 24-month-olds is exploring the hiding place that was correct on the 
immediately preceding trial (known as a ‘perseveration error’; DeLoache & Bums, 
1994). If 24-month-olds’ apparent failure to use pictures as a source of symbolic 
information is a direct consequence of their reduced ability to inhibit prior 
representations, they should display above-chance success rates in completely novel 
situations that are untainted by the effects of reinforcement.
In one experiment, Suddendorf (2003) found that nearly 60% of 24-month- 
olds searched the correct location in the first trial of DeLoache’s picture search task, 
however, their mean errorless retrieval rate dropped below-chance across 4 trials, with 
two thirds of all errors due to perseveration. Therefore, in first-trial conditions that are 
unbiased by reinforcement learning, 24-month-olds are capable of using pictures as a 
symbolic source of information about current reality. This conclusion was 
corroborated by another experiment that cleverly mimicked first-trial conditions in 
each of the 4 trials: each retrieval trial involved a different toy and took place in a 
different room, with each room containing a unique set of hiding locations arranged in 
a unique spatial configuration. Under these conditions, 24-month-olds’ errorless 
retrieval rate across four trials significantly exceeded chance. As the setting was 
completely different in each trial, perseveration errors caused by proactive- 
interference from prior representations were ruled out, and children presumably 
approached each trial as if it was a novel problem that required the computation of a
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novel solution (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2000). Thus, TD children aged just 24-months 
can contextualise symbolic information communicated by photographs, however, this 
ability is fragile and error-prone.
1.1.3 Word-referent mapping in typically developing children
The finding that children are relatively inconsistent in their ability to 
contextualise pictures before 30-months has important implications for their ability to 
generalise information from pictures to depicted referents. During picture-book 
reading interactions, children are taught the names of 3-D objects via the labelling of 
their 2-D counterparts. However, in order for this learning to be successful, children 
must understand that pictures are intended to stand for real things and that verbal 
labels refer to symbolised objects rather than pictures themselves. Depending on how 
young children form relations between words, pictures and objects, learning from 
pictures may be surprisingly difficult.
According to proponents of associative learning theory, young children 
initially form one-to-one mappings between symbols and referents based on statistical 
regularities in the environment (Plunkett, 1997; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). If this 
account is correct, children must encounter a symbol in the same context as the real- 
world object it represents in order for a correct symbol-referent relation to be 
established (e.g. hearing the word “monkey” whilst looking at a real monkey). A 
consequence of this learning style might be that children form associative mappings 
between pictures and verbal labels. Obviously, this would negatively impact on 
children’s ability to learn from pictures, as they may not spontaneously generalise 
labels from depictions to real objects, or vice versa.
However, in opposition to associative learning theory, many empirical studies 
have yielded robust evidence that TD children understand the referential function of
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words by 18-months. In Baldwin’s (1991) classic study, 16- to 19-month-old infants 
were given an unfamiliar object to explore. In the ‘discrepant condition’, the 
experimenter uttered a novel label (“look, it’s a modi”) whilst staring at an occluded 
object in a bucket whilst the child’s focus was on the object they were holding. Rather 
than mapping the novel word to the object that was the focus of their attention at the 
moment of hearing (the response predicted by associative learning theory), children 
spontaneously consulted the speaker’s face for cues to their referential intentions and 
assigned the label to the object in the bucket. In a later study by Baldwin and 
colleagues (Baldwin, Markman, Bill, Desjardins, Irwin & Tidball, 1996), 15- to 20- 
month-old infants heard a novel label whilst they were exploring an unfamiliar object. 
In the ‘coupled condition’ the participants could see the orator, whose attention was 
concurrently focussed on the unfamiliar object, while in the ‘decoupled condition’ the 
speaker was stationed outside the child’s view. Subsequent comprehension questions 
revealed that infants aged 18- to 20-months only formed a word-object mapping in the 
coupled condition when the orator’s referential intentions could be unequivocally 
evaluated. Together, these important studies show that young children understand that 
words represent objects and recognise that speakers’ intentions determine referential 
relations.
Moreover, research explicitly investigating how young children relate words, 
pictures and objects confirms that children can form referential symbol-object 
mappings by 18-months. Preissler and Carey (2004) taught 18- and 24-month-olds the 
name of an unfamiliar object (a whisk) depicted in a black-and-white line drawing. At 
test, children were asked to select the referent of the newly-leamed word from an 
array consisting of the relatively familiar whisk-picture and a previously unseen, 
perceptually similar, real whisk. Given this choice, an associative word learning
16
strategy would direct children to select the whisk-picture, as this was the primary 
stimulus mapped to the word. However, the children in this study never selected the 
picture to be the sole referent of the label. Instead, both age groups consistently 
selected either the real whisk alone, or both the whisk-picture and the real whisk 
together. As explanations based on object-preference and within-category novelty 
biases were ruled out by systematic controls, this pattern of responding provides 
compelling evidence that, by approximately 18-months, children form referential 
relations between words, pictures and objects. More specifically, it is clear that young 
children spontaneously map labels onto symbolised referents, demonstrating their 
understanding that pictures are intentional representations, and facilitating the 
generalisation of information to real objects (also see Ganea, Allen, Butler, Carey & 
DeLoache, 2009; Ganea, Pickard & DeLoache, 2008). Overall, this study shows that 
children younger than 24-months are successful at mapping symbolic relations 
between pictures and real-life referents when circumstances are favourable (e.g. when 
picture and referent are viewed simultaneously).
Collectively, the studies reviewed in the preceding sections have shown that 
humans develop the numerous cognitive components of symbolic picture 
comprehension over the first few years of life. Within months after birth, infants are 
able to recognise familiar referents (e.g. DeLoache, Strauss & Maynard, 1979) and 
can also discriminate between real and depicted objects (DeLoache et al., 1998), 
indicating their awareness that pictures are somehow different from the things they 
represent. However, infants’ unusual behaviour towards pictures suggests that they are 
not fully aware of the nature of this difference. Between 9- and 24-months, infants 
transition from manually exploring pictures (treating them as objects of action) to 
pointing at them in a culturally normative fashion (treating them as objects of
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contemplation; DeLoache et al., 1998; Wemer & Kaplan, 1963). By 24- to 30-months, 
children understand that pictures are not always decontextualized generic 
representations, but can symbolise real objects that exist in the world and can provide 
useful information about current realities (DeLoache & Bums, 1994; Suddendorf, 
2003). Furthermore, this knowledge enables them to generalise information (e.g. 
verbal labels) from pictures to their previously unseen real-life referents (Preissler & 
Carey, 2004; Ganea, et al., 2009).
1.2 The development of pictorial understanding in typically developing children
The research reviewed so far has documented the developmental trajectory 
over which TD children leam what pictures are and how they relate to referents in the 
world. These studies, however, do not tell us what causes children to become aware of 
the symbolic relationships that exist between pictures and objects, nor do they identify 
any of the forces that drive the development of pictorial understanding. Studies 
investigating the abilities and mechanisms -  social-cognitive skills and language — 
that mediate development in the pictorial domain are discussed in the following 
sections.
1.2.1 The relation between pictorial development and social-cognition
In agreement with Gombrich (1974) and Goodman (1976), Callaghan 
emphasises that pictorial communication is a cultural convention that must be learned 
from more experienced social partners (e.g. Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan, 
Rochat, MacGillivray & MacLellan, 2004). She draws a parallel between the learning 
of pictorial and linguistic symbols, stating that children must receive certain exposure 
to adults using each type of symbol in order to acquire them. Because cultures around 
the world employ different symbolic conventions, all human infants are bom with the 
capacity to rapidly develop social-cognitive skills that will allow them to adopt the
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specific symbol systems of the culture they are bom into (Callaghan et al., 2011). One 
of the most important of these skills, and particularly pertinent to this thesis, is the 
ability to read intentions. At the heart of any symbol system is the intention to 
represent reality, hence the ability to infer this intention from others’ actions involving 
symbols is vital. Various studies have shown that infants develop a rudimentary 
ability to read intentions within the first year of life. Experiments have demonstrated 
that infants as young as 9-months understand the intentions underlying goal-directed 
actions (Woodward, 2009) and react differently to intentional versus non-intentional 
actions (Behne, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005). Another cmcial skill is 
instrumental imitation -  the reproduction of others’ intentional goal-directed actions 
towards objects (Bmner, 1971; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Rochat & Callaghan,
2005; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). Through instrumental imitation, infants 
acquire symbolic behaviours that communicate meaning to others (Tomasello, 1999). 
Although the ability to imitate is almost certainly innate (see Meltzoff & Moore,
1989), infants can infer the intentions underlying goal-directed behaviours between 
12- and 18-months, as shown by their preference for reproducing intended (rather than 
accidental) actions on objects (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Callaghan et al., 2011; 
Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998; Johnson, Booth & O’Heam, 2001; Meltzoff, 
1995).
Infants entering the world of symbols must also understand that other people 
perceive things, and that their attention can be directed to external entities. By 12- 
months, infants who see an adult gazing at something behind a barrier will crawl to 
get a better view of the hidden location, thus indicating their awareness of the adult’s 
perception (Moll & Tomasello, 2004). Also at 12-months, infants begin to direct the 
attention of others by pointing to features of their environment using their index finger
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(Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni & Volterra 1979; Butterworth, 2003;
Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998; Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Murphy & Messer, 
1977). According to Tomasello and colleagues, infant pointing is driven by the 
intention to influence the mental states of others, making it the earliest mode of 
referential communication (Tomasello, Carpenter & Lizskowski, 2007). Collectively, 
the studies cited above confirm that the major social-cognitive skills required to 
become symbol-minded are in place by 1 to 1.5 years of age.
According to Rochat and Callaghan (2005; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008), 
pictorial development is initiated by a “basic affiliative need” -  an instinct that drives 
human beings to communicate and maintain social proximity with one another. In the 
absence of language, the primary means through which young infants relate to others 
is imitation. Infants living in modem societies are immersed in a world of pictures, 
and it is not long before they spontaneously reproduce the referential actions that they 
observe adults directing towards pictures. In a study by Callaghan and colleagues 
(2004), infants aged 6- to 18-months were presented with toys and colour photographs 
depicting those toys, and an experimenter demonstrated one of two behavioural 
stances towards each item. One behavioural stance conveyed a contemplative attitude 
(e.g. the experimenter looked and pointed at the item while shifting gaze between the 
participant and the item), while the other behavioural stance highlighted the physical 
interactive properties of the item (e.g. the experimenter explored the item with their 
hands). After these demonstrations, the infants performed their own actions on the test 
objects, which were coded as referential (e.g. looking at the item) or manipulative 
(e.g. handing the item). The results showed that, by 12-months, infants were more 
likely to adopt a contemplative stance and spend longer looking at the picture after a 
referential demonstration, and they were more likely to manually explore the picture
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following a manipulative demonstration. By contrast, infants always manually 
explored the 3-D toys irrespective of which behaviour the experimenter demonstrated 
towards them. Callaghan et al’s (2004) finding that young infants reliably model adult 
behaviour towards pictures, regardless of its appropriateness, suggests that the 
“referential stance” evidenced by 19-month-olds (see DeLoache et al., 1998) is 
socially constructed.
In developing a mature understanding of pictures, children must recognise the 
communicative intentions that underlie their creation and comprehension (Callaghan, 
2004; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). Pictorial symbols are 
inherently collaborative -  they demand the bidirectional coordination of two implicit 
roles, artist and viewer, and the success of a given picture is contingent on how 
accurately and comprehensively the artist’s communicative intentions can be inferred 
by the viewer. When an artist creates a picture, their goal is not simply to represent an 
object (e.g. a cat), but also to ensure that viewers who are disparate in time and space 
derive their intended meaning from that representation (e.g. they interpret it as a cat, 
rather than a dog). Thus, the artist holds the recipient in mind while creating the 
picture, and strategically positions markings on the paper or canvas in a configuration 
that they feel is most likely to elicit their intended mental representation in a viewer. 
Likewise, it is not merely the viewer’s goal to derive referential meaning from a 
picture, but to interpret that picture in a way that reflects the artist’s intended meaning. 
Because, “the correct interpretation of any communication is what the communicator 
intends to communicate” (Ittelson, 1996, p. 183), the viewer holds the artist in mind 
when comprehending a picture, and endeavours to extract the meaning that was 
intended for them. Therefore, in order to become a proficient picture-user, children
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must infer and simulate the communicative intentions that underlie the roles of both 
artist and viewer.
There are two branches of evidence that suggest TD children learn how to 
comprehend pictures by inferring representational intent from more experienced 
symbol-users (Callaghan et al., 2011; Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan &
Rochat, 2008; Callaghan, Rochat & Corbit, 2012). The first branch demonstrates that 
young children’s symbolic understanding of pictures can be improved by increasing 
their exposure to referential actions involving pictures. At the onset of Callaghan and 
Rankin’s (2002) longitudinal study, none of the 28-month-old participants could 
complete a search task using realistic pictures, nor had they shown any evidence of 
representational drawing. Half of the children were assigned to a treatment group that 
received weekly training sessions that were intended to facilitate picture 
comprehension and production over a 4-month period, while the remaining children 
received “placebo” training sessions over the same time frame. Training sessions for 
the treatment group involved the experimenter drawing objects selected by the 
participant, and highlighting the picture-referent correspondences. By contrast, 
children in the control group selected objects and watched the experimenter position 
them in a line (i.e. they did not observe drawing). Children’s picture comprehension 
and production abilities were assessed at monthly intervals. The authors reported that 
the treatment group experienced a substantial improvement in their picture 
comprehension and production after 2 and 3 months’ training respectively, while the 
skills of the control group did not develop. Overall, these findings indicate that infants 
spontaneously deduce the knowledge and rules that underlie pictorial representation 
from the behaviour of others, and that development in this domain can be accelerated
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by providing infants with regular opportunities to infer the referential intentions of 
symbolically-experienced adults (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002).
The second branch of evidence consists of cross-cultural studies reporting that 
rate of pictorial development is mediated by frequency of exposure and social 
scaffolding opportunities (Callaghan et al., 2011; Callaghan et al., 2012). In one study, 
Callaghan and colleagues (2011) assessed symbolic understanding of pictures in 2- to 
4-year-olds living in Canada, India and Peru. Mothers reported that their infants began 
to show an interest in pictures at the same time across cultures (approximately 10- 
months), however, their exposure to pictures varied significantly. While 100% of 
Canadian children were provided with rich pictorial environments filled with picture 
books, child-directed symbols and family photographs, most Peruvian and Indian 
children only had access to one picture (usually a wall poster or a calendar) which 
they rarely viewed. Children’s pictorial understanding was assessed via a picture- 
object matching task that tested comprehension and a production task that involved 
drawing unfamiliar objects using lines and circles. The results of the comprehension 
task revealed that the Canadian children had superior picture-referent mapping ability 
and achieved an above-chance performance rate much earlier (at approx. 2.5-years) 
than the Peruvian and Indian children who scored above-chance at 4-years or later. 
Furthermore, the results of the production task showed that Canadian children made 
representational drawings at a younger age and with greater frequency than children 
from the other cultures; at least 2 thirds of the drawings produced by Canadian 4-year- 
olds were coded as representational, while Indian and Peruvian children achieved this 
performance level at 5- and 5.5-years respectively.
In addition to investigating the effect of culture on children’s pictorial 
development, Callaghan et al (2011) also examined the cross-cultural emergence of
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various social-cognitive abilities that precede symbolic understanding. Across a series 
of experiments, the prevailing finding was that children in Canada, Peru and India all 
acquire skills relating to intention reading, imitation, gaze following, communicative 
pointing and joint attention at approximately the same ages. Thus, the differences in 
pictorial understanding displayed by these three cultural groups cannot be attributed to 
differences in their social-cognitive skills. Instead, these findings suggest that pictorial 
development is dependent on a child’s engagement in the picture symbol system. That 
is, children who frequently engage in picture-based interactions with symbolically- 
experienced adults acquire competence with pictures significantly earlier than children 
who have little exposure to pictures. The conclusions drawn by Callaghan and 
colleagues (2011) have since been corroborated by another recent study in which 
children from Canada, India and Peru were assessed on two standard false-belief tasks 
and an experimental false-belief task that assessed children’s symbolic understanding 
of pictures (Callaghan et al., 2012). While children from all cultural settings passed 
the standard false-belief tasks at similar ages (between 4.1- and 4.9-years), the 
Canadian children passed the pictorial false-belief task at least a year earlier (at 4.1- 
years) than children in India (5.2-years) or Peru (5.7-years).
Overall, the studies reviewed in this section suggest that children develop an 
understanding of pictures through social exchanges with symbol-minded others. An 
infant who continually observes adults performing referential actions towards pictures 
will spontaneously reproduce those actions in future social exchanges, and will 
naturally infer the shared communicative intentions that underlie those actions. Over 
time, as an infant’s experience with pictures grows, they come to develop an 
increasingly sophisticated theory of what pictures are, what they are used for, and 
eventually achieve the ability to communicate via their own pictorial symbols.
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However, children bom into cultures that do not promote early pictorial understanding 
are delayed in their comprehension and production of pictures despite the fact that the 
foundational social-cognitive skills emerge at virtually the same ages across cultures.
1.2.2 The relation between pictorial development and language
In most cultures, words are the primary symbols used to communicate in 
routine social interactions. Infants are immersed in spoken language from the moment 
they are bom, and caregivers prioritise facilitating infants’ understanding and 
acquisition of linguistic representations over all other symbol systems (Adamson, 
1995). As infants’ understanding of language is scaffolded earlier and more 
extensively than their understanding of pictures, it follows that development should be 
more rapid in the former domain. However, Callaghan argues that these domains are 
fundamentally related, and that symbolic understanding of language is an important 
precursor to understanding picture-referent relations (Callaghan, 1999, 2000, 2008; 
Callaghan & Rankin, 2002).
To date, two studies have directly investigated how linguistic and pictorial 
development inter-relate. The first, Callaghan and Rankin (2002; see page 21 for 
further details), tested children’s comprehension and production abilities in three 
different symbolic domains -  language, play and pictures -  at monthly intervals 
between 28-36 months, and once more at 42 months. To identify whether language 
provides a scaffolding base for other symbol systems, the authors employed variants 
of each measure that either enabled or prevented linguistic support. The results 
revealed significant positive correlations between comprehension and production 
measures across all three domains. However, language comprehension and production 
emerged before unsupported symbolic play, unscaffolded picture comprehension and 
first representational drawings. Based on these results, Callaghan and Rankin
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concluded that children’s performance in symbolic play and picture tasks is supported 
by their already-established linguistic symbol system, and that positive correlations 
between these symbolic domains are caused by children’s employment of language 
across tasks.
The second study, Kirkham, Stewart and Kidd (2012), measured TD children’s 
abilities in the domains of symbolic play, language, picture production and nonverbal 
intelligence at 36-48 months, and then again 12 months later. At time 1, picture 
production was positively correlated with symbolic play and overall language ability, 
and predictive relationships were found between most domains. However, the results 
from the second test session revealed that only language ability at time 1 significantly 
predicted children’s ability to produce representational pictures and sophistication of 
symbolic play at time 2. Thus, the significant relationships between symbolic domains 
at time 1 suggest that these systems develop concurrently and equivalently during the 
4th year of life. However, the results from time 2 suggest that symbolic domains do 
not develop in parallel beyond the 4th year. The finding that language predicted, but 
was not predicted by, picture production and symbolic play suggests that linguistic 
symbols are mastered earlier in development and henceforth serve as a scaffolding 
base for other symbolic domains. Overall, these findings indicate that language is a 
privileged symbol system that, once mastered, mediates children’s understanding and 
development in the pictorial domain (Callaghan, 2000, 2008; Carpenter, Nagell & 
Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, 1999, 2003).
So, how might a child’s understanding of linguistic symbols bolster their 
picture comprehension? One possibility is that adult-directed picture book reading 
interactions effectively teach young children to decode pictures using language 
(Callaghan & Rankin, 2002). The majority of pictures in books targeted at young
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infants are decontextualized and do not relate to specific elements of reality (e.g. they 
represent generic category prototypes or depict pure fantasy; DeLoache & Bums, 
1994). Thus, when viewing picture books with infants, adults very rarely highlight the 
symbolic function of visual representations by pointing out how they relate to 3-D 
referents in the world. Rather, adults tend to focus on labelling each picture, and often 
encourage infants to label them as well. Through labelling, the adult conveys the 
meaning of the novel symbol (the picture) using a symbol that the infant is already 
familiar with (the linguistic representation). As an infant’s experience with picture 
books grows, they become increasingly adept at naming pictorial symbols without 
actually developing a conceptual understanding of how they relate to objects in the 
world (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002). However, by labelling a picture, the child 
essentially replaces the graphic symbol with a linguistic symbol that is much easier to 
derive referential meaning from.
Callaghan argues that children’s early understanding of pictures is facilitated 
by the ability to mentally substitute them for linguistic representations (Callaghan, 
1999, 2000; Callaghan & Rankin, 2002). Furthermore, she believes that linguistic 
scaffolding of this nature can bolster children’s performance in experimental picture 
tasks. In many investigations of pictorial understanding, infants are either presented 
with pictures that depict familiar entities that they already have labels for (e.g. 
DeLoache & Bums, 1994), or they are provided with verbal labels for unfamiliar 
pictures (e.g. Preissler & Carey, 2004). Consequently, it is possible for children in 
these paradigms to utilise their more advanced language skills to decode the meaning 
of the relatively enigmatic pictorial symbols. For example, if a child in DeLoache’s 
search task is shown a photograph of a chair, the child’s recognition of the referent 
object may trigger the retrieval of the associated linguistic representation, ‘chair’,
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which can be held in mind while searching the room. The child might then recognise 
the referent of the memorised word (i.e. the real chair) and make an errorless retrieval, 
without being explicitly aware that the picture was intended to represent that location 
in the room. Thus, it may be that children’s symbolic responses to pictures are 
scaffolded by their linguistic system until they develop a genuine understanding of 
picture-referent representational relations (Callaghan, 1999, 2000, 2008; Callaghan & 
Rankin, 2002).
In order to identify when children can decode symbolic picture-referent 
relations without the support of language, Callaghan (2000) assessed 2.5- and 3-year- 
olds in conditions that inhibited linguistic scaffolding. The general paradigm involved 
children viewing a realistic black-and-white line drawing and then selecting the 
depicted referent from a pair of choice objects. In control trials, the choice objects 
were members of the same basic level category and shared the same verbal label (e.g. 
two different breeds of dog), while in standard trials, the choice objects belonged to 
different categories and had distinct verbal labels (e.g. a cat and a dog). Furthermore, 
half the choice objects in each type of trial were familiar (children had access to the 
verbal labels) and half were unfamiliar (children did not know the associated verbal 
labels). Thus, linguistic scaffolding was only possible in trials involving familiar 
objects with different verbal labels (standard-familiar), and impossible in trials 
involving unfamiliar objects (standard-unfamiliar, control-unfamiliar) or familiar 
objects that had the same verbal label (control-familiar). The results showed that 2.5- 
year-olds performed at chance in the control trials, and were most successful and 
significantly above-chance in the standard trials involving familiar objects. By 
comparison, the 3-year-olds perfonned above chance in both trial types, but were 
relatively more successful in standard trials and trials involving familiar objects.
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These findings suggest that 2.5-year-olds’ symbolic understanding of pictures is 
mediated by language, and demonstrate that their ability to decode picture-referent 
relations deteriorates when linguistic scaffolding is unavailable. Contrastingly, the 
finding that 3-year-olds are successful even when verbal labels are unknown or 
identical suggests that they possess a deeper understanding of how pictures relate to 
objects.
It is also possible that TD children’s understanding that pictures represent 
categories is related to their early word learning. TD children begin learning word- 
referent relations at approximately 12-months (Bloom, 2002), and the majority of the 
earliest-acquired words refer to object categories that are well-organised by shape 
(Samuelson & Smith, 1999). Smith and colleagues state that the process of learning 
object names selectively tunes children’s attention to shape, which in turn accelerates 
their acquisition of novel object names (Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkooff-Stowe & 
Samuelson, 2002). Attentional tuning to shape starts with the learning of individual 
noun-referent relations (e.g. mapping “car” to a specific car) and, as children map a 
particular noun to additional category members, they quickly realise that “cars” share 
the same global shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999). This realisation evokes first-order 
generalisations about the structures of known object categories (e.g. that “cars” are 
car-shaped), enabling the child to recognise and label new members of familiar object 
categories. Subsequently, children infer the general rule that object categories are all 
organised by shape (e.g. “X’s are X-shaped”), eliciting the second-order 
generalisation that shape is the criterial perceptual detenninant when mapping and 
extending novel word-referent relations (commonly known as a “shape bias”).
The emergence of the shape bias is underpinned by categorisation -  the 
cognitive process that organises known information into conceptual groups and
enables the evaluation of new information based on existing concepts (Klinger & 
Dawson, 2001). At the core of categorisation is the ability to focus on objects’ 
category-defining characteristics (i.e. shape), while ignoring details that are not 
intrinsic to an object’s identity (e.g. colour or size). Typically developing infants 
organise object categories through the abstraction of prototypes (e.g. Younger, 1990). 
A prototype is a minimalist psychological representation of an object’s defining shape, 
which can be considered the “central tendency” of a particular category (Posner & 
Keele, 1970). It is believed that abstract mental representations of category-defining 
shapes direct children’s generalisation of object names (Son, Smith & Goldstone, 
2006). That is, if the global shape of a newly encountered object (e.g. a Persian cat) is 
sufficiently similar to a stored prototype (e.g. the cat basic level category), the child 
may generalise the label for that prototype (e.g. “cat”) to the novel object. By 24- 
months, TD children can correctly generalise a newly-leamed label to similarly- 
shaped category members after hearing a single word-referent pairing (Markman, 
1989). Therefore, early in development, young TD children spontaneously recognise 
that shape is the correct basis for generalising noun-referent relations; they do not 
need to experience a myriad of Xs in order to establish the sorts of things that are Xs. 
Importantly, categorisation plays a vital role in picture comprehension. When a child 
views a picture, they must compare the depicted referent against their existing 
prototypes in order to decide what object is represented. Alternatively, if a picture is 
of an unfamiliar object, viewers can generate a prototype directly from the depicted 
image, enabling generalisation to other pictures and real world referents. Importantly, 
by 18-24 months, TD children almost always extend newly-leamed words from 
pictures to depicted objects, thus demonstrating their knowledge of symbolic word- 
picture-object relations (Preissler & Carey, 2004).
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1.3 Pictures and autism
The preceding sections have discussed evidence that typical pictorial 
development is mediated by children’s social-cognitive engagement with others and 
their symbolic understanding of language. In this section, I speculate how specific 
deficits in social-cognition, language and visual processing may impact on pictorial 
development in autism.
Autism is a pervasive neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by profound 
social-cognitive and linguistic impairments, in addition to significant atypical 
behaviours (Baron-Cohen, 1995; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; 
Frith, 2003; Kanner, 1943; Volkmar et al., 2000). A striking and defining feature of 
autism is that sufferers display an alarming lack of motivation to engage in dyadic or 
triadic social interactions with family members or peers. This primary deficit in social 
motivation is thought to originate from neurobiological abnormalities in the 
orbitoffontal-striatum-amygdala circuit (Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006), and can be 
observed virtually from birth. In the first year of life, infants subsequently diagnosed 
with ASD show infrequent orienting to their own name and other social stimuli, 
diminished eye contact, and social aloofness (Klin, 199; Nadig, Ozonoff, Young, 
Rozga, Sigman & Rogers, 2007; Osterling., Dawson & Munson, 2002; Ozonoff et al., 
2010; Presmanes, Walden, Stone & Yoder, 2007; Riby & Hancock, 2008; 
Zwaigenbaum, Bryson, Rogers, Roberts, Brian & Szatmari, 2005). They are 
significantly less likely to follow gaze (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi &
Brown, 1998), suggesting a failure to recognise that others’ selectively attend. Unlike 
TD children, those with ASD rarely attempt to communicate or establish joint 
attention with others through declarative pointing (Mitchell, Brian, Zwaigenbaum, 
Roberts, Szatmari, Smith & Bryson, 2006; Swinkels, Dietz, van Daalen, Kerkhof, van
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Engeland & Buitelaar, 2006). The absence of early referential gestures indicates 
impaired awareness that others’ attention can be directed to aspects of one’s 
environment -  arguably the core principle underlying pictorial representation. Also, 
perhaps most consequential to pictorial development, children with ASD show 
impaired imitation (D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Gopnik, Capps & Meltzoff, 2001; 
Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse & Wehner, 2003) and intention reading (Baron-Cohen, 
1989, 1995; Charman, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird & Drew, 1997; Griffin, 
2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996). Hence, children with ASD may 
not develop a referential stance towards pictures by replicating the intentional actions 
of other picture-users, nor develop the ability to infer the symbolic-representational 
function of pictures from others’ social-communicative behaviours.
Another hallmark of autistic development is severely impaired language 
acquisition and usage (Lord, Risi & Pickles, 2004). Around 80% of children with 
ASD aged 5-years and younger who enter special education are unable to functionally 
communicate (Bondy & Frost, 1994), and approximately 30% are nonverbal at 9- 
years (Anderson et al., 2007). Impaired language generally inhibits the ability of 
children with ASD to socially interact, and specifically limits their acquisition of 
conversational experience -  both of which facilitate, and are probably intrinsic to, the 
development of a functional Theory of Mind (i.e. the ability to recognise and 
understand that other people have their desires, intentions and beliefs; Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Perner, Baker & Hutton, 1994). Without language, many children with ASD are 
unable to express their needs and desires, unable to reject, and are unable to engage in 
routine social interactions. Understandably, these impairments elicit intolerable 
frustration, which can cause children to display self-injurious behaviours or strike out 
aggressively at others. Furthermore, their inability to understand the communications
32
of others makes life bewildering and chaotic, inducing the development of complex 
and lengthy rituals as a means of establishing a structured routine (Bondy & Frost, 
2002). In recognition of these grave difficulties, clinicians and special educators have 
developed numerous augmentative and alternative communication systems (AACs) 
that enable low-functioning children with ASD to communicate without expressive 
verbal language. There is a huge market of ACCs available today, including high-tech 
strategies (e.g. Voice Output Communication Aids) and low-tech strategies (e.g. sign- 
language and picture-exchange systems), however, the success of a particular ACC is 
largely dependent on the characteristics of the recipient and can vary dramatically 
between children.
In addition to their expressive language difficulties, previous research suggests 
that receptive word learning is atypical in ASD. Contemporary theories of word 
learning emphasise the importance of social cues (e.g. gaze, gesture, posture, facial 
expression) in the process of mapping novel word-referent relations (Baldwin & 
Moses, 2001; Bloom; 2000; Tomasello, 2003), and are supported by evidence that 
social-cognitive skills, such as joint attention, are strong predictors of typical language 
development (Morales, Mundy, Delgado, Yale, Neal & Schwartz, 2000; Watt, 
Wetherby & Shumway, 2006). However, it is well-documented that children with 
ASD (particularly low-functioning individuals) fail to use social information to guide 
their interpretation of language (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997; Carpenter, 
Pennington & Rogers, 2002; Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006; McDuffie, Yoder & 
Stone, 2006; Preissler & Carey, 2005). For example, using Baldwin’s (1991) 
paradigm (see page 15), Baron-Cohen, Baldwin and Crowson (1997) discovered that 
children with ASD mapped novel labels onto objects that were the focus of their 
attention, rather than the speaker’s intended referents. By contrast, ability-matched TD
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and intellectually disabled children utilised the experimenter’s direction of gaze as a 
cue to mapping. In a more recent study, Gliga et al (2012) found that linguistically 
impaired children with ASD could follow gaze to the correct referents of words, but 
then failed to map word-referent relations. Together, these studies suggest that word 
learning in children with ASD is not directed by cues to a speaker’s referential intent. 
Rather, children with ASD tend to learn the meaning of words via an associative 
mechanism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Carpenter et al., 2002; Frith & Happe, 1994; 
Kanner, 1946; McDuffie et al., 2006; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005).
As briefly discussed on page 14, an associative mapping is a relation that can 
be formed between any two arbitrary stimuli, and is governed by nothing more than 
statistical regularities in the environment (e.g. frequency and temporal contiguity; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). When acquiring language, an associative learning style is 
highly maladaptive as every word (or picture) would have to be initially encountered 
in the same context as its referent (Plunkett, 1997). In reality, words are generally 
spoken without their referents in line-of-sight, and associative learning in ASD can 
lead to incorrect mappings between words and objects in the listener’s immediate 
environment (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Kanner, 1946). By contrast, typically 
developing children rarely make such errors, indicating a more adaptive learning style 
based on thei understanding of representation (Baldwin, 1991; Bloom; 2000; Harris, 
Jones & Grant, 1983). Furthermore, the one-to-one nature of associative mappings 
will often prevent the generalisation of labels -  a problem frequently observed in ASD 
(e.g. Preissler, 2008). In relation to pictorial development, impairments in expressive 
communication coupled with associative word learning would likely prevent children 
with ASD from utilising linguistic symbols as a scaffolding platform. Moreover, the 
failure to understand the symbolic nature of word-referent relations may prevent
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children with ASD from using language to distance themselves from the concrete 
properties of pictures, a process that facilitates dual representation in TD children 
(Homer & Nelson, 2005).
Comprehension of word-picture-object relations in children with ASD may 
also be influenced by their atypical visual processing. When viewing objects, children 
with ASD demonstrate a preference for processing localised perceptual details at the 
expense of deriving global meaning (Frith, 2003; Happe, 1999; Happe & Frith, 2006; 
Mottron, Burack, Iarocci, Belleville & Ennis, 2003; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, 
Hubert & Burack, 2006), and there is substantial evidence that individuals with autism 
are unable to generate prototypes of object categories (e.g. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; 
Plaisted, 2000). For example, Klinger and Dawson (2001) examined the ability of 
high-functioning children with ASD to abstract prototypes of unfamiliar animal-like 
categories. In some trials, category membership was defined by a rule (e.g. “all mips 
have long feet”), and in other trials children had to abstract a prototype representation 
in order to successfully learn the concept. Children with ASD were just as able to 
perform rule-based categorisations as controls, but they failed to learn categories via 
prototype formation. The failure of children with ASD to selectively attend to global 
shape when learning object names may subsequently impact on their ability to 
categorise pictures via the abstraction of shape-based prototypes. When processing 
pictures, it may be that category defining details (e.g. global shape) and category 
irrelevant details (e.g. size, colour, texture) are not psychologically separable. 
Consequently, some children with ASD may be unable to weight these perceptual 
details when deciding what a picture represents or whether to extend a known label on 
the basis of category membership.
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At present, very few studies have specifically investigated symbolic 
understanding of pictures in children with ASD (see Allen, 2009; Preissler, 2008; 
Preissler & Carey 2005). This gap in the autism literature is rather surprising when we 
consider the importance and prevalence of picture-based communication 
interventions. Since its conception in 1985, Bondy and Frost’s Picture Exchange 
Communication System (PECS) has emerged as the most popular and widespread 
AAC for nonverbal children with ASD in educational and clinical settings. PECS is a 
manualised intervention protocol that is designed to develop children’s expressive 
communication abilities through the use of reinforcement, delay and generalisation 
across trainers and settings. PECS-users are taught to make requests by giving a 
picture to a communicative partner in exchange for the depicted item and are 
encouraged to initiate interactions with others using their personal picture library. In 
addition, trainees learn to associate pictures with various daily activities, allowing 
them to better understand the structure of their day and facilitating the establishment 
of adaptive behavioural routines.
PECS training is delivered through six formulaic phases (Bondy & Frost,
1994, 2002). In Phase One: Initiating Communication, children are taught to initiate a 
request for one highly desired item. The child learns how to pick up a picture of the 
desired reinforcer and release the picture into the hand of a communicative partner, 
who then provides and names the item. A second trainer, sitting behind the child, 
provides physical assistance which is gradually faded out. In Phase Two: Expanding 
the Use of Pictures, a communication book (a ring binder with Velcro strips where 
pictures are stored and easily removed) is introduced and the distance between the 
child and the communicative partner is increased. The child is taught to locate their 
communication book, open it, retrieve a picture of a desired object and travel to the
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communicative partner to request the object. Spontaneity and persistence are 
developed by placing pictures in different places within the book, and generalisation is 
encouraged by conducting the picture exchange in different settings and with different 
communicative partners. In Phase Three: Picture Discrimination, the child is taught to 
discriminate between two pictures. Initially, the pictures will be of one highly desired 
item and one less desired or neutral item, but eventually comparisons are made 
between pictures of two equally reinforcing items. Correspondence checks are 
introduced to ensure that the child is requesting the preferred item. In Phase Four: 
Sentence Structure, the child learns to construct a simple sentence and make a request 
using a ‘sentence strip’. An “I want” picture is placed on the sentence strip next to a 
picture of a desired item, and the entire strip is exchanged for that item. After the child 
has requested the item, the communicative partner provides the verbal model “I 
want...” and pauses before labelling the desired item. The sentence strip and the 
requested item are then handed to the child. A recent meta-analysis of the PECS 
empirical literature concluded that there was some evidence that the verbal modelling 
and delay components of Phase Four could be linked with the acquisition of spoken 
language for those children who develop speech through PECS (Flippin, Reszka & 
Watson, 2010). In Phase Five: Answering Simple Questions, the communicative 
partner asks the child “What do you want?” Initially, this verbal prompt is 
immediately followed by a gestural prompt towards the “I want” picture, however, a 
gradually increasing time delay is inserted between the two prompts. Eventually, the 
child begins to form the “I want” picture sentence before their communicative partner 
makes a gestural prompt. In Phase Six: Teaching Commenting, children learn to 
comment in response to questions such as “What do you see?” and “What do you
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have?” by constructing sentences with new starter pictures (e.g. “I see a...” and “I 
have a...”).
One of the main advantages of PECS is that it appeals to the relatively stronger 
visual-spatial processing abilities of children with autism (Mottron, Belleville & 
Menard, 1999; O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver & Baron-Cohen, 2001; Plaisted,
O’Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 1998); unlike word-referent relations which are arbitrary, 
picture-referent relations can be mapped based on perceptual resemblance. In addition, 
trainees do not need to master prerequisite skills, such as eye contact, progress is not 
dependent on fine motor skills, and children are highly motivated by their desired 
reinforcers. From an interventionist’s perspective, the training required to implement 
PECS is not financially expensive or overly time consuming, enabling clinicians, 
teachers and parents to apply the strategy with relative ease.
Over the last decade, studies examining the efficacy of PECS have 
demonstrated that the strategy can successfully facilitate communication in low- 
functioning children with ASD (for review, see Flippin et al., 2010). However, there is 
no evidence that PECS-users can comprehend symbolic relations between words, 
pictures and objects. To date, a single study by Preissler (2008) has addressed this 
important issue. In that study, a sample of low-functioning children with ASD, half of 
whom were PECS-users, were taught an unfamiliar word (e.g. “Whisk”) repeatedly 
paired with a simple black-and-white line drawing of an unfamiliar object (e.g. a 
whisk). At test, the children were asked to identify the referent of the newly-leamed 
word when presented with the drawing and the previously unseen depicted object. The 
results showed that children with ASD (especially PECS-users) displayed a strong 
tendency to select the picture alone, whereas TD children almost always included the 
depicted object in their response (Preissler & Carey, 2004). These findings suggest
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that low-functioning children with ASD do not understand symbolic word-picture- 
object relations, and instead map words to pictures via an associative mechanism that 
may inhibit the generalisation of labels to depicted objects. At an applied level, it may 
be that PECS capitalises on a general tendency in ASD to learn in a context-based 
manner; by repeatedly pairing a picture with an object, the child may realise that the 
two entities are connected without understanding that the picture represents the object.
From a theoretical perspective, it is possible that the deficits that characterise 
autism may cause children with ASD to derive meaning from pictorial representations 
in a manner that is qualitatively atypical. Although children with ASD may receive as 
much exposure to pictures as their TD peers, their inability to infer representational 
intentions from others’ communicative actions involving pictures may prevent them 
from inferring the symbolic nature of picture-referent relations. Moreover, because 
picture comprehension is initially scaffolded by symbolic understanding of words 
(Callaghan, 2000; Kirkham, Stewart & Kidd, 2012), severe linguistic impairments 
(Anderson et al., 2007; Lord, Risi & Pickles, 2004) may further inhibit the ability of 
children with ASD to map picture-referent relations early in development. Therefore, 
in the absence of these foundational processes, it may be that some low-functioning 
children with ASD can only relate pictures to objects in their environment by virtue of 
resemblance. In the following section, I discuss how TD children decode what 
pictures represent, and introduce the possibility that children with ASD differ in their 
understanding of what fundamentally relates a picture to its referent.
1.4 Decoding of picture-referent relation in typical development and autism: 
Intentions vs. resemblance
Once children understand that pictures are vehicles for symbolic 
communication, how do they decipher what exactly is represented in a specific
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picture? This important question directly relates to a centuries-old philosophical 
debate over what makes a picture represent its referent in the mind of a viewer. One 
school of thought captures the “common-sense” notion that picture-referent relations 
are determined entirely by resemblance -  the extent to which perceptual properties of 
an image and an object overlap (e.g. Hopkins, 1995, 1998; Hyman, 2006; Peacocke, 
1987). Thus, a picture represents a cat only if it provides viewers with the same 
category-defining perceptual information that they would derive from observing a real 
cat (Neander, 1987). This principle underlies the theory of naive realism, which posits 
that young children process pictures exclusively in terms of their resemblances to 
objects in the world, ignoring factors external to the image such as the artist’s 
intentions (Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995). Hence, to a naive realist, a 
picture that looks like a cat is “a cat”, even if the artist intended to represent a dog.
However, there are several criticisms of the pure resemblance account of 
pictorial representation. Firstly, Goodman (1976) argues that resemblance alone 
cannot explain the representational qualities of pictures. He points out that while 
resemblance is symmetrical (a picture of a red car resembles a real red car, and vice 
versa) symbolic representation is asymmetrical (a picture of a red car represents a real 
red car, whereas a real red car does not represent a picture of a red car). This criticism 
implicitly highlights the fact that pictures, unlike their referents (in the majority of 
cases), are intended to be representational. Secondly, Browne and Woolley’s (2001) 
observation that “a portrait intended to portray person X equally resembles X ’s 
identical twin, Y, yet we would not say that the picture actually represents the two 
twins equally” (p. 390) illustrates that even the interpretation of highly iconic pictures 
requires the observer to consider more than just resemblance. Thirdly, the pure 
resemblance-based account cannot adequately explain how humans are able to
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attribute and extract meaning from non-iconic pictures that do not resemble anything. 
Representational ambiguity can be the calculated result of an artist’s desire to depart 
from reality and portray a referent without the use of naturalistic visual references. 
Although uniformed viewers may find it extremely difficult to decode the abstract 
paintings of Wassily Kandinsky or Joan Miro, few would question their statuses as 
symbolic representations.
Building on the notion that a picture’s referential meaning transcends its 
perceptual features, contemporary theorists purport that the inference of 
communicative intentions underlies picture comprehension (e.g. Bloom, 1996; Bloom 
& Markson, 1998; Preissler & Bloom, 2008; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005; Taylor,
1998). According to their intentional account, a picture’s referent is whatever object 
the artist intended to depict, and resemblance merely serves as a window to those 
intentions. For example, if we see a picture that possesses the perceptual 
characteristics of a cat, the meaning we derive from that picture is based on an 
inference about the artist’s referential intentions. This inference is guided by 
resemblance -  if a drawing looks like a cat, it is highly probable that the artist 
intended to represent a cat (Bloom & Markson, 1998). However, a high level of 
iconicity (the degree to which a picture resembles its intended referent) is not 
necessary for a referential relation to exist. Thus, according to intentional theorists, it 
is perfectly acceptable to call a roughly-drawn rectangle “a cat” if we have reason to 
believe that its creator intended the image to represent a cat.
In the context of developmental psychology, one might predict that children 
start life as na'ive realists, interpreting pictures exclusively in terms of their perceptual 
features, and gradually leam the intentional basis of pictorial representation as they 
acquire experience of creating and interpreting pictures, whilst developing an
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increasingly sophisticated theory of mind. However, empirical evidence suggests that 
children derive referential meaning from artists’ intentions by 2- to 3-years of age. In 
their classic study, Bloom and Markson (1998) asked 3- and 4-year-olds to draw pairs 
of objects that closely resembled each other, such as a balloon and a lollipop. 
Following a distraction task, the experimenter asked participants to name their own 
drawings. Predictably, the pairs of pictures produced by the young children were 
virtually indistinguishable, and thus could not be accurately matched to their original 
referents based on resemblance alone. Nevertheless, the authors reported that 3- and 4- 
year-olds correctly named 76% and 87% of their drawings respectively. These 
findings show that toddlers consider their original representational intentions in 
addition to appearance when assigning meaning to their own pictures. In fact, a 
child’s protestations resulting from the experimenter calling their balloon picture “a 
lollipop” would suggest that representational intentions are a more decisive influence 
on toddlers’ picture comprehension than similarity of shape. Moreover, the referential 
identities that young toddlers assign to their graphic productions are highly consistent, 
even after delays as long as 3 months (Gross & Hayne, 1999).
Yet more remarkable is the finding that young toddlers perform mentalistic 
reasoning when interpreting ambiguous pictures created by others (Gelman &
Ebeling, 1998; Priessler & Bloom, 2008). Gelman and Ebeling (1998) showed 2- and 
3-year-olds a series of line drawings roughly shaped like familiar nameable objects 
(e.g. a kite). Half of the children were informed that the pictures had been created 
intentionally (e.g. someone painted a picture), while the other half were told that the 
pictures had been created by accident (e.g. someone spilled some paint). At test, 
children were more likely to name the ambiguous pictures according to shape (thus 
regarding them as symbolic representations) when they believed the pictures to be
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intentional, rather than accidental, creations. In another study, 2-year-olds watched an 
experimenter produce an ambiguous line drawing that looked equally like two visible 
unfamiliar objects (Priessler & Bloom, 2008). When asked to extend a novel label 
from the picture, the majority of children generalised the word to the object that the 
artist had been gazing at whilst drawing, indicating that they perceived this object to 
be the picture’s intended referent. Together, these studies suggest that, between 2- and 
3-years of age, children consider intentional information when comprehending 
pictures created by themselves and others.
While these studies indicate that young toddlers are sensitive to artists’ 
intentions when comprehending pictures, they do not directly assess the relative 
importance of intentions and resemblance. Other studies have examined this issue by 
pitting these cues in direct conflict. Browne and Woolley (2001) showed 4-year-olds, 
7-year-olds and adults a puppet show in which the protagonist announced his intention 
to draw a bear, but actually produced a picture that resembled a rabbit. Subsequently, 
84 to 100 percent of each age group named the picture according to its appearance 
(e.g. a rabbit) rather than the artist’s stated intentions (e.g. a bear). In a similar study 
by Richert and Lillard (2002), children aged 4 to 8 years comprehended drawings after 
being provided with explicit information about the knowledge of the artist. At the start 
of the procedure, children were introduced to a troll who was said to be from a distant 
land where no animals existed. The children then watched the troll create a picture 
that looked exactly like a fish, but were informed that the artist had neither seen nor 
heard of fish before. When asked whether the troll was in fact drawing “a fish”, all but 
the eldest children responded in the affirmative, thus failing to consider the mental 
state of the artist (i.e. one cannot draw a fish if one does not know what a fish is).
The results of Browne and Woolley (2001) and Richert and Lillard (2002) 
suggest that if a picture is sufficiently recognisable, resemblance rather than intent 
determines what it represents for both children and adults. However, it may be that the 
findings of these studies were biased by the conflict between children’s existing 
knowledge of pictures and the extremely unusual task demands. Through countless 
hours of joint picture-book reading interactions with adults, children in modem 
cultures leam that the appearance of a picture tends to be highly congruent with its 
intended referential meaning. That is, if a drawing looks like X, it is highly likely that 
its creator intended it to represent X. By contrast, it is extremely irregular to encounter 
a drawing that is intended to represent X, but looks uniquely like another category 
member, Y (Bloom & Markson, 1998). As pictures are deliberately created to 
communicate a specific message to viewers, it is illogical that an artist would create a 
picture of Y when they intend to direct viewers’ thoughts towards X. Yet this is the 
scenario that was presented to children in these two studies.
While it may be inconceivable that an artist would draw one thing whilst 
intending to represent something entirely different, it is culturally acceptable to assign 
meaning to pictures that do not appear to resemble anything (e.g. abstract art). 
Therefore, studying how children interpret abstract pictures may provide a more 
ecologically valid method of assessing the relative importance of resemblance and 
representational intent. To date, very few studies have examined children’s 
comprehension of abstract pictures, with Bloom and Markson (1998) being a notable 
exception. In their “Size Task”, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown pairs of differently- 
sized scribbles that had supposedly been drawn by a child with a broken arm. For each 
pair of scribbles, the experimenter explained that the artist had attempted to draw two 
objects -  one large (e.g. an elephant) and one small (e.g. a mouse). Crucially, the
44
pictures looked nothing like the named objects, and could only be matched to their 
intended referents based on relative size. When asked to describe each pair of pictures, 
the children reported that the large shape represented the large named object (e.g. an 
elephant) and the small picture represented the small named object (e.g. a mouse). The 
authors claimed that participants had reflected on the intentions of the artist, perhaps 
reasoning that it would be logical for an individual with a broken arm to represent an 
elephant and a mouse as differently-sized scribbles.
However, it is possible that children used non-intentional reasoning to 
complete the Size Task. Rather than considering how the artist may have 
distinguished their intended referents following the loss of fine motor control, 
participants may have simply noted the parallel between the relative sizes of the 
scribbles and the named objects, and assigned names to the drawings without 
considering the role of the artist or perceiving the drawings as referential symbols. If 
the intentional information provided by the experimenter did not factor in the 
children’s reasoning, they may not have believed that the scribbles were created with 
the intention of representing the named objects. If this was the case, Bloom and 
Makson (1998) may have overestimated young children’s referential understanding of 
abstract pictures and underestimated the importance of perceptual similarity to their 
comprehension of pictures drawn by others.
In summary, there is evidence that young TD children derive meaning from 
the communicative intentions underlying pictures (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman 
& Ebeling, 1998; Preissler & Bloom, 2008), however, there is counter evidence that 
resemblance is the relatively more important cue (Browne & Woolley, 2001; Richert 
& Lillard, 2002), but these findings are potentially flawed. Thus, the question of how 
TD children map pictures to objects remains open. Furthermore, there is reason to
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believe that children with ASD might weight communicative intentions and 
resemblance differently when mapping picture-referent relations. In Allen (2009), 
children with ASD watched an adult turn towards one of two named objects on a 
table, and produce a drawing that resembled both objects equally. When asked to label 
the picture, children with ASD named the object that was in the experimenter’s line of 
sight on just 25% of trials, whereas TD children made the same response on 75% of 
trials. These findings suggest that, unlike their typically developing peers, children 
with ASD do not use intentional information to decode the referents of ambiguous 
pictures drawn by others.
One possibility that is investigated in later chapters is that picture 
comprehension in children with ASD conforms to the theory of nai've realism. That is, 
due to their great difficulty understanding the intentions of others in social- 
communicative situations (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 
2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), picture comprehension in autism 
may privilege resemblance and neglect external sources of meaning that are not 
immediately perceptible (e.g. the artist’s intentions, whether the picture was created 
accidentally, expectations of the viewer). If so, to a child with autism, a picture that 
resembles a cat is “a cat”, even if the artist intended to represent a dog.
1.5 Objectives of this thesis
This thesis will explore symbolic understanding of pictures in low-functioning 
children with ASD (primarily PECS-users) and young ability-matched TD children. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have an applied focus, and examine the factors that mediate the 
ability of TD children and children with ASD to use pictures as a source of 
information about the world. More specifically, Chapter 2 investigates whether 
referential word-picture-object mapping in children with ASD is facilitated by
iconicity or verbal labelling. Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by elucidating the cues 
that direct the generalisation of labels from colour pictures in children with ASD. 
Chapter 4 addresses whether iconicity and familiarity influence the ability of children 
with ASD to contextualise pictures in a search task. Chapters 5 and 6 address the 
theoretical question of whether children with and without ASD differ in their 
understanding of what fundamentally relates a picture to its referent. In particular, 
Chapter 5 investigates whether artists’ communicative intentions or resemblance 
guide children’s mapping of word-picture and picture-object relations, and Chapter 6 
assesses whether artists’ intentions influence children’s own naming and reproduction 
of pictures.
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Chapter Two: Symbolic understanding of pictures in low-functioning children 
with autism: The effects of iconicity and naming.1
In typical development, spoken words are the primary symbols used to 
communicate in social interactions. However, the early development of children with 
ASD is characterised by severely impaired language acquisition and usage (Lord, Risi 
& Pickles, 2004), with approximately 25% of individuals remaining functionally non­
verbal (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz & Klin, 2004). These children cannot express 
their needs effectively and are often unable to comprehend the language of others. In 
recognition of these grave difficulties, Bondy and Frost (1994) developed the Picture 
Exchange Communication System (PECS) -  a manualised intervention protocol that 
enables non-verbal children with ASD to communicate using pictures instead of 
words.
Despite the popularity of PECS in educational and clinical settings, and the 
ubiquitous use of pictures as communicative supports in classroom settings, relatively 
little research has investigated how children with ASD fundamentally comprehend 
pictures. In one study, Preissler (2008) tested whether children with ASD form 
symbolic or associative relations (i.e. one-to-one mappings based on statistical 
regularities; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) between pictures, words and the objects they 
represent. Low-functioning children with ASD, half of whom were PECS-users, were 
taught a novel word (e.g. “Whisk”) repeatedly paired with a simple black-and-white 
line drawing of an unfamiliar object (e.g. a whisk). At test, the children were asked to 
identify the referent of the newly-learned word when presented with the drawing and
1 Based on Hartley, C., & Allen, M. (in press). Symbolic understanding o f pictures in children with 
autism: The effects o f iconicity and naming. Journal o f  Autism and Developmental Disorders. 
doi:l 0.1007/sl 0803-013-2007-4.
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the previously unseen depicted object. In this paradigm, TD children aged 18-24 
months almost always extended the label to the depicted object (Preissler & Carey, 
2004), demonstrating their knowledge that pictures and words are symbolic. By 
contrast, children with ASD (especially PECS-users) displayed a strong tendency to 
select the picture alone, suggesting that they learn word-picture relations instead via 
an associative mechanism that may prevent the extension of labels to depicted objects.
Children with ASD may fail to treat pictures as symbols for several reasons. In 
TD children, this achievement has been linked to language development (Callaghan, 
2000) and the ability to understand referential intentions (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; 
DeLoache, 2002; DeLoache & Bums, 1994; Salsa & de Mendoza, 2007). Thus, it 
could be that impairments in both of these areas (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Bloom, 2000; 
DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Griffin, 2002) prevent children 
with ASD from understanding that pictures are symbolic. However, it is also possible 
that the associative responding of children with ASD in Preissler (2008) was 
exacerbated by the iconicity of the pictorial stimuli. While the black-and-white line 
drawings broadly resembled their referents, the strength of the perceptual relationship 
could be increased markedly. The present study will therefore investigate whether 
iconicity mediates symbolic understanding of pictures in children with ASD.
Iconicity is defined as the perceptual resemblance between a symbol and its 
referent, with symbols that are highly iconic (e.g. colour photographs) labelled as 
transparent, symbols that are moderately iconic (e.g. black and white line drawings) 
labelled as translucent and symbols with little or no resemblance to their referent (e.g. 
written words) labelled as opaque (Fuller, 1997). According to DeLoache (1995), 
“iconicity generally facilitates symbol use” (p. I l l ) :  higher levels of perceptual 
similarity between picture and referent make the symbolic relationship more salient,
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increasing the likelihood that the viewer will map the correspondence between the two 
and draw an inference from one to the other. This notion is supported by evidence 
from TD children (Callaghan, 2000; Ganea et al., 2008; Simcock & DeLoache, 2006) 
and individuals with intellectual disabilities (Brady & McLean, 1998; Mirenda & 
Locke, 1989; Sevcik & Romski, 1986). For example, the degree that young TD 
children successfully imitate a sequence of actions following a picture-book reading 
interaction varies as a function of iconicity (Simcock & DeLoache, 2006) and TD 15- 
18-month-olds are more likely to generalise a label to an object depicted in a highly 
iconic photograph rather than a moderately iconic cartoon (Ganea et al., 2008).
Given that relationships between highly iconic pictures and their referents are 
easier to recognise, low-functioning children with ASD may be more likely to view 
such pictures as symbols. This would have important implications for PECS and other 
picture-based educational supports. There are many symbol sets designed for use with 
PECS that provide graphic representations of vocabulary (e.g. Blissymbols, Picsyms, 
Picture Communication Symbols), but the pictures within and between these sets vary 
considerably along the continuum of iconicity (Bloomberg, Karlan & Lloyd, 1990; 
Mirenda & Locke, 1989). If the ability of children with ASD to perceive pictures as 
symbols benefits from greater iconicity, educators and therapists would have a data- 
grounded rationale for selecting highly iconic symbols for picture-based treatments.
Although greater iconicity may increase the likelihood that children with ASD 
recognise a picture-referent relation, we cannot assume that they will interpret that 
relation in the same manner as TD children. An important aspect of pictures is that the 
same depiction can be taken to represent a unique exemplar (e.g. my red chair) or an 
object category (e.g. chairs in general). Accordingly, verbal labels (e.g. “chair”) can 
be extended to objects that share the same category-defining shape (e.g. blue chairs)
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as a picture’s specific referent. This comes naturally to TD children, who 
spontaneously generalise labels to novel objects based on resemblances to familiar 
things (e.g. generalising the word “ball” to other new round objects; Smith et al., 
2002), and similarity of shape is the most important aesthetic feature when forming 
novel noun-referent relations (Smith, 2000). This ‘shape bias’ facilitates rapid word 
learning and underlies a link between semantic and conceptual development by 
indicating category membership (Gelman, 2003; Rosch, 1973; Samuelson & Smith, 
1999). By contrast, impairments in category and prototype formation prevent children 
with ASD from utilising sameness of shape as a basis for extending nouns to novel 
objects (Tek, Jaffery, Fein & Naigles, 2008). Thus, even if a child with ASD was to 
recognise that a colour photograph (e.g. of a yellow ball) was symbolic, he may not 
generalise the referent’s label to other objects that belong to the same category (e.g. a 
green ball). Indeed, the fact that a colour photograph shares so many perceptual 
features with its referent may elicit the belief that it only represents the specific 
depicted exemplar.
The present study examined whether picture comprehension in low- 
functioning children with ASD is influenced by iconicity and naming. Experiment 1 
investigated whether iconicity mediates how children with ASD form relations 
between words, pictures and objects. Following the paradigm of Preissler (2008), 
children were taught a novel word (e.g. “zepper”) repeatedly paired with a target 
picture of an unfamiliar object. They were then asked to identify the referent of the 
newly-1 earned word when presented with the target picture paired with the depicted 
object and then a novel category member (a differently-coloured version of the target 
object). Unlike Preissler (2008), who exclusively used black-and-white line drawings,
I manipulated the strength of the resemblance between picture and referent by varying
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the iconicity of target pictures. Based on her study, it was predicted that children with 
ASD would not view less-iconic pictures (i.e. black-and-white line drawings) as 
symbols, and therefore would not extend labels to their depicted referents. As greater 
iconicity facilitates recognition of picture-referent relations in TD children 
(DeLoache, 1995), I predicted that children with ASD may extend labels to objects 
depicted in highly iconic colour photographs. It was also expected that, unlike TD 
children who privilege sameness of shape when extending labels to novel objects, 
children with ASD would not generalise labels to differently coloured versions of 
objects depicted in colour photographs due to impairments in category formation (Tek 
et al., 2008). Experiment 2 tests whether verbal labels influence how children with 
ASD view pictures. When young TD children know the name of a picture, they 
usually view it from a symbolic perspective and categorise it with its referent rather 
than with another picture (Callaghan, 2000; Preissler & Bloom, 2007). However, 
when the name of a picture is unknown or not provided, they are more likely to view it 
from a non-symbolic perspective and categorise it with another picture rather than its 
referent. Thus, I examined whether knowledge of word-picture relations similarly 
guides how children with ASD perceive pictures. Overall, the findings of these studies 
will shed light on how children with ASD understand pictures by identifying whether 
increased iconicity facilitates the extension of labels from pictures to their referents 




Participants were 20 low-functioning children with ASD (all male; M  age =
9.7 years, range = 5.3-14 years) and 20 TD children (14 males, 6 females; M age =
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3.3 years, range: 2.5-5.3 years). Children with ASD were recruited from specialist 
schools in Kendal and Preston, United Kingdom. TD children were recruited from 
primary schools, nurseries and preschools in Kendal. All children with ASD received 
a clinical diagnosis of autism from a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, 
using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism 
Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & 
Le Couteur, 1994) and expert clinical judgment. Clinical diagnosis was confirmed for 
children with ASD using the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, 
Reichler, DeVellis & Daly, 1980), which was completed by a class teacher (M  score = 
43, range = 31-55.5). Groups were matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997).2 
The mean receptive vocabulary of children with ASD was 3.7 years (range: 2.4—5.7) 
and the mean receptive vocabulary of TD children was 3.5 years (range: 2.6-5.7).
All children with ASD were current PECS-users with impaired expressive 
language skills. The language abilities of children within the sample varied somewhat, 
as is expected in a low-functioning population. Nine children with ASD were 
functionally non-verbal (no spoken words), 9 had some words and produced 
utterances of 1-2 words in length (however, echolalia accounted for many utterances 
in this group) and 2 could speak some short phrases over 3 words in length. Therefore,
2
Ten children with ASD achieved scores that had standardised age equivalents (M ability: 3.8 years, 
SD: 1.1) which were individually matched to those of TD children (M  ability: 3.7-years, SD: 1). The 
BPVS scores of 3 children with ASD who completed the measure did not have age equivalents (they 
were too low), and so they were matched to 3 TD children based on their raw scores. Another seven 
children with ASD were unable to complete the BPVS due to behavioural issues, thus these participants 
were matched to 7 TD children who each had a receptive language age o f approximately three-years. 
Although it would have been desirable to acquire a measure of receptive language from every child 
with ASD, it is important to note that this research is particularly relevant to nonverbal individuals who 
have difficulty with standardised assessments, display challenging behaviours and receive picture-based 
communication training.
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this sample was linguistically representative of children who receive and typically 
benefit from picture-based communication interventions. Participants had 1-6 years’ 
experience of using PECS. Their progress through the programme ranged from Stage 
1 to fully-trained user (see Frost & Bondy, 2002). The pictures used by participants to 
communicate varied on an individual basis, with coloured drawings/symbols and 
black-and-white drawings/symbols being the most common. Several children used a 
mixture of picture types that varied in iconicity and only one child in the sample used 
“some” colour photographs. Three children acquired spoken words through the use of 
PECS. PECS heavily scaffolded the spoken language of the 2 subjects who produced 
longer utterances (3+ words), particularly when learning new concepts. One child 
used PECS in conjunction with manual signs.
The study was approved by the Lancaster University Ethics Committee and 
informed consent was obtained from parents before children were tested. Please refer 
to Appendix A for additional information concerning the inclusion and exclusion of 
children with ASD across experiments in this thesis.
Materials
The stimuli were ‘unfamiliar’ objects and small laminated pictures of those 
objects. There were 8 types of objects, with two differently coloured versions of each 
object type. One exemplar in each pair was the ‘target object’ and the other alternately 
coloured version was the ‘novel object’. All pictorial stimuli were 2 x 2  inches, thus 
confonning to the recommendations outlined in the PECS training literature (Frost & 
Bondy, 2002). There were 4 pictures of each target object (a black-and-white line 

















Figure 1. Examples o f stimuli; black-and-white line drawings (a. b), coloured line 
drawings (c,d), greyscale photographs (e. f). coloured photographs/target objects (g, h) 
and novel objects (i, j).
The black-and-white line drawings were created using a black Tinewriter' pen 
and white paper. Digital copies o f each drawing were created and their sizes were 
standardised. The colour line drawings were created by colouring print-outs o f the 
edited black-and-white line drawings with crayons. Colour photographs were taken of
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each target object using a 9.2 megapixel camera, and a greyscale version of each 
photograph was created. The photographs were edited using Adobe Photoshop and 
their size was standardised. All pictures were printed by the same high-quality laser 
printer, cut out, and laminated.
Several sets of pictures were created for use in the training procedure. Black- 
and-white line drawings, colour line drawings, greyscale photographs and colour 
photographs of four familiar objects (an apple, a fork, a pen and a comb) and twenty 
unfamiliar distracter objects were created. The distracter pictures were divided into 
sets of 5, and there were 4 versions of each set (corresponding to the 4 levels of 
Iconicity).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on three different days (approx. 1 week 
apart) in their own schools and were always accompanied by a familiar adult. They 
were seated at a table next to or opposite the experimenter and the materials were 
placed within their reach. Children were reinforced throughout the session for 
attention and good behaviour. Correct performance was only reinforced during the 
Training Stage.
Participants received two levels of Iconicity (picture types) in the first test 
session and two levels in the second test session, counterbalanced for order. Each 
child received one trial per level of Iconicity (i.e. one trial with each type of picture), 
and the procedure was identical for all picture types. Trials always consisted of a 
Training Stage, a Mapping Stage and a Generalisation Stage (experienced in a fixed 
order). If a child included the target object in their response at the Mapping Stage, 
they also received a Novelty Test Trial immediately after the Generalisation Stage. In
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the third test session, participants completed a brief Preference Task to rule out 
general picture/object selection biases.
Training Stage
Children were taught a novel word repeatedly paired with a target picture of an 
unfamiliar object. There were 4 novel words (zepper, miggy, drogart, slipsal) and 8 
unfamiliar objects represented in pictures of varying iconicity (see Fig. 1). Pictures 
depicting four of these objects were used as target pictures. Children were initially 
shown the target picture in isolation and told, “This is a zepper. Touch the zepper.”
The target picture was then presented with an iconicity-matched picture of a familiar 
object (e.g. an apple) and participants were asked to show the experimenter “a 
zepper”. This was repeated until a criterion of three consecutive correct responses was 
reached. If participants made an error, the training procedure was re-implemented 
from the initial step (presenting the target picture in isolation) until criterion was 
reached. To ensure that participants had learned the new word and could distinguish 
the target picture from pictures of other unusual objects, they were asked to identify “a 
zepper” from an array of 5 iconicity-matched pictures of random unfamiliar objects. 
There were four sets of these distracter pictures and four versions of each set (one 
version represented at each level of Iconicity). Children viewed a different set each 
trial. The frequency that each set appeared at a particular level of Iconicity was 
counterbalanced between participants.
Mapping Stage
Children were presented with the target picture and the previously unseen 3- 
dimensional depicted object (target object) and were asked to show the experimenter 
the referent of the newly-learned word (e.g. “show me a zepper”). If the participant 
had learned the word through a paired association -  without understanding the
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referential function of words and pictures -  we would expect them to select the target 
picture alone. If, however, they understand that both words and pictures are symbolic, 
they should always include the target object in their response (see Preissler & Carey, 
2004). After making their selection, the experimenter removed the stimuli from the 
child’s line of sight and recorded the selection. The Generalisation Stage followed 
immediately.
Generalisation Stage
The experimenter presented the target picture and a differently coloured 
version of the depicted object (novel object), and asked participants to identify the 
referent of the newly-leamed word (e.g. “show me a zepper”). If the child had formed 
an associative relation between the novel word and the target picture, we would once 
again expect them to select the target picture alone. However, in trials involving 
coloured pictures, I anticipated that some children with ASD would select the target 
picture having previously selected the target object at the Mapping Stage. This pattern 
of responding may indicate that the child perceived the picture to be a representation 
of a specific exemplar (i.e. the target object), thus preventing generalisation of the 
label to differently-coloured category members. After making their response, the 
experimenter removed the stimuli from the child’s line of sight and recorded the 
selection.
Novelty Test Trial
The Novelty Test Trial was included to rule out the possibility that children 
who selected the 3-D objects did so because they were novel and more salient than the 
target pictures. If the participant selected the target object alone or with the target 
picture at the Mapping Stage, they were presented with an additional array consisting 
of the target picture and a different unfamiliar object (‘distracter object’), and were
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asked to identify the referent of the newly-learned word (e.g. “show me a zepper”). In 
order to demonstrate symbolic understanding, children must suppress novelty and 
object preferences and re-select the relatively familiar target picture alone. If, 
however, a child included the object in their responses to the previous test stages and 
then selected the distracter object here, this would suggest that their responding was 
driven by a novelty preference rather than genuine symbolic understanding. The 
frequency that each object appeared as a target and a distracter at each level of 
Iconicity was counterbalanced.
Preference Task
In the third test session, children were presented with 4 arrays, each consisting 
of one real familiar object (cat, car, ball or cup) and one picture of a familiar object 
(key, spoon, banana, toothbrush), and were asked to identify one of the two items (e.g. 
“Show me a ball”). Each participant received one black-and-white line drawing, one 
colour line drawing, one greyscale photograph and one colour photograph (order of 
appearance and requested referent were counterbalanced between participants). This 
was a control to ensure that participants could choose an item named by the 
experimenter, and would not always be drawn to either the picture or object 
irrespective of its identity. It is possible that PECS-users may be biased to select 
pictures, since they frequently handle pictures as part of their daily routine. Thus, this 
control serves to rule out simple object or picture preferences.
Coding
Responses were coded as the item(s) that participants pointed to or gave to the 
experimenter in each trial. Possible codable responses were ‘target picture only’, 
‘target/novel object only’ or ‘both picture and object’. Following Preissler’s (2008) 
coding criteria, only responses judged to be deliberate were coded (e.g. giving or
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sliding an item to the experimenter, pointing to or picking up and showing the 
experimenter an item). If the child played with or manipulated an item without clearly 
indicating a response, this was noted but excluded from the final coding. For example, 
if a child clearly indicated that the target picture was correct by pointing to it before 
manually exploring the target object, this would be coded as a ‘target picture only’ 
response.
2.1.2 Results and Discussion
Training Stage
All children met the word-leaming criterion (5 consecutive correct pairings) on 
completed trials. Due to challenging behaviour, one child with ASD failed to complete 
a ‘colour photograph’ trial and another child with ASD did not complete a ‘greyscale 
photograph’ trial. The TD children completed every trial. For the TD children, there 
were no significant effects of gender on training or responding in Experiment 1 or 2. 
See Table 1 for mean pairings between verbal label and the target picture for children 
with ASD and TD children at each level of Iconicity. Within-group analyses 
confirmed that there were no differences between the numbers of pairings across 
levels of Iconicity for children with ASD or TD children. Between-group analyses 
revealed that children with ASD required significantly more pairings to reach criterion 
than TD children, F (l, 38) = 10.06, MSE = 4.58, p  = .003, qp2 = .21.3 At each level of 
Iconicity, more TD children learned to pair the verbal label with the target picture 
without error, while more children with ASD required at least one re-implementation 
of the procedure from the initial step (see Table 1).
3 Group means replaced the missing values of the 2 children with autism who did not complete colour 
photograph and greyscale photograph trials respectively.
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Table 1
Mean number ofpairings at training between verbal label and target picture for  
children with autism (ASD) and typically developing children (TD) at each level o f 
Iconicity in Experiment 1. Ranges in parentheses
Iconicity of target picture
Black-and-white line 
drawing
Colour line drawing Greyscale photograph Colour photograph
ASD 5.9 (5-9) 6.6 (5-14) 6.7 (5-12) 6.1 (5-10)
Number that learned 
word-picture pairing 
without error.
13/20 9/20 10/19 12/19
TD 5.1 (5-7) 5 (5 ) 5.5 (5-9) 5.4 (5-12)
Number that learned 
word-picture pairing 
without error.
19/20 20/20 16/20 18/20
Test Stages
For ease of interpretation, the results are presented in subsections according to 
Iconicity. These are further divided into sections corresponding to the stages within 
each condition (Mapping Stage, Generalisation Stage, Novelty Bias Trial). See Figure 
2 for rates of responding for typically developing children and children with autism as 
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Figure 2. Responses o f children with autism (ASD) and typically developing children 
(TD) at the Mapping (a, b) and Generalisation stages (c, d) o f Experiment 1. Bars 
represent standard error o f the mean. Note. BWL = black-and-white line drawing; GP 
= greyscale photograph; CL = colour line drawing; CP = colour photograph.
Due to small expected frequencies, the statistical significance o f group 
differences was assessed using the Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test rather than chi- 
squared test (see Ruxton & Neuhauser, 2010). The Fisher-Freeman-Halton test is an 
extension o f the Fisher’s exact test that can be applied to 2 x 3 contingency tables, and 
gives the probability o f observing a table that provides at least as much evidence o f 




Mapping Stage. Sixteen children with ASD selected the target picture alone 
(80%), three selected the target object alone (15%) and one selected both picture and 
object (5%). By contrast, three TD children selected the target picture alone (15%), 
twelve selected the target object alone (60%) and five selected both picture and object 
(25%), a significant difference {p < .001, Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test).
Generalisation Stage. Fourteen children with ASD selected the target picture 
alone (70%), three selected the novel object alone (15%) and three selected both 
picture and object (15%), whereas three TD children selected the target picture alone 
(15%), twelve selected the novel object alone (60%) and five selected both picture and 
object (25%), a significant difference {p = .001, Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test).
Novelty Test Trial. All four of the children with ASD who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage responded in a manner consistent with 
symbolic understanding by selecting the target picture rather than the distracter object. 
Of the 17 TD children who included the target object in their response at the Mapping 
Stage, 16 correctly selected the target picture and 1 selected the distracter object. 
Colour line drawings
Mapping Stage. Eleven children with ASD selected the target picture alone 
(55%), five selected the target object alone (25%) and four selected both picture and 
object (20%). Conversely, three TD children selected the target picture alone (15%), 
thirteen selected the target object alone (65%) and four selected both picture and 
object (20%), a significant difference (p = .016, Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test).
Generalisation Stage. Twelve children with ASD selected the target picture 
alone (60%), four selected the novel object alone (20%) and four selected both picture 
and object (20%), while three TD children selected the target picture alone (15%),
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thirteen selected the novel object alone (65%) and four selected both picture and 
object (20%), a significant difference (p = .007, Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test).
Novelty Test Trial. All nine of the children with ASD who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage correctly selected the target picture 
rather than the distracter object. Of the 17 TD children who included the target object 
in their response at the Mapping Stage, 13 correctly selected the target picture and 4 
selected the distracter object.
Greyscale photographs
Mapping Stage. Twelve children with ASD selected the target picture alone 
(63.2%), five selected the depicted object alone (26.3%) and two selected both picture 
and object (10.5%), whereas four TD children selected the target picture alone (20%), 
twelve selected the depicted object alone (60%) and four selected both picture and 
object (20%), a significant difference (p = .029, Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test).
Generalisation Stage. Fifteen children with ASD selected the target picture 
alone (78.9%), three selected the novel object alone (15.8%) and one selected both 
picture and object (5.3%). By contrast, four TD children selected the target picture 
alone (20%), thirteen selected the novel object alone (65%) and three selected both 
picture and object (15%), a significant difference (p < .001, Fisher-Freeman-Halton 
exact test).
Novelty Test Trial. Of the seven children with ASD who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage, 5 correctly selected the target picture 
and 2 selected the distracter object. Of the 16 TD children who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage, 10 correctly selected the target picture 
and 6 selected the distracter object.
64
Colour photographs
Mapping Stage. Nine children with ASD selected the target picture alone 
(47.4%), five selected the depicted object alone (26.3%) and five selected both picture 
and object (26.3%). By contrast, only one TD child selected the target picture alone 
(5%), eighteen selected the depicted object alone (90%) and just one selected both 
picture and object (5%), a significant difference (p < .001, Fisher-Freeman-Halton 
exact test).
Generalisation Stage. Thirteen children with ASD selected the target picture 
alone (68.4%), three selected the novel object alone (15.8%) and three selected both 
picture and object (15.8%). Conversely, two TD children selected the target picture 
alone (10%), fifteen selected the novel object alone (75%) and three selected both 
picture and object (15%), a significant difference (p < .001, Fisher-Freeman-Halton 
exact test).
Novelty Test Trial. Of the ten children with ASD who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage, 9 correctly selected the target picture 
and 1 selected the distracter object. Of the 19 TD children who included the target 
object in their response at the Mapping Stage, 17 correctly selected the target picture 
and 2 selected the distracter object.
Preference Task
Both children with ASD and TD children responded correctly on 98% of trials. 
There was no difference between trial types (picture or object requested) for either 
group and there were no item effects. These ceiling rates of performance indicate that 
neither group had a general preference for selecting pictures or objects irrespective of 
their identity.
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Categorising participants’ response patterns
To gain a more comprehensive understanding of how TD children and children 
with ASD were responding in each condition, participants’ were categorised based on 
their pattern of performance across the 2 or 3 test stages they experienced (see Table 
2). Following Ganea and colleagues (2009), I was primarily interested in the relative 
rates of associative vs. symbolic responding. Since people use the same label to 
describe both real and depicted versions of the same object, ‘target/novel object only’ 
and ‘both picture and object’ responses were collapsed. For each level of Iconicity, 
children were allocated to one of the following categories:
a) Symbolic (robust): Selected the target object alone or with the target picture 
at the Mapping Stage, then selected the novel object alone or with the target picture at 
the Generalisation Stage, and finally selected the target picture at the Novelty Test 
Trial. Extension of the verbal label to the target object and the novel object indicates 
the child’s understanding that pictures represent categories of objects. This is 
consistent with a mature understanding of pictures.
b) Symbolic (fragile): Selected the target object alone or with the target picture 
at the Mapping Stage, then selected the target picture alone at the Generalisation 
Stage, and finally selected the target picture at the Novelty Test Trial. Extension of the 
verbal label to the target object but not the novel object suggests that sameness of 
shape and colour (rather than just sameness of shape) cue the child’s mapping of 
picture-referent relations. This could be regarded as a lower level of pictorial 
understanding.
c) Associative: Selected the target picture alone at the Mapping Stage and then 
selected the target picture alone at the Generalisation Stage. The child’s failure to 
extend the verbal label to the target object or novel object suggests that they believe
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that the target picture is its true referent. As the target picture is the entity that was 
directly paired with the verbal label throughout training, this is consistent with 
associative learning.
d) Novelty bias: Selected the target object alone or with the target picture at the 
Mapping Stage, then selected the novel object alone or with the target picture at the 
Generalisation Stage, and finally selected the distracter object at the Novelty Test 
Trial. Selection of the distracter object following the selection of the target object and 
novel object suggests that the child’s responding was motivated by a simple 
preference for the more novel and interesting 3-D stimuli.
e) Other. Pattern of performance that did not fit into any of the above 
categories. Child makes a series of responses that cannot be explained by associative 
word learning, symbolic understanding or a novelty bias.
Table 2
Patterns o f performance associated with response categories in Experiment 1
Response
Mapping Stage Generalisation Stage Novelty Test Trial
Symbolic (robust) TO or Both NO or Both TP
Symbolic (fragile) TO or Both TP TP
Associative TP TP /
Novelty Bias TO or Both NO or Both DO
Other Any other combination o f responses.
Note. TO = target object alone; TP = target picture alone; NO = novel object alone; 
Both = both target/novel object and target picture; DO = distracter object
67
The numbers of children with ASD and TD children in each of the above 
categories at each level of Iconicity are displayed in Table 3. Children with ASD 
tended to map verbal labels onto target pictures in each condition, while TD children 
recognised that they were symbolic representations of target and novel objects. It is 
notable, however, that children with ASD more frequently responded in a manner 
consistent with symbolic understanding in the colour line and photograph conditions 
(18 symbolic responses) than in the non-colour line and photograph conditions (9 
symbolic responses). Furthermore, as a group, children with ASD responded similarly 
overall in the two colour conditions and in the two non-colour conditions. Thus, these 
categorical data appear to indicate an effect of picture colour. To examine this further, 
the black-and-white line drawing condition was collapsed with the greyscale 
photograph condition, and the colour line drawing condition was collapsed with the 
colour photograph condition. Additionally, the two symbolic response types (robust 
and fragile) were collapsed, and the frequencies associated with the “novelty bias” and 
“other” categories were omitted from the data below due to their low frequency.
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Table 3
Number o f children with autism (ASD) and typically developing children (TD) in each 
response category at each level o f  Iconicity in Experiment 1. Children were assigned 
to a category according to their pattern o f responding across the Mapping Stage, 
Generalisation Stage and possibly Novelty Test Trial







Symbolic (robust) 4 3 7 5
Symbolic (fragile) 0 2 2 4
ASD Associative 14 12 10 9
Novelty Bias 0 1 0 1
Other 2 1 1 0
Symbolic (robust) 16 10 12 16
Symbolic (fragile) 0 0 1 1
TD Associative 3 4 1 1
Novelty Bias 1 6 3 2
Other 0 0 3 0
Non-colour conditions. The children with ASD made 9 “symbolic” responses 
(25.7%) and 26 “associative” responses (74.3%) across the two non-colour conditions. 
By contrast, the TD children made 26 “symbolic” responses (78.8%) and 7 
“associative” responses (21.2%).
Colour conditions. The children with ASD made 18 “symbolic” responses 
(48.6%) and 19 “associative” responses (51.4%) across the two colour conditions. 
Conversely, the TD children made 30 “symbolic” responses (93.8%) and 2 
“associative” responses (6.2%).
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Overall, these values confirm that low-functioning children with ASD tend to 
form associative word-picture mappings, and do not extend labels learned for pictures 
to real depicted objects. However, they generalised verbal labels to target objects, and 
sometimes novel objects, in nearly 50% of trials in colour picture conditions. By 
comparison, they only extended labels to depicted objects in 25% of trials involving 
non-colour pictures. It may be that viewing a colour picture alongside its colour- 
matched referent helps children with ASD recognise that the picture is a symbol, and 
in some individuals, this might evoke the idea that it could represent other objects as 
well (e.g. differently-coloured versions of the depicted object). By contrast, TD 
children almost always extended novel labels from pictures to their referents and also 
generalised those labels to objects that matched depicted referents on shape but not 
colour. The between-condition difference was in the same direction as for children 
with ASD (i.e. more symbolic responses in the colour picture conditions), although 
the relative difference was much smaller.
Over and above the observed effect of Iconicity, it is clear that verbal labels 
impact differently on how children with ASD and TD children view pictures. Previous 
research has shown that the symbolic use of pictures by TD children is facilitated by 
knowledge of verbal labels corresponding to their referents (Callaghan, 2000). Thus, 
the process of learning a unique verbal label for each target picture may have guided 
TD children to view them as symbols when presented alongside their perceptually 
similar referents. However, it appears that word-picture relations do not similarly 
scaffold the symbolic understanding of children with ASD. This differential effect of 
picture naming was explored in Experiment 2.
The following experiment employed the paradigm reported in study 1 of 
Preissler and Bloom (2007). Children were presented with arrays consisting of two
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unfamiliar objects and two black-and-white line drawings of those objects. The 
experimenter drew attention to one of the drawings in the array, with or without 
assigning it a novel label, and asked the participant to show her “another one”.
Preissler and Bloom (2007) found that TD 2-year-olds in the “Labelled” condition 
tended to select the depicted object, whereas those in the “Unlabelled” condition 
typically selected the other picture. This pattern of responding suggests that naming 
prompts TD children to view pictures from a symbolic perspective. An important 
difference from Experiment 1 of this thesis is that children in the Labelled condition 
heard word-picture pairs only once per trial. A single pairing of stimuli is much less 
likely to elicit a narrow one-to one mapping than repeatedly presenting and 
reinforcing a word-picture relationship. Thus, the responses of children with ASD in 
Experiment 2 will also help us identify whether the Training Stage of Experiment 1 
suppressed a potentially beneficial effect of naming by promoting associative 
learning. Overall, the results of Experiment 2 will shed light on whether or not 




Participants were the same individuals from Experiment 1. Half of the children 
in each group (children with ASD and TD children) were randomly assigned to the 
Labelled condition and half to the Unlabelled condition. Children with ASD in the two 
conditions did not vary significantly on chronological age (Labelled: M  = 9 years, SD 
= 2.5 years; Unlabelled: M=  10.3 years, SD = 2.9 years), CARS score (Labelled: M  = 
40.25, SD = 6.87; Unlabelled: M=  45.65, SD = 8.55) or receptive vocabulary
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(Labelled: M =  3.3 years, SD = 1 year; Unlabelled: M=  2.9 years, = 1 year).4 
Similarly, TD children in the two conditions were not significantly different on 
chronological age (Labelled: 3.4 years, SD = 0.8 years; Unlabelled: M =  3.5
years, SD = 0.9 years) or receptive vocabulary (Labelled: M=  3.4 years, = 0.5 
years; Unlabelled: 3.8 years, 5D = 1 year). Children with ASD and TD children
in the Labelled condition did not differ significantly on receptive vocabulary, nor did 
children with ASD and TD children in the Unlabelled condition.
Materials
Stimuli were 8 small unfamiliar objects (different from those in Experiment 1) 
and 8 2 x 2  inch laminated black-and-white line drawings of those objects (see Fig. 3). 
Only black-and-white line drawings were used in this experiment because a) I wanted 
the results to be directly comparable to Preissler and Bloom (2007), and more 
importantly, b) I sought to rule out the possibility that children with ASD were 
impaired in their ability to match pictures to objects based on resemblance. In 
Experiment 1, children with ASD may have selected the target picture alone because 
they failed to perceive picture-object relations in the least iconic conditions. The 
black-and-white line drawings were created in the same way as those in Experiment 1.
4 As stated previously, some children with autism did not have BP VS scores. In order to assess the 
relative language abilities o f children with autism in the Labelled and Unlabelled conditions, we 
conservatively assigned participants without a BPVS score a receptive vocabulary age o f 2.5 years as 
this is the youngest age at which typically developing children can complete the task (which all children 
with autism managed).
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a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h)
i) j) k) 1) m) n) o) p)
Figure 3. Stimuli used in Experiment 2; objects (a-h) and black-and-white line 
drawings (i-p).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in their own schools, approximately 2 
weeks after completing Experiment 1. Testing was completed in one session. All 
participants were accompanied by a familiar adult throughout the testing procedure. 
Children were seated at a table opposite the experimenter, and the materials were 
placed within their reach. Participants were reinforced throughout the session for 
attention and good behaviour, but the experimenter never indicated whether their 
responses were correct or incorrect.
Both conditions -  Labelled and Unlabelled -  consisted o f 4 trials. Each trial 
involved four items -  2 different unfamiliar objects and 2 black-and-white line 
drawings depicting those objects. In both conditions, the two objects and one o f the 
pictures were placed in a line in front of the participant. The experimenter then held 
up the remaining picture (target picture) and made a condition-specific utterance 
whilst pointing to the picture. In the Labelled condition the experimenter said “Look!
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This is a noun (ploffer, yitter, trella, gedro)”, whereas in the Unlabelled condition he 
said “Look at this!” This utterance was always followed by the question: “Can you 
show me another one?” Children made their selection from the array, which contained 
the object depicted by the target picture (target object), a different object (distracter 
object) and a picture depicting the second object (distracter picture). The order of 
labels, the pairing of objects, their order of appearance and the frequency of their use 
as targets and distracters were all counterbalanced between participants. The 
positioning of items in the array was counterbalanced between trials.
Coding
Responses were coded as the item(s) that participants pointed to or gave to the 
experimenter in each trial. Only responses judged to be deliberate were coded (e.g. 
giving or sliding an item to the experimenter, pointing to or picking up and showing 
the experimenter an item). If the child interacted with an item without clearly 
indicating a response, this was noted but excluded from the final coding.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
The number of trials in which participants selected the target object, the 
distracter picture and distracter object were calculated (each out of 4). Of the 80 trials 
received by each group, 2 children with ASD failed to respond in 1 trial each (once in 
both Labelled and Unlabelled conditions) and another in the Unlabelled condition 
selected the distracter object in 1 trial. Two TD children in the Labelled condition 
each selected the distracter object in a single trial. Because the distracter object was 
selected so rarely, these data were excluded from the subsequent analyses.
In the Labelled condition, children with ASD selected the target object on 
82.5% of trials (M = 3.3, SD = 1.25; see Fig. 4) and the distracter picture on 15% of 
trials (M= 0.6, SD = 1.26), while TD children selected the target object and distracter
M  no. 
o f  trials
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picture on 92.5% (M =  3.7, SD = 0.48) and 2.5% o f trials (M =  0.1, SD = 0.32) 
respectively. In the Unlabelled condition, children with ASD selected the target object 
on 57.5% of trials (M = 2.3, SD  = 1.7) and the distracter picture on 37.5% o f trials (M  
= 1.5, SD = 1.43), whereas the TD children chose the target object on 22.5% o f trials 
(M =  0.9, SD = 1.66) and the distracter picture on 77.5% o f trials (M  = 3.1, SD =
1.66). It is noteworthy that the TD children responded in a very similar fashion to the 
2-year-olds in Preissler and Bloom (2007) who selected the target object in 90% and 






Figure 4. Mean numbers o f target object and distracter picture responses by children 
with autism (ASD) and typically developing children (TD) in the Labelled and 
Unlabelled conditions o f Experiment 2. Bars represent standard error o f the mean.
The proportion o f trials in which children selected the target object was 
calculated by dividing their number o f target object responses by their total number o f
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valid responses. These proportion data were entered into a 2(Group, typically 
developing children, children with autism) x 2(Condition: Labelled, Unlabelled) 
univariate ANOVA. The analyses yielded a significant main effect of Condition, F( 1, 
36) = 22.82, MSE = 0.12,/? < .001, r|p2 = .39, indicating that the target object was 
selected more frequently in the Labelled condition than the Unlabelled condition 
across groups. More interestingly, there was a significant Group x Condition 
interaction, iftT, 36) = 4.9, MSE = 0.12,/? = .033, qp2 = .12. Pairwise comparisons 
subjected to the Bonferroni correction revealed no effect of Condition on target object 
selection in children with ASD, whereas TD children were significantly more likely to 
select the target object in the Labelled condition (and therefore selected the distracter 
picture more frequently in the Unlabelled condition), F (l, 18) = 31.4, MSE = 0.09,/? < 
.001, qp2 = .64. In the Labelled condition, children with and without ASD selected the 
target object at similar rates, while in the Unlabelled condition, there was trend for 
children with ASD to select the target object more often than TD children, F (l, 18) = 
3.52, MSE= = .065, rip2 = .16.
These results show that low-functioning children with ASD can categorise 
pictures with their referents, and that this is their default response. This affirms that 
children with ASD are sensitive to the perceptual relationships that exist between 
pictures (even black-and-white line drawings) and objects in their environment. 
Crucially, their preference for selecting the target object regardless of whether the 
target picture was named, suggests that verbal labels do not scaffold the symbolic use 
of pictures by children with ASD.
Unlike the children with ASD, and in line with previous research (Preissler & 
Bloom, 2007), the TD children tended to select the target object in the Labelled 
Condition and the distracter picture in the Unlabelled Condition. This further
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demonstrates that labelling underpins whether young TD children view pictures from 
a symbolic or non-symbolic perspective.
2.3 General Discussion
This study explored how low-functioning children with ASD comprehend 
pictures as symbols. In Experiment 1, participants were taught a series of novel words 
paired with different target pictures that varied in iconicity. When a target picture was 
presented alongside its previously unseen referent, children with ASD most frequently 
indicated that the picture alone was the referent of the word in 3 out of 4 Iconicity 
conditions. However, when the target picture was a colour photograph (the most 
iconic condition), children with autism extended the label to the depicted referent in 
52% of trials. Overall, children with ASD extended verbal labels to target objects (and 
sometimes novel objects) approximately twice as often in colour picture trials relative 
to non-colour picture trials (48.6% vs. 25.7%). Irrespective of Iconicity, TD children 
almost always extended labels from target pictures to their referents and also 
generalised those labels to objects that matched depicted referents on shape but not 
colour. However, like children with ASD, they appeared more likely to view colour 
pictures as symbols.
The results of Experiment 1 implicate colour as an important influence on 
whether children with ASD extend labels from pictures to depicted objects. One 
possibility is that children with ASD are more likely to view colour pictures as 
symbols because sameness of colour cues their recognition of picture-referent 
relations. Thus, because iconic colour pictures are more transparent than iconic non­
colour pictures, children with ASD may be increasingly likely to generalise 
information from the former in a manner consistent with symbolic understanding 
(DeLoache, 1995; Fuller, 1997; Fuller & Lloyd, 1991). Furthermore, and contrary to
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my predictions, most children with ASD who extended the label to the target object at 
the Mapping Stage then generalised the same label to the novel object at the 
Generalisation Stage (12 of 18 responses in colour conditions), despite the difference 
in colour. Perhaps the viewing of a colour picture alongside its colour-matched 
referent at the Mapping Stage encouraged these children to view it from a symbolic 
perspective, and this opened the possibility that it could stand for other objects (e.g. 
those that match shape, but not necessarily colour). By comparison, those children 
who extended the label to the target object at the Mapping Stage but not the novel 
object at the Generalisation Stage may not have understood that pictures are generally 
intended to represent categories of objects rather than specific exemplars. Hence, I 
would argue that the symbolic understanding of these individuals is fragile. They may 
perceive picture-referent relations as one-to-one pairs (i.e. one picture represents one 
object), with colour being critical to the definition of these relationships. By contrast, 
TD children clearly understand that pictures can represent categories of objects and 
recognise that sameness of shape, rather than sameness of colour, is the best indicator 
of category membership (Smith et al., 2002). Hence, they were adept in their use of 
shape as a basis for generalising labels to objects, even when colour was incongruent.
Experiment 2 explored whether children with ASD view pictures differently 
depending on whether or not they are named and, in conjunction with Experiment 1, 
sheds light on how they form relations between words and pictures. Children with 
ASD categorised black-and-white line drawings with their 3-D referents more often 
than with another drawing, regardless of whether they were assigned a verbal label. 
This confirms that children with ASD have no difficulty matching pictures (even 
black-and-white line drawings) with perceptually similar objects and, crucially, 
suggests that verbal labelling does not significantly influence how children with ASD
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view pictures. Moreover, when word-picture relations are not reinforced through 
repeated simultaneous exposures, children with ASD spontaneously match them with 
their referents. This suggests that the high rate of picture alone responses in 
Experiment 1 may have been fostered by the Training Stage. It is well documented 
that children with ASD form associations between words and stimuli that co-occur, 
indicating that they do not realise that word learning is driven by referential intent, 
and that appropriate referents of spoken words are often outside one’s current focus of 
attention (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Frith & Happe, 1994; Kanner, 1946;
Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005). Therefore, the repeated and reinforced 
pairing of the novel label with the target picture in Experiment 1 may have caused 
them to map the label onto the picture itself (the entity that they experienced co­
occurring with the word), rather than the symbolised object. By contrast, the single 
word-referent pairing experienced in the Labelled Condition of Experiment 2 did not 
generate a strong associative bond, enabling them to match the picture to its referent 
(a behaviour that they perform frequently in their daily lives) when asked to show the 
experimenter “another one”.
As children with ASD require a high number of mappings in order to learn 
word-picture relations (see Experiment 1 Training Stage data), the single word-picture 
pairings in Experiment 2 may not have been meaningful. That is, the children with 
ASD may not have registered the symbolic link between the spoken word and the 
target picture. Furthermore, because their comprehension of pictures is not guided by 
language, the lack of naming in the Unlabelled condition did not have the same impact 
on the children with ASD as it did on the TD children. Together, these experiments 
show that children with ASD and TD children are not relating pictures, words and 
objects in the same way. While children with ASD are able to match pictures with
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their referents, the repeated pairings required to learn the names of pictures often 
narrows the word-referent relation to the extent that the picture itself (rather than the 
depicted object) is considered the referent of the word. However, children with ASD 
were nearly twice as likely to extend verbal labels to objects depicted in colour 
pictures, suggesting that these are more often viewed as symbols. Conversely, TD 
children understand that words refer to depicted referents and can be generalised to 
real objects accordingly.
Are there other explanations for the associative responding of children with 
ASD in Experiment 1? While designing the study, it was recognised that children who 
have experienced picture-based communication training may be biased to select 
pictures irrespective of their identity, since handling pictures is a common feature of 
their daily routine. However, the Preference Task coupled with the results of 
Experiment 2 confirmed that they did not have a general preference for selecting 
pictures over objects. Perhaps children with ASD are just more likely to associate 
words with pictures when given the choice of a picture and its referent. Preissler 
(2008) addressed this possibility and found that when a word is initially paired with an 
object, rather than a picture, children with ASD do not show a significant preference 
for the picture when asked to select the word’s referent. Given that the participants in 
Preissler (2008) were very similar to those in the present study, there is no reason to 
believe that my sample of children with ASD would respond differently. Also, based 
on another control by Preissler (2008), we can rule out perseveration (a characteristic 
of autism resulting from impairments in frontal lobe function; e.g. Shu, Lung, Tien & 
Chen, 2001) as an explanation for the associative responding of children with ASD.
It might be that low-functioning children with ASD map verbal labels onto 
individual pictures because they have difficulty forming dual representations. In word
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learning contexts, children with ASD may represent pictures as objects and neglect to 
represent their relations to symbolised referents. A bias towards viewing pictures as 
objects contrasts markedly with the stance of TD children (and adults) who reflect 
primarily on the referents of pictures. Such atypical processing in children with ASD 
could be attributable to impaired social-cognitive skills, which enable TD children to 
“acquire” the pictorial symbol system from social partners (e.g. Callaghan & Rochat, 
2008), and impaired language, which usually provides a scaffolding base for the 
pictorial domain (Callaghan, 2000). Perhaps these deficits inhibit low-functioning 
children with ASD from fully appreciating the intended symbolic-communicative 
function of pictures, which in turn, causes them to focus on their object (rather than 
symbolic) identity when mapping word-picture relations. However, this explanation is 
speculative at present and requires investigation in future research.
Of course, I must caution against generalising the results of these experiments 
across the autism spectrum. Higher-functioning individuals who are more 
linguistically developed may have an understanding of word-picture-object relations 
that is similar to typical development. However, the children with ASD that 
participated in these experiments were representative of the population that this 
research is most relevant to: low-functioning individuals with impaired language 
development who receive and benefit from picture-based communication training.
Overall, the results of these experiments have important implications for 
picture-based communication interventions. At present, there are no data-grounded 
guidelines regarding what types of pictures are best suited for such interventions and it 
is not uncommon for children with ASD to be taught using relatively abstract black- 
and-white line drawings and symbols (see participant information in Experiment 1). 
While it is clear that children with ASD have a general difficulty using pictures as
symbols, this study has shown that they are twice as likely to generalise information to 
objects depicted in colour pictures than non-colour pictures. This may be because they 
are more likely to perceive colour pictures as symbols in contexts that foster 
associative learning, such as the Training Stage of Experiment 1 and the early stages 
of the PECS programme (although this requires confirmation in future research).
Thus, these findings support the use of iconic colour pictures, which promote the 
extension of information from pictures to objects, when implementing picture-based 
communication training. Furthermore, because “experience responding to a given 
entity as a representation of something other than itself increases an individual’s 
readiness to respond to other entities in an abstract rather than concrete mode” 
(DeLoache, 1995, p.l 12), perceiving iconic colour pictures as representations may 
elicit general gains in symbolic development.
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Chapter Three: Generalisation of word-picture relations in low-functioning 
children with autism and typically developing children.5
TD children begin learning word-referent relations at approximately 12- 
months (Bloom, 2002), and the majority of the earliest-acquired words refer to object 
categories that are well-organised by shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999). The process 
of learning object names selectively tunes children’s attention to global structure 
(Smith et al., 2002) and, by approximately 24-months, TD children infer the general 
rule that shape is the criterial perceptual determinant when mapping and extending 
novel word-referent relations (commonly known as a “shape bias”; Landau, Smith & 
Jones, 1988; Smith, 2003).
The shape bias is underpinned by categorisation (the process that organises 
known information into conceptual groups), and TD infants categorise objects through 
the abstraction of prototypes (e.g. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Younger, 1990). It is 
believed that prototypical representations of objects’ category-defining shapes direct 
children’s shape-based generalisation of labels (Son, Smith & Goldstone, 2006). 
Categorisation is also involved in children’s picture comprehension. When a child 
views a picture, they must compare the depicted referent against their existing 
prototypes in order to decide what object is represented. Alternatively, if a picture is 
of an unfamiliar object, viewers can generate a prototype directly from the depicted 
image, enabling generalisation to other pictures and real world referents. From 2-years 
of age, TD children extend newly-learned labels from pictures to similarly shaped 
objects, irrespective of colour, thus evidencing their understanding that shape defines
5 Based on Hartley, C., & Allen, M. (in press). Generalisation o f word-picture relations in children with 
autism and typically developing children. Journal o f  Autism and Developmental Disorders.
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referential word-picture-object relations (Hartley & Allen, in press (a); Preissler & 
Carey, 2004).
In contrast to TD children, children with ASD tend to learn object names via 
an associative mechanism (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005), 
and do not privilege sameness of shape as a basis for extending labels to novel objects 
(Tek et al., 2008). Using a preferential looking paradigm, Tek and colleagues 
investigated whether children with ASD aged 2- to 3-years (at the start of the study) 
evidenced an attentional bias to shape in word learning across a 12-month period.
Over the year, the children with ASD developed sizeable vocabularies (exceeding 100 
count nouns), but at no stage evidenced the shape bias heuristic, suggesting a 
dissociation between vocabulary size and the maxims governing word learning in 
autism.
It could be that differences in word-object mapping and generalisation 
evidenced by children with ASD are related to inherent deficits in visual processing 
and categorisation. There is evidence that high-functioning children and adults with 
autism are unable to generate prototypes of object categories (e.g. Klinger & Dawson, 
2001; Plaisted, 2000), thus explaining their inability to organise unfamiliar stimuli and 
atypical examples of familiar categories (e.g. Gastgeb, Strauss & Minishew, 2006;
Tek et al., 2008). One possibility is that children with ASD are unable to form 
minimalist representations because they do not selectively attend to shape when 
processing visual stimuli. Prototype formation demands the ability to selectively 
abstract global shape information, but children with ASD evidence a preference for 
processing local details at the expense of holistic meaning (Mottron et al., 2006; Frith 
& Happe, 1994). It may be that children with ASD process novel objects in a 
predominantly feature-based fashion (similar to how they process faces; e.g. Joseph &
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Tanaka, 2003), and fail to develop a shape bias because they do not identify shape as 
the most pertinent determinant of category membership. Unlike TD children, who can 
abstract a shape-based category representation after a single exposure (Markman, 
1989), it might be that children with ASD require multiple experiences with multiple 
category members in order to formulate a set of rules that define category 
membership. However, before these rules are established, it may be that their 
representations of categories are characterised by several separable, and equally 
weighted, perceptual details.
Difficulties in word learning and category formation in children with ASD also 
manifest in the pictorial domain. Priessler (2008) reported that low-functioning 
children with ASD map associative relations between words and black-and-white line 
drawings, indicating their failure to understand that labels refer to the symbolised 
categories. One explanation of these findings is that picture comprehension in low- 
functioning children with ASD is contingent on a high degree of iconicity (the extent 
that a symbol resembles its referent). In their recent study, Hartley and Allen (in press 
(a); see Chapter 2) found that children with ASD extended verbal labels to referent 
objects approximately twice as often in colour picture trials relative to non-colour 
picture trials (48.6% vs. 25.7%). Furthermore, most children with ASD who extended 
labels to depicted objects also generalised the same labels to differently-coloured 
category members. These findings implicate colour as an important influence on 
whether children with ASD comprehend symbolic picture-referent relations and 
extend labels to depicted objects.
However, given their impairments in prototype and category formation, it 
cannot be assumed that children with ASD map relations between words, colour 
pictures and objects in the same manner as TD children. While it is clear that children
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with ASD benefit from greater iconicity when generalising words from pictures, they 
may not abstract minimalist shape-based representations of symbolised referents. Due 
to their localised processing bias and weak central coherence (Frith & Happe, 1994), 
category defining details (e.g. global shape) and category irrelevant details (e.g. size, 
colour, texture) may not be psychologically separable for children with ASD. As a 
result, some children with ASD may be unable to weight these perceptual details when 
deciding whether to extend a known label to a novel item (picture or object) on the 
basis of category membership. Thus, it is possible that children with ASD may 
generalise newly-learned word-picture relations based on multiple and independent 
perceptual details (e.g. shape and/or colour).
The present study investigates whether low-functioning children with ASD 
generalise labels from colour pictures to objects based on similarity of shape, colour, 
or both shape and colour. Samples of children with ASD and ability-matched TD 
children were taught novel words paired with colour photographs of unfamiliar target 
objects, and were required to sort items into two buckets according to whether or not 
they were also referents of the newly-learned labels. Sorted items included real target 
objects, differently-coloured variants of target objects, other unfamiliar objects that 
were colour-matched to target objects, familiar objects, and pictures of each object. 
Based on Hartley and Allen (in press (a)), it was anticipated that some children with 
ASD would map associative word-picture relations and fail to generalise, while others 
would generalise labels to target objects and differently-coloured variants of target 
objects. I also predicted that the absence of a shape bias (Tek et al., 2008) may cause 
some children with ASD to over-extend labels to unfamiliar objects that match 
pictures on colour, but not shape. By contrast, it was expected that TD children would 
only generalise labels to items that matched pictures on shape.
3.1 Experiment 3 
3.1.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 17 low-functioning children with ASD (all male; M age =
9.7 years, range = 4.1-16.1 years) and 17 TD children (6 males, 11 females; M age = 
3.5 years, range: 2.2-6.4 years). Children were recruited from local specialist schools, 
mainstream schools, nurseries and preschools. All children with ASD received a 
diagnosis of autism from a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, using 
standardised instruments (i.e. ADOS and ADI - Revised; Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 
1994) and expert judgment. Diagnosis was confirmed using the Childhood Autism 
Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler et al., 1980), as completed by a class teacher (M score: 
41, range: 31.5-51.5). Groups were matched on receptive vocabulary (ASD: 3.5 years, 
range: 2-6.2 years; TD: 3.5 years, range: 2-5.4 years) as measured by the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997).6 In addition, the nonverbal 
intellectual abilities of each group, as measured by the Leiter-R (Roid & Miller,
1997), were not significantly different, /(32) = -.81 ,p  = .43.
All children with ASD were current PECS-users, and the sample was 
linguistically representative of children who receive and benefit from picture-based 
communication interventions. Seven children with ASD were functionally non-verbal 
(no spoken words), 7 had some words and produced utterances of 1-3 words in length 
(including echolalic utterances) and 3 could speak some short phrases over 4 words 
long. Participants’ experience using PECS varied between 5 months and 10 years, and
6 The BPVS scores o f 4 children with ASD and 1 typically developing child were marginally below the 
lowest raw score with a standardised age equivalent (of 2.3 years). Consequently, we conservatively 
assigned these children a receptive language ability of exactly 2 years. This research is particularly 
relevant to individuals with language impairments who have difficulty with standardised assessments, 
display challenging behaviours and receive picture-based communication training.
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their progress ranged from Stage 1 to fully-trained user (see Frost & Bondy, 2002). 
The pictures used by participants to communicate varied individually, with coloured 
drawings/symbols and black-and-white drawings/symbols the most common. Several 
children used a mixture of picture types that varied in iconicity and only four children 
in the sample used “some” colour photographs.
The study was approved by the Lancaster University Ethics Committee and 
informed consent was obtained from parents.
Materials
Stimuli included familiar objects, unfamiliar objects, laminated colour 
photographs of those objects, and two opaque white 6-litre Tupperware boxes. 
Photographs were taken with a 9.2 megapixel camera and edited using Adobe 
Photoshop. All photographs were standardised to 2 x 2 inches, conforming to the 
PECS training literature guidelines (Frost & Bondy, 2002).
Sixteen familiar objects were used in two Training Trials. Each of the 4 Test 
Trials involved a unique set of 4 objects and colour photographs of those objects (see 
Fig. 5).
a) Target Object b) N ovel Object c) Distracter Object d) Familiar Object
i) Target Object j) Novel Object k) Distracter Object
f
m) Target Object n) Novel Object o) Distracter Object
e) Target Object f) Novel Object g) Distracter Object h) Familiar Object
1) Familiar Object
p) Familiar Object
Figure 5. Object stimuli used in Experiment 3: Set 1 (a-d), Set 2 (e-h), Set 3 (i-1) and 
Set 4 (m-p).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in their own schools and accompanied by 
a familiar adult. Children were reinforced throughout the session for attention and 
good behaviour. Correct performance was only reinforced during Training Trials.
Children sat at a table opposite the experimenter, with two Tupperware boxes 
positioned between them (one left and one right o f centre). The experimenter told the 
child that they would be playing a game that involved sorting things. Two Training 
Trials were then administered, counterbalanced for order. First, the experimenter
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showed the child a familiar practice object (car/dog) and named the object several 
times (e.g. “This is a car (dog). See, it’s a car (dog). Have a look at the car (dog)”). He 
then pointed to one of the containers and demonstrated that the named object should 
be placed inside, before allowing the child to copy this action (e.g. “Cars go in here. 
See, the car goes in here [experimenter places object in appropriate container]. Can 
you put the car in here?”). The experimenter then informed the child that they should 
place further examples of the named object in the same container (e.g. “I want you to 
put cars in here”), and then pointed to the other container and stated that non-named 
items should be placed in there (e.g. “Other things go in here.”). A series of items 
were presented one-by-one and in a random order for the child to sort (e.g. “So where 
does this go? And where does this go?”). To reinforce task understanding, the first 
item presented was always identical to the practice object. The remaining items were 
either cars/dogs or other familiar objects from different categories. If a child made an 
error, the experimenter demonstrated the correct response and re-started the trial from 
the initial step. Training Trials were repeated until the child correctly sorted all items 
without help. The distribution of sorted items was 5 cars (vs. 3 non-cars) and 4 dogs 
(vs. 4 non-dogs). This discrepancy was intended to prevent children from inferring 
that a certain number of items should be sorted into each container in the Test Trials.
Four Test Trials followed (see Fig. 6). For each trial, the experimenter showed 
the child a colour photograph of an unfamiliar object (target picture) and assigned it a 
novel label (e.g. “This is a blicket. See it’s a blicket. Have a look at the blicket”). Four 
novel labels (blicket, parloo, gariff, nellby) were counterbalanced for order. The 
experimenter then pointed to one of the containers and demonstrated that the named 
item should be placed inside, before allowing the child to copy this action (e.g. 
“Blickets go in here. See, the blicket goes in here [experimenter places target picture
in the appropriate container]. Can you put the blicket in here?). The experimenter then 
informed the child that they should place further examples of the named object in the 
same container (e.g. “I want you to put blickets in here”), and then pointed to the other 
container and stated that non-named items should be placed in there (e.g. “Other 
things go in here.”). Additionally, the experimenter retrieved the target picture and 
placed it in front of its container to prevent children from forgetting where named 
items should go. The experimenter then presented a series of 8 items, one-by-one and 
in a random order, for the child to sort into the two containers (e.g. “So where does 
this go? And where does this go?”). Those items consisted of the target object (the 
unfamiliar object depicted in the target picture), a novel object (a differently coloured 
version of the target object), a distracter object (a different unfamiliar object that was 
exactly the same colour as the target object), a familiar object, a copy of the target 
picture, a novel picture (a photograph of the novel object), a distracter picture (a 
photograph of the distracter object) and a familiar picture (a photograph of the 
familiar object). After sorting 4 items, the experimenter reminded the child which 
container the named items were meant to be placed inside (e.g. “Remember, blickets 
go in here. Other things go in here”). A different set of stimuli was used on each Test 
Trial, and order of sets was counterbalanced.
9 ]
T h is  is a b licket’n
a)
“ B lickets go in here”
I b)
“ O ther things go in 
here” *
i)
Figure 6. Illustration o f Test Trial procedure and stimuli: target picture (a), copy o f 
target picture (b), target object (c), novel picture (d), novel object (e), distracter 
picture (f), distracter object (g), familiar picture (h) and familiar object (i).
3.1.2 Results
Training Trials
All children passed both Training Trials by placing all o f the named items in 
one box and all o f the non-named items in the other box. All TD children passed both 
Training Trials at their first attempt. Thirteen children with ASD passed both Training 
Trials at their first attempt, two required two attempts to pass Training Trial 1, one
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required two attempts to pass Training Trial 2, and one required two attempts to pass 
both Training Trials.
Test Trials
Every child completed all 4 Test Trials. In each trial, children learned the 
name o f an unfamiliar target picture and then sorted 8 items according to whether or 
not they were also referents o f the label. The number o f times that children 
generalised labels to each type o f item was calculated, yielding 8 scores (each out of 
4) per participant. The mean rates that children generalised labels from colour 
photographs to each type o f item are displayed in Figure 7.






Picture Object Picture Object Picture Object
Novel Distracter FamiliarTarget
Figure 7. Mean number o f trials (out o f 4) that children with autism (ASD) and 
typically developing children (TD) generalised labels from target pictures to each item 
type in Experiment 3. Bars represent standard error o f the mean.
These data were entered into a 2(Group) x 8 (Item) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Main effects o f Group, F ( l ,  32) = 13.86, M S E -  .59,p =  .001, qp“ = .3, and 
Item, F(1.89, 60.31) = 180.62, M SE =  1.87 < .001 , tip2 = .85,were qualified by a
significant Group x Item interaction, F(1.89, 60.31) = 28.24, MSE = 1.87, p  < .001, 
r|p = .47 (please note that all of the following pairwise comparisons were subjected to 
the Bonferroni correction). Between-group comparisons for each item showed that TD 
children and children with ASD generalised labels to target pictures and target objects 
at equal rates, TD children generalised labels to novel pictures, F (l, 32) = 16.1 ,/? < 
.001, and novel objects, FfT, 32) = 15.69,p  < .001, significantly more frequently than 
children with ASD, children with ASD generalised labels to distracter pictures, F( 1, 
32) = 33.07,p  < .001, and distracter objects, 7 (^1, 32) = 40.56,/? < .001, significantly 
more frequently than TD children, children with ASD generalised labels to familiar 
pictures significantly more frequently than TD children, 77(1, 32) = 5.68,/? = .023, and 
the two groups generalised labels to familiar objects at equal rates. The rates at which 
TD children generalised labels to target pictures, target objects, novel pictures, and 
novel objects were equivalent and all significantly higher than rates of generalisation 
to distracter pictures (all ps < .001), distracter objects (all ps < .001), familiar pictures 
(all ps < .001) and familiar objects (all ps < .001), which were all equally low. Thus, 
TD children almost always generalised labels from colour photographs to similarly- 
shaped items, and almost never generalised to items that possessed a different shape. 
For children with ASD, rates of generalisation to target pictures and target objects 
were equivalent and significantly higher than rates for almost every other item (/?s = 
.001—.08; the difference between rates for target objects and novel pictures bordered 
on significance). Children with ASD generalised labels to novel pictures, novel 
objects, distracter pictures and distracter objects at statistically equivalent rates, that 
were all significantly above-chance (ts = 2.06-3.57,ps = .003-.056; rate of 
generalisation to the distracter object was borderline), and significantly greater than 
rates of generalisation to familiar pictures and familiar objects (all ps < .001), which
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were both equally low. Overall, children with ASD almost always generalised labels 
from pictures to items that matched depicted objects on shape and colour, but they 
also extend labels at above-chance rates to shape-matched items (novel 
pictures/object) and colour-matched items (distracter pictures/objects), suggesting that 
both perceptual cues directed their extension of words from photographs. As the ASD 
sample only consisted of males, two follow-up analyses were conducted to rule out a 
possible effect of Gender. Firstly, the data from the TD children were entered into a 
2(Gender) x 8(Item) mixed ANOVA, which showed that Gender had no influence on 
their generalisation of word-picture relations. Secondly, I reran the between-groups 
analyses including only the male TD children (n = 6). Exclusion of the female TD 
children yielded exactly the same Group x Item interaction and simple main effects as 
the primary analyses.
For TD children, generalisation rates did not correlate with chronological age, 
receptive language ability or nonverbal intellectual ability. This is unsurprising given 
that the whole group demonstrated the same general response pattern. For children 
with ASD, generalisation rates did not correlate with chronological age, nonverbal 
intellectual ability or years of PECS training. Generalisation to novel objects 
positively correlated with receptive language (r = .57, p — .02), and generalisation to 
distracter pictures negatively correlated with receptive language {r = -.53, p  = .03). 
Also, there were significant correlations between CARS score and generalisation to 
novel pictures (r = -.62, p  =.008) and novel objects (r = -.77,/? < .001). These 
correlations suggest that children with more severe autism were less likely to 




This study investigated the cues that direct the generalisation of words from 
colour photographs by low-functioning children with ASD and language-matched TD 
children. Participants were taught novel words paired with photographs of unfamiliar 
target objects, and were required to sort a series of items according to whether or not 
they were also referents of the newly-leamed labels. Children with ASD almost 
always extended labels to items that matched depicted objects on shape and colour, 
but also frequently generalised to items that matched on only shape or colour. By 
contrast, TD children only generalised labels to pictures and objects that matched the 
depicted referent’s shape. These findings suggest that low-functioning children with 
ASD understand that words paired with colour photographs relate to independently 
existing referents, however, they often generalise based on incorrect dimensions (i.e. 
colour). This atypical pattern of responding indicates a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the rules that govern symbolic word-picture-object relations.
The finding that children with ASD frequently generalised labels from colour 
photographs was somewhat surprising, given that Preissler (2008) and Hartley and 
Allen (Experiment 1; in press (a)) reported that children with ASD often form 
associative word-picture relations. It is likely that the higher rate of generalisation in 
this study was elicited by differences in the present word learning procedure. In both 
previous studies, children were required to actively pair words and target pictures over 
a minimum of 5 consecutive training trials, and were directly reinforced for doing so. 
This repeated and reinforced pairing may have nan-owed the referential relation to the 
extent that the picture itself (rather than the depicted object) was considered the 
referent of the word. Indeed, in a second experiment, Hartley and Allen showed that 
children with ASD tend to categorise pictures with their referents when word-referent
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relations are not reinforced (however, unlike TD children, children with ASD do 
require multiple pairings in order to map word-picture relations). I contend that the 
procedure in the present study was sufficient to foster learning of non-associative 
word-picture relations; children heard labels paired with target pictures multiple times, 
however, the relation was not narrowed through repeated reinforcement, enabling 
children with ASD to generalise.
Although children with ASD in this study extended labels from photographs to 
objects, they generalised based on both shape and colour at above-chance rates. 
Therefore, this low-functioning population did not display a shape bias; they utilised 
colour, a category-irrelevant cue, as a basis for naming just as frequently as shape, a 
category-defining cue. This atypical response pattern clearly indicates that children 
with ASD have significant difficulty organising new word-referent concepts around 
shape. Visual processing in children with ASD tends to be localised and feature-based 
(e.g. Mottron et al., 2006), and I argue that their failure to selectively attend to global 
shape when learning object names may subsequently impact on their ability to 
categorise via the abstraction of shape-based prototypes. Weak central coherence may 
prevent children with ASD from identifying similarity of global shape as the 
perceptual constraint that organises word-referent categories, thus inhibiting the 
development of a shape bias word learning heuristic. Consequently, in my sorting 
task, low-functioning children with ASD may have categorised pictures based on two 
separate parts -  shape and colour -  without deriving meaning from the sum of the 
information or global whole. This informs our understanding of how new concept 
fonnation in autism and typical development might differ. When TD children learn a 
novel word-picture relation, they generate a minimalist representation of the depicted 
referent’s shape, which provides a basis for comparison when deciding if additional
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objects belong to the same category and thus receive the same label. By contrast, 
children with ASD do not selectively abstract global shape and may instead generate 
mental representations that are characterised by multiple, equally-weighted, perceptual 
details (e.g. shape and colour) that serve as independent bases for label extension.
Generalisation to novel category members (shape-matched items) was 
negatively correlated with CARS score, suggesting that children with more severe 
autism were less likely to generalise labels from photographs based on similarity of 
shape. As nonverbal intellectual ability did not correlate with generalisation rates for 
any items, we can conclude that this effect was not an artefact of higher cognitive 
ability in children with lower CARS scores. It is possible that those children with the 
most severe autism experience the greatest difficulty recognising sameness of shape 
when categorising novel objects that differ in colour and, for these children, colour 
may be the most pertinent cue when establishing new word-referent concepts (see 
Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). Receptive language also positively correlated with 
generalisation to novel objects, and negatively correlated with generalisation to 
distracter pictures. Although previous research suggests that the shape bias is directly 
related to language development in young TD children (e.g. Tek et al., 2008), it is 
difficult to draw a similar conclusion here given that receptive language did not 
correlate with generalisation to novel pictures or distracter objects.
At an applied level, this study provides further evidence that iconic colour 
pictures facilitate the generalisation of words to objects in children with ASD (also see 
Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). As such, it could be beneficial to deliver picture-based 
interventions, such as PECS, using iconic colour pictures in order to maximise the 
probability that recipients map referential word-picture-object relations. However, 
given that low-functioning children with ASD have difficulty abstracting shape as the
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key constraint underlying word-referent relations, it is possible that their 
categorisation is rule-based. Due to impairments in prototype formation (Klinger & 
Dawson, 2001), it may be that children with ASD require multiple experiences with a 
variety of category members in order to generate hypotheses that correctly define 
category membership. As such, it may be beneficial to deliver picture-based 
interventions using differently-coloured depictions of objects in order to increase the 
likelihood that children with ASD recognise that shape, rather than colour, defines 
category membership. The benefits of such training would be an interesting topic for 
future research.
The failure of children with ASD to demonstrate a shape bias when 
generalising labels from photographs cannot be attributed to insufficient language 
development, as all children had a receptive language age of at least 2-years -  the age 
at which the shape bias typically emerges. Furthermore, Tek and colleagues (2008) 
showed that the absence of a shape bias in autism is not related to general word 
learning deficits, inadequate vocabulary size, or the inability to notice similarity of 
shape among visual stimuli. Indeed, Hartley and Allen (in press (a)) showed that low- 
functioning children with ASD are good at matching even black-and-white line 
drawings with similarly-shaped objects regardless of labelling. Thus, it appears that 
low-functioning children with ASD have specific difficulty identifying shape as the 
primary cue that directs the mapping of categorical word-picture-object relations. 
Naturally, I must caution against generalising these results to high-functioning 
children or adults with autism. However, it is important to state that the children who 
participated in this study were representative of the population that this research is 
most relevant to: low-functioning individuals with impaired language development 
who receive and benefit from picture-based communication interventions.
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In summary, this study has shown that low-functioning children with ASD 
form referential relations between words and colour photographs, however, they do 
not evidence a shape bias when generalising labels to real objects. I propose that 
deficits in categorisation and prototype formation (e.g. Klinger & Dawson, 2001) may 
prevent children with ASD from privileging shape as a basis for generalising word- 
picture relations. Consequently, they are just as likely to incorrectly extend labels to 
objects that match depicted referents on colour (but not shape). Conversely, language- 
matched TD children only generalise labels to objects that belong to the same 
category as depicted objects, as indicated by sameness of shape, rather than sameness 
of colour. Thus, this study is the first to demonstrate that different cues constrain the 
mapping of novel word-picture-object relations for TD children and children with 
ASD.
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Chapter Four: The effect of iconicity on the performance of low-functioning 
children with autism in a pictorial search task.7
Some pictures are intended to inform viewers about specific objects, people 
and events in the world (they are contextualised). The ability to utilise these pictures 
requires the understanding that visual representations correspond to specific elements 
of reality, even if they are absent at the time of viewing. Through infancy and early 
childhood, typically developing (TD) children learn what pictures are and how they 
relate to real world referents (Callaghan, 2000, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2011;
DeLoache & Bums, 1994; Ganea et al., 2008, Preissler & Carey, 2004; Suddendorf, 
2003). During this developmental period, children’s success at using pictures as a 
source of information is contingent on several mediating factors, including iconicity 
(Ganea et al., 2008; Simcock & DeLoache, 2006), linguistic scaffolding (Callaghan, 
2000) and the ability to infer referential intentions (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; 
Preissler & Bloom, 2008; Salsa & Peralta de Mendoza, 2007). For many low- 
functioning children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), pictures provide an 
alternative form of functional communication in the absence of verbal language 
(Anderson et al., 2007; Lord, Risi & Pickles, 2004; Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz & 
Klin, 2004). However, despite the popularity of picture-based communication 
interventions, such as the Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS; Frost & 
Bondy, 2002), little research has investigated the ability of children with ASD to 
contextualise symbolic information communicated by pictures.
7 Based on Hartley, C., & Allen, M. (revisions under review). Iconicity influences how effectively 
children with autism use pictures as symbols in a search task. Journal o f  Experimental Child 
Psychology.
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Pictures are unique in that they are both symbolic representations of 
independently-existing referents and 3-D objects in their own right (Sigel, 1978). With 
experience, children develop an increasingly nuanced concept of how pictures are 
both similar and different from their referents, and how these qualities should guide 
their behaviour towards pictures (DeLoache & Bums, 1994; DeLoache et al., 1998). 
Once acquired, it is thought that the ‘Picture’ concept activates automatically 
whenever a picture is encountered, triggering the formation of a ‘dual representation’ 
(a mental representation of both the symbolised referent and the picture’s status as an 
independent concrete object). For example, if we see a picture of a flower, the 
corresponding dual-representation would consist of ‘Picture’ and ‘Flower’. 
Recognition of the flower’s perceptual properties activates the mental representation 
corresponding to ‘Flower’ (including the associated semantic information and verbal 
label), but the ‘Picture’ tag inhibits the activation of information relating to the 
physical interactive properties o f ‘Flower’. Thus, the ‘Picture’ concept serves to 
prevent direct physical action by decontextualising the mental representation elicited 
by the referential content of the picture (DeLoache & Bums, 1994).
The decontextualizing component of the ‘Picture’ concept serves to prevent 
one’s mental representation of a picture from merging with their representation of 
reality (Leslie, 1987). However, some pictures are intended to communicate 
information that directly relates to specific realities. In their classic study, DeLoache 
and Bums (1994) investigated the ability of 24- and 30-month-old TD children to 
contextualise pictorial symbols. In their task, an experimenter concealed a toy in one 
of several hiding places in a room, and then communicated the location of the toy by 
showing children a picture of the toy in its hiding place. Children were then allowed to 
enter the room and search for the toy. Crucially, children never saw the depicted room
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and the real room concurrently -  they had to rely on their internal representation of the 
picture to guide their searching, and update their internal representation to 
accommodate changes in hiding location.
In their first experiment, DeLoache and Bums (1994) found that the 
performance of 24- and 30-month-old TD children differed; the older children 
searched the correct location first-time in 72% of trials, while the younger children’s 
rate of errorless retrieval was just 13%. These contrasting success rates suggest that 
TD children aged 24-months failed to represent any relation between the depicted 
room and the real room, whereas children just 6 months older were competent at using 
the picture to guide their actions in reality. Moreover, the errorless retrieval rate of 24- 
month-olds could not be significantly improved through facilitatory procedural 
adjustments (e.g. observing the experimenter create photographs of hiding locations 
using a Polaroid camera prior to searching). DeLoache and Bums (1994) claim that 
24-month-old TD children fail in the search task because they have yet to learn that 
pictures can be contextualised. Despite explicit instructions and demonstrations 
suggesting that the pictures of hiding locations should be contextualised, their mental 
representations maintained their rigid decontextualized status. Consequently, these 
young children viewed the pictures as if they were non-informative depictions of a 
random or generic room, rather than highly-informative representations of the specific 
room they were required to search.
However, Suddendorf (2003) proposed that poor performance on the search 
task could be explained by children’s inability to suppress a mental representation of a 
picture that was formed on a previous trial. Indeed, the most frequent mistake made by 
24-month-olds was exploring the hiding place that was correct on the immediately 
preceding trial (a ‘perseveration error’; DeLoache & Bums, 1994). In one experiment,
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Suddendorf (2003) found that nearly 60% of 24-month-old TD children searched the 
correct location on the first trial of the search task, but their mean errorless retrieval 
rate dropped below-chance across 4 trials, with 2 thirds of all errors due to 
perseveration. In another experiment that cleverly mimicked first-trial conditions in all 
4 trials (each trial involved a different toy, a different room, and a different set of 
hiding locations), 24-month-olds’ overall errorless retrieval rate significantly 
exceeded chance. Thus, in conditions that preclude proactive interference from prior 
representations, even 24-month-olds can contextualise symbolic information 
communicated by photographs. Furthermore, it is important that contemporary studies 
employing search task paradigms are designed to minimise perseverative responding, 
which may be particularly prevalent in children with ASD (e.g. Shu et al., 2001).
Before approximately 3-years of age, children’s ability to contextualise 
pictures is heavily influenced by several independent factors. One factor is iconicity, 
the perceptual resemblance between a symbol and its referent. According to DeLoache 
(1995), “iconicity generally facilitates symbol use” (p. I l l ) :  higher levels of 
perceptual similarity between picture and referent make the symbolic relationship 
more salient, increasing the likelihood that the viewer will map the correspondence 
between the two and draw an inference from one to the other. Several studies have 
shown that symbolically-inexperienced children are increasingly likely to 
contextualise highly-iconic pictures (e.g. photographs) than less-iconic pictures (e.g. 
line drawings). For example, the degree that young TD children successfully imitate a 
sequence of actions following a picture-book reading interaction varies as a function 
of iconicity (Simcock & DeLoache, 2006) and typically developing 15-18-month-olds 
are more likely to generalise a label to an object depicted in a highly iconic 
photograph rather than a moderately iconic cartoon (Ganea et al., 2008).
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Another influence on children’s picture comprehension is language. Kirkham 
and colleagues’ finding that language predicted, but was not predicted by, picture 
production and symbolic play suggests that linguistic symbols are mastered earlier in 
development and henceforth serve as a scaffolding base for other symbolic domains 
(Kirkham et al., 2012). Callaghan proposes that, through picture-book reading 
interactions, young TD children become increasingly adept at naming pictures without 
necessarily developing a conceptual understanding of how they relate to objects 
(Callaghan & Rankin, 2002). By labelling a picture, the child essentially substitutes 
the relatively unfamiliar graphic symbol with a familiar linguistic symbol that is easier 
to comprehend. Linguistic scaffolding of this nature can also bolster children’s 
performance in experimental paradigms. For example, if a child in DeLoache’s search 
task is shown a photograph of a chair, the child’s recognition of the referent object 
may trigger the retrieval of the associated linguistic representation, ‘chair’, which can 
be held in mind while searching the room. The child might then recognise the referent 
of the memorised word and make an errorless retrieval, without being explicitly aware 
that the picture was intended to represent that location in the room. Thus, it may be 
that children’s ability to contextualise pictorial information is initially supported by 
their linguistic system (Callaghan, 1999, 2000, 2008; Callaghan & Rankin, 2002).
Children’s contextualisation of pictures is also mediated by their ability to 
infer their intended symbolic-communicative function from other picture-users (Salsa 
& Peralta de Mendoza, 2007). In a series of studies (see Peralta, Salsa, Maita & 
Mareovich, 2012), TD children aged 2.5-years completed an object retrieval task 
using a small furnished space and colour photographs depicting individual hiding 
places. Some children received complete instructions from the experimenter that 
highlighted both the individual picture-object correspondences and the intended
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symbolic function of the pictures, some received no instructions, and some received 
instructions that highlighted either the one-to-one picture-object correspondences or 
the pictures’ intended function as a source of information about the hidden toy. It was 
shown that children achieved above-chance retrieval rates when the instructions 
highlighted the intended function of the pictures, and performed below-chance when 
this information was omitted. Therefore, young children’s ability to contextualise 
symbolic information communicated by pictures is dependent on their ability to infer 
from others their intended function in a given situation.
Despite the prevalence of PECS in educational and clinical settings, and the 
ubiquitous use of pictures as communicative supports in classroom environments, no 
research to date has investigated the ability of low-functioning children with ASD to 
contextualise pictorial symbols using a search task paradigm. However, those studies 
that have investigated picture comprehension in children with ASD suggest that this 
population may have a fundamental difficulty understanding the symbolic nature of 
pictures (Allen, 2009; Hartley & Allen, in press (a); Preissler, 2008). For example, in 
Preissler (2008), low-functioning children with ASD were taught a novel word (e.g. 
“Whisk”) repeatedly paired with a black-and-white line drawing of an unfamiliar 
object (e.g. a whisk). At test, children were asked to identify the referent of the newly- 
leamed word when presented with the drawing and the previously unseen depicted 
object. In this paradigm, TD children aged 18-24 months almost always extend the 
label to the depicted object (Hartley & Allen, in press (a); Preissler & Carey, 2004), 
demonstrating their knowledge that pictures and words are symbolic. By contrast, 
children with ASD (especially PECS-users) displayed a strong tendency to select the 
picture alone, suggesting that they failed to understand that pictures represent specific 
3-D referents.
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At a theoretical level, there are several reasons why symbolic understanding of 
pictures may be impaired in low-functioning children with ASD. Research 
investigating the acquisition of pictorial understanding has shown that social-cognitive 
skills (e.g. intention reading and imitation) enable TD children to learn about pictures 
through interactions with symbolically-experienced adults (Callaghan & Rankin,
2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2004; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). 
However, many children with ASD show deficits in the social-cognitive skills that 
underlie pictorial development (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 
2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996). Thus, if a low-functioning child 
with autism is unable to infer representational intentions from a social partner’s 
communicative actions involving pictures, they may fail to learn that pictures are 
symbols for specific real-world objects. Additionally, because early picture 
comprehension is scaffolded by symbolic understanding of words (Callaghan, 2000; 
Kirkham et al., 2012), severe linguistic impairments (Anderson et al., 2007; Lord, Risi 
& Pickles, 2004) may also inhibit children with ASD from recognising referential 
relations between pictures and objects. Therefore, in the absence of intention-reading 
abilities and linguistic scaffolding, it may be that some low-functioning children with 
ASD can only relate pictures to objects in their enviromnent by virtue of resemblance.
It is possible that picture-object mapping in some children with ASD is 
contingent on a high degree of iconicity. In line with this theory, Hartley and Allen (in 
press (a); see Chapter 2) recently found that low-functioning children with ASD were 
much more likely to generalise labels to objects depicted in highly-iconic colour 
pictures than less-iconic non-colour pictures. These findings implicate colour as an 
important influence on whether children with ASD comprehend symbolic picture- 
referent relations and extend labels to depicted objects. However, it is important to
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note that children in this study viewed pictures alongside the depicted objects, and 
perhaps this simultaneous viewing encouraged children to map referential picture- 
object relations. It is currently unknown whether iconicity facilitates picture 
comprehension in children with ASD when picture and referent are not viewed 
concurrently, and mapping is based on a mental representation of the picture. One 
might predict that children with ASD would be more successful at contextualising 
colour pictures in real life environments because the corresponding mental 
representations can be matched to potential referents based on two dimensions -  shape 
and/or colour. By contrast, children with ASD might have difficulty contextualising 
non-colour pictures because the corresponding mental representations are defined only 
by shape, which may not be sufficient for children with ASD to map referential 
picture-object relations (Preissler, 2008). Evidence of this dichotomy would have 
important implications for PECS and other picture-based educational supports. There 
are many symbol sets designed for use with PECS that provide graphic representations 
of vocabulary (e.g. Blissymbols, Picsyms, Picture Communication Symbols), but the 
pictures within and between these sets vary considerably along the continuum of 
iconicity (Bloomberg et al., 1990; Mirenda & Locke, 1989). If the ability of children 
with ASD to contextualise mental representations of pictures is contingent on a high 
degree of iconicity, educators and therapists would have a data-grounded rationale for 
selecting highly iconic symbols for picture-based treatments.
The present study investigates the ability of low-functioning children with 
ASD to solve a search task by contextualising symbolic information communicated by 
pictures. Previous studies of picture comprehension in autism have examined how 
children learn word-picture relations and then generalise labels to objects that are 
viewed concurrently. Here, I employ a task that does not involve word learning, and
108
children could not simultaneously view depicted and real hiding locations while 
searching -  they had to generate a mental representation of the depicted hiding 
location and then identify the corresponding 3-D referent. In each trial, children were 
introduced to a small toy character who was said to enjoy hiding underneath things. A 
unique set of 4 occluders (various upturned buckets) were presented and the 
experimenter demonstrated the toy hiding under each one. Children were then shown 
4 pictures, one representing each occluder, and the experimenter pointed out the one- 
to-one picture-referent correspondences and stated their intended function 
(information that is critical to children’s understanding of the task; e.g. Salsa &
Peralta de Mendoza, 2007). Participants then left the room and the toy was hidden 
underneath one of the occluders. Outside the room, the experimenter showed the child 
a picture of that occluder and the child was then allowed to search for the hidden toy. 
Stimuli were designed to minimise perseverative responding.
There were two independent variables: pictorial iconicity and familiarity of 
depicted referents. Children played the “hide and seek” game on 3 different days using 
colour photographs (matched referents on shape and colour), line drawings (matched 
referents only on shape) and ‘abstract pictures’ (matched referents only on colour). It 
was predicted that children with ASD would be most successful in colour photograph 
trials and perform poorly in line drawing trials. I also expected children with ASD to 
perform poorly in abstract picture trials as, in the absence of conventional shape-based 
resemblance, children needed to infer intended picture-referent relations from the 
communicative behaviour of the experimenter. Referent familiarity was manipulated 
in colour photograph and line drawing trials; in some trials the occluders were 
individuated by familiar nameable objects that were clearly visible in their pictures, 
and in other trials the occluders were individuated by unfamiliar unnameable objects.
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If children with ASD explicitly employ language when decoding pictures, they would 
be expected to perform better on familiar than unfamiliar trials. Importantly, this study 
will shed light on the cues that mediate the ability of children with ASD to use 




Participants were 16 low-functioning children with ASD (all male; M  age =
9.9 years, range = 4.1-16.1 years) and 16 TD children (6 males, 11 females; M age = 
3.6 years, range: 2.2-6.4 years). Children with ASD were recruited from a specialist 
school in Preston, United Kingdom. TD children were recruited from primary schools, 
nurseries and preschools in Kendal, United Kingdom. All children with ASD received 
a diagnosis of autism from a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, using 
standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism 
Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert 
judgment. Diagnosis was confirmed using the CARS (Schopler et al., 1980), which 
was completed by a class teacher (M score: 40.66, range: 31.5-51.5). Groups were 
matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997).8 Mean receptive vocabulary of children with ASD was 
3.6-years (range: 2-6.2 years) and mean receptive vocabulary of TD children was 3.6- 
years (range: 2-5.4 years). In addition, the nonverbal intellectual abilities of each
8 The BPVS scores o f 3 children with ASD and 2 TD children were marginally below the lowest raw 
score with a standardised age equivalent (of 2.3 years). Consequently, we conservatively assigned these 
5 children a receptive language ability of exactly 2 years. Although it would have been desirable to 
ascertain a standardised language score for every child with autism, it is important to note that this 
research is particularly relevant to individuals with language impairments who have difficulty with 
standardised assessments, display challenging behaviours and use pictures to facilitate communication.
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group were measured using the Leiter-R (Roid & Miller, 1997), a nonverbal measure 
of IQ that is specifically designed and normed for use with linguistically impaired 
individuals. The mean IQ of children with ASD was 57.5 (range: 36-95), indicating 
impairments in nonverbal intellectual development and confirming the low- 
functioning status of the sample. However, the nonverbal performance of TD children 
and children with ASD at the time of testing, as indicated by participants’ raw scores, 
was not significantly different, r(30) = -.19, p  = .44.
All children with ASD were current PECS-users with impaired expressive 
language skills. The language abilities of children within the sample varied somewhat, 
as is expected in a low-functioning population. Seven children with autism were 
functionally non-verbal (no spoken words), 6 had some words and produced 
utterances of 1-3 words in length (however, echolalia accounted for many utterances 
in this group) and 3 could speak some short phrases over 4 words in length. Thus, the 
sample was linguistically representative of children with autism who receive and 
benefit from picture-based communication interventions. Participants’ experience 
using PECS varied between 5 months and 10 years. Their progress through the 
programme ranged from Stage 1 to fully-trained user (see Frost & Bondy, 2002). The 
pictures used by participants to communicate varied on an individual basis, with 
coloured drawings/symbols and black-and-white drawings/symbols being the most 
common. Several children used a mixture of picture types that varied in iconicity and 
only four children in the sample used “some” colour photographs. A number of 
children acquired spoken words through the use of PECS. Pictures scaffolded the 
spoken language of the 3 children who produced longer utterances (4+ words), 
particularly when learning new concepts and during communication therapy sessions.
Materials
The stimuli were small toy figures, sets of plastic occluders and pictorial 
representations of those occluders varying in iconicity. There were 4 toy figures that 
resembled familiar characters from children’s media (Buzz Lightyear, Scooby Doo, 
Thomas the Tank Engine, Mickey Mouse). Each toy figure was approximately 6cm 
tall and could be hidden easily under each type of occluder.
The construction of the occluders was informed by evidence that children’s 
tendency to perseverate can disguise their true ability to comprehend symbolic 
picture-referent relations (Suddendorf, 2003) and that children’s early understanding 
of pictures is scaffolded by their use of linguistic representations (Callaghan, 2000). 
The 16 occluders were made from different types of upturned containers (see Fig. 8). 
Four occluders were made from cube-shaped boxes (12cm tall, 12cm wide), four were 
made from sandcastle buckets (14cm tall, 15cm wide), four were made from jelly 
moulds (9.5cm tall, 15.5cm wide) and four were made from large plastic drinking 
goblets (18cm tall, 9cm wide). The four occluders made from the same type of 
container were grouped together in a set. Thus, there were 4 sets of occluders; the 
occluders within each set were all made from the same type of container (e.g. four 
jelly moulds), but the sets of occluders were markedly different from each other, 
reducing the likelihood of perseveration across trials. Furthermore, each of the 16 
occluders was painted a unique colour using Plasti-kote spray paint. This modification 
meant that occluders within each set could be discriminated on colour, enabling the 
inclusion of an ‘Abstract Picture’ condition in which colour was the only cue to 
intended picture-referent mappings.
In order to assess the impact of iconicity via a black-and-white ‘Line Drawing’ 
condition, the shape of occluders had to be modified so that hiding locations in the
same trial could be discriminated in the absence of colour. This was achieved by 
attaching a unique individuating object to the top of each occluder (see Fig. 8). Eight 
of the individuating objects were highly familiar (plastic apple, toy baby bottle, toy 
plane, soft toy dog, baby book, toy car, rubber duck, miniature chair), and were 
selected on the basis that the majority of children understand their linguistic labels by 
15-months (Fensen, Dale, Reznick, Bates, Thai & Pethick, 1994). These 8 familiar 
individuating objects were divided into two groups of 4, and each group was attached 
to a set of occluders (sandcastle buckets and boxes). The other eight individuating 
objects were very unfamiliar, and were selected on the basis that no children in the 
samples tested would know their linguistic labels. These 8 unfamiliar individuating 
objects were also divided into two groups of 4, and each group was attached to a set of 
occluders (jelly moulds and goblets). By comparing performance on trials involving 
occluders topped with familiar nameable objects versus unfamiliar unnameable 
objects, it could be determined whether access to a linguistic representation is 
necessary for picture comprehension in low-functioning children with ASD. 
Individuating objects were a different colour from the occluder they were attached to, 
and objects in the same set were all different colours. Individuating objects were glued 
to small metal disks and attached to occluders using self-adhesive Velcro, allowing 
them to be removed for Abstract Picture trials. The mean height of each occluder set, 
including their individuating objects, was as follows: 19cm for the food boxes, 22cm 
for the sandcastle buckets, 17cm for the jelly moulds and 16cm for the goblets.
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Figure 8. Occluders used in Experiment 4; a-d) Set 1 (familiar individuating objects), 
e-h) Set 2 (familiar individuating objects). i-I) Set 3 (unfamiliar individuating objects), 
m-p) Set 4 (unfamiliar individuating objects).
By attaching different individuating objects, hiding locations made from the 
same type of container could be discriminated on the basis of shape in black-and- 
white line drawings. Also, their addition meant that each possible hiding location was
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unique, and that the appearances of hiding locations in different trials varied on 3 
dimensions (shape of occluder, colour of occluder, and individuating object). By 
removing similarities between occluders in different trials, the likelihood of children 
perseverating was reduced and the probability that they would successfully map new 
picture-referent relations was increased (Suddendorf, 2003). When not in use, the sets 
of occluders were kept out of view in opaque storage boxes.
Three pictures of each occluder were created. One picture was a colour 
photograph, one picture was a black-and-white line drawing and one picture was an 
abstract representation that only resembled its referent on the basis of colour (see Fig. 
9). Colour photographs were taken of each occluder with a 9.2 megapixel camera and 
edited using Adobe Photoshop. The black-and-white line drawings were created using 
a black ‘finewriter’ pen and white paper. Digital copies of each drawing were created 
and their sizes were adjusted to match their photograph counterparts. The dimensions 
of the photographs and line drawings varied slightly according to the different 
dimensions of the occluders with their unique individuating objects attached (heights 
ranged from 8 to 10.5cm and widths ranged from 5.5cm to 6.5cm). Crucially, pictures 
of occluders in the same set were exactly the same scale (they only varied on height: 
taller occluders had taller pictures than shorter occluders) and all pictures were large 
enough to clearly perceive the details of individuating objects. The abstract pictures 
were created in Microsoft PowerPoint by generating 16 ‘cloud shapes’ and colouring 
them to match the 16 occluders. Thus, for every occluder, there was an abstract cloud 
picture that was exactly the same colour. The abstract pictures were 6cm tall and 
6.5cm wide. To avoid confusion, the individuating objects (which contrasted in colour 
with their respective occluders) were removed in the abstract condition. All pictures 




Figure 9. Example pictorial stimuli used in Experiment 4; a and b) colour 
photographs, c and d) black-and-white line drawings, e and f) abstract colour pictures.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on three different days (approximately 1 
week apart) in their own schools and were always accompanied by a familiar adult. 
Children were reinforced throughout each session for attention and good behaviour. 
Sessions comprised of 4 trials and each trial consisted o f an Orientation Stage and a 
Test Stage. Participants received one level o f Iconicity in each session. In other words,
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children completed 4 trials with colour photographs in one session, 4 trials with black- 
and-white line drawings in another session and 4 trials with abstract colour pictures in 
another session. The order in which the three levels of Iconicity were administered 
was counterbalanced between participants. The same 4 toys and the same 4 sets of 
occluders were used in each session. Sessions began with the experimenter asking the 
child if they would like to play a game of hide-and-seek.
Orientation Stage
The purpose of the Orientation Stage was to familiarise the child with the toy 
character, occluders and pictures that would be used in the trial. At the start of the 
trial, the experimenter showed the child a small toy character and began to explain the 
task (e.g. “This is Buzz and Buzz likes to hide underneath things”). A different toy 
character was used in each of the 4 trials, and their order of use was randomly 
determined. The experimenter then presented one set of 4 occluders in a line in front 
of the child and explained their role (e.g. “These are the things that Buzz likes to hide 
underneath.”). A different set of occluders was used in each of the 4 trials. In the 
colour photograph and black-and-white line drawing conditions, two sets of occluders 
were topped with familiar nameable objects and two sets were topped with unfamiliar 
unnameable objects. In the abstract picture condition, the individuating objects were 
removed from the tops of the occluders. The occluder sets were presented in a 
different order in each session, and the relative position of the occluders within each 
set was randomly determined. The experimenter then demonstrated the toy hiding 
under each occluder from left-to-right or right-to-left (counterbalanced across trials) 
(e.g. “See, Buzz might hide under here. Or he might hide under here. Or, he might 
hide under here. Or, he might hide under here”). Next, the experimenter presented the 
pictures of the occluders. Each picture was positioned in front of its respective
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occluder and the child’s attention was drawn to each picture-referent relation from 
left-to-right or right-to-left (opposite direction to the hiding demonstration). The 
experimenter explicitly stated that the pictures were intended to help the child solve 
the task (e.g. “Now look at these pictures! These are pictures of where Buzz likes to 
hide. See, this one looks like this. And this one looks like this. This one looks like this. 
And this one looks like this. The pictures will show you where to look for Buzz when 
he hides!”). The Orientation Stage ended at this point and transitioned to the Test 
Stage.
Test Stage
The Test Stage began with the experimenter leading the participant and their 
familiar adult a short distance away from the testing location so that the occluders 
were not visible to them (e.g. “Ok, let’s play hide-and-seek with Buzz! First we need 
to let Buzz hide...”). The experimenter then explained that they would leave 
momentarily to hide the toy, and that the child could search for the toy once they got 
back (e.g. “I’m going to help Buzz hide underneath something, and when I come back, 
you can go find him!”). The experimenter returned to the test array and positioned the 
toy underneath one of the occluders in the array. As the occluders were positioned in a 
line, the toy could be hidden in one of the following locations: far left, middle left, 
middle right, far right. The toy was hidden at a different location on each of the 4 
trials in a session. The order of hiding locations was randomised before each session. 
The experimenter then returned to the child with the picture that represented the 
hiding location, showed the child the picture and informed them that the toy was 
hiding there (e.g. “This is where Buzz is hiding [pointing to picture]. Can you find 
Buzz here?”). The pictures depicting the three other occluders were hidden before the 
child began their search. If the participant failed to find the toy on their first search,
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the experimenter provided a prompt (e.g. “Remember, Buzz is hiding in the same 
place as I pointed in the picture.”). If they searched unsuccessfully again, the 
experimenter offered more explicit cues until the toy was discovered. Upon finding 
the toy, the experimenter offered positive verbal reinforcement. The occluders and toy 
character were removed from view and the four pictures of the occluders in that trial 
were presented in a line in front of the child. As a memory control, the child was 
asked to identify the picture they had been shown in isolation (e.g. “Which picture did 
I show you?”). If a child failed to find the toy on their first search and also failed to 
identify the correct picture, this would suggest their error was caused by poor memory 
rather than a lack of symbolic understanding. This memory control question was 
asked at the end of every trial, regardless of whether the child found the toy on their 
first search.
Following the memory control, the experimenter administered the next trial. 
The Orientation Stage and Test Stage, as described above, were repeated for each trial 
until all 4 trials in the session were completed.
4.1.2 Results
The number of errorless retrievals (out of 4) made by children in each 
Iconicity condition was calculated. A response was coded as an errorless retrieval if 
the child’s first search was in the correct location and was unprompted. Incorrect 
responses were coded as either a perseveration error (searching the location that had 
served as the hiding place on the immediately preceding trial) or a non-perseveration 
error (searching an incorrect location that was not the hiding place on the immediately 
preceding trial). For ease of interpretation, the descriptive statistics are presented in 
subsections corresponding to the three levels of Iconicity.
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Colour Photographs
Children with ASD made errorless retrievals on 72% of Familiar trials (M = 
1.44, SD = 0.81), and 75% of Unfamiliar trials (M= 1.5, SD = 0.63). Examination of 
error data showed that 23.5% and 76.5% of errors made by children with ASD were 
perseverative and non-perseverative respectively. TD children made errorless 
retrievals on 84.5% of Familiar trials (M= 1.69, SD = 0.6) and 78% of Unfamiliar 
trials (M= 1.56, SD = 0.81). Of all errors made by TD children, 33.3% were 
perseverative and 66.7% were non-perseverative.
Line Drawings
Children with ASD made errorless retrievals on 65% of Familiar trials (M = 
1.31, SD = 0.79) and 50% of Unfamiliar trials (M= 1, SD = 0.89). In this condition, 
27.6% of errors made by children with ASD were perseverative and 72.4% were non- 
perseverative. TD children made errorless retrievals on 62.5% of Familiar trials (M = 
1.25, SD = 0.93) and 59.5% of Unfamiliar trials (M= 1.19, SD = 0.98). Error data 
showed that 24% of errors made by TD children were perseverative, and 76% were 
non-perseverative.
Abstract Pictures
Children with ASD made errorless retrievals on 62.5% of trials (M= 2.5, SD =
1.4) -  trials did not vary on Familiarity as the individuating items were removed from 
the tops of occluders. Only 16.7% of errors made by children with ASD were 
perseverative, and 83.3% were non-perseverative. TD children made errorless 
retrievals on 67.3% of trials (M= 2.69, SD = 1.25). Just 23.8% of errors made by TD 
children were perseverative and 76.2% were non-perseverative.
The first analyses examine the effect of Iconicity in isolation. The Familiar and 
Unfamiliar trials in the Colour Photograph and Line Drawing conditions were
collapsed, and entered into the analysis with the Abstract Picture data (see Fig. 10 for 
mean rates of errorless retrievals). A 2(Group: ASD, TD) x 3 (Iconicity: Colour 
Photograph, Line Drawing, Abstract Picture) mixed ANOVA was conducted, which 
revealed a significant main effect of Iconicity, F(2, 60) = 12.93, MSE = 0.39, p  < .001, 
rip = .3. Pairwise comparisons subjected to the Bonferroni correction showed that 
both groups made significantly more errorless retrievals in Colour Photograph trials 
than in Line Drawing Trials (/? < .001) and Abstract Picture trials (p = .003), which 
were not statistically different from each other. There was no effect of Group and no 
interaction. Additionally, both groups performed significantly above-chance (1 
errorless retrieval; alpha value corrected to .0083 to compensate for multiple 
comparisons) in Colour Photograph trials (ASD: *( 15) = 5.78,/? < .001, d = 2.98; TD: 
£(15) = 6.71, p  < .001, d = 3.47), Line Drawing trials (ASD: *(15) = 3.05,/? = .008, d = 
1.58; TD: *(15) = 3.36,/? = .004, d = 1.74) and Abstract Picture trials (ASD: *(15) = 
4.11,/? = .001, d=  2.12; TD: *(15) = 5.4,/? < .001, d=  2.79). Thus, low-functioning 
children with ASD and TD children were able to contextualise all picture types, 
however, performance in both groups was facilitated by a high degree of Iconicity (i.e. 
they were most successful in Colour Photograph trials).
121
M  no. 
errorless 
retrievals
Photographs Line Drawing Abstract Pictures
Iconicity
Figure 10. Mean errorless retrieval rates for each picture type in Experiment 4 
(participant groups collapsed). Chance-level responding indicated by the dashed line 
and bars represent standard error o f the mean.
The second analyses investigated whether Familiarity o f depicted referents 
influenced children’s ability to contextualise pictorial symbols. The data from 
Familiar and Unfamiliar trials in the Colour Photograph and Line Drawing trials were 
entered into a 2(Group: ASD, TD) x 2(Iconicity: Colour Photograph, Line Drawing) 
x 2(Familiarity: Familiar, Unfamiliar) mixed ANOVA. As above, there was a 
significant main effect o f Iconicity, F ( l ,  30) = 14.51, M SE  = 0 2 9 , p  = .001, pp2 = .33, 
indicating that both groups made significantly more errorless retrievals in the Colour 
Photograph trials than Line Drawing trials. There was no effect o f Familiarity and no 
interactions. Therefore, access to linguistic representations relating to the shapes o f 
depicted referents had no influence on children’s ability to contextualise pictorial 
symbols in the hide-and-seek task.
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The following analyses examine the relationships between chronological age, 
receptive language and errorless retrieval rates in each of the Iconicity conditions. As 
the preceding ANOVAs failed to identify any populations differences, TD children 
and children with ASD were collapsed for the regressions to provide sufficient power. 
Colour photographs
For TD children, chronological age and receptive language both positively 
correlated with performance in Colour Photograph trials (Age: r(14) = A l ,p  = .066; 
Receptive language: r(14) = .51, p  = .042). For children with ASD, performance in 
Colour Photograph trials positively correlated with receptive language, (r( 14) = .69, p  
= .003), and nonverbal ability, (r(14) = .69,p  = .003). To establish which factor(s) 
significantly predicted errorless retrieval rates, chronological age, receptive language, 
nonverbal ability and group (TD, ASD) were entered as predictor variables into a 
stepwise regression. The analysis yielded a significant model containing only 
receptive language ability, F (l, 30) =17, MSE = 1.16,/? < .001, which accounted for
? 736% of variation in performance (R = .36 , Adjusted R = .34).
Line Drawings
For TD children, chronological age, receptive language and nonverbal ability 
all positively correlated with performance in Line Drawing trials (Age: r(14) = .68,/?
= .004; Receptive language: r(14) = .75,/? = .001; Nonverbal ability: r(14) = .6,/? = 
.013). For children with ASD, receptive language and nonverbal ability both 
positively correlated with performance in Line Drawing trials (Receptive language: 
r(14) = .69,/? = .003; Nonverbal ability: r(14) = .64,/? = .008). As above, 
chronological age, receptive language, nonverbal ability and group (TD, ASD) were 
entered as predictor variables into a stepwise regression. The analysis produced a 
significant model containing only receptive language, F (l, 30) = 30.93, MSE = 1.33,/?
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< .001, which accounted for 51% of variation in performance (R2 = .51 , Adjusted R2 
= .49).
Abstract Pictures
For TD children, chronological age, receptive language and nonverbal ability 
positively correlated with performance in Abstract Picture trials (Age: r(14) = •8 ,p <  
.001; Receptive language: r(14) = .82,p <  .001; Nonverbal ability: r( 14) = .62,p  = 
.01). For children with ASD, receptive language, r(14) = .74, p  = .001, and nonverbal 
ability, r(14) = .58,p  = .019, both positively correlated with performance in Abstract 
Picture trials. Chronological age, receptive language, nonverbal ability and group (TD, 
ASD) were entered into a stepwise regression, which calculated a significant model 
containing only receptive language, F (l, 30) = 44.4, MSE = 0.75,p  < .001, and 
accounted for 60% of variation in performance (R1 = .6 , Adjusted R2 = .58).
To summarise, the results of the preceding analyses clearly implicate both 
iconicity and receptive language as important mediators of children’s ability to 
contextualise pictures. TD children and children with ASD with higher receptive 
language produced more errorless retrievals than their peers with low receptive 
language, and both groups also showed increased performance in the most iconic 
Colour Photograph trials.
The final analyses assess the relationship between task performance (success 
or failure on first search attempt) and memory check performance (remembered or 
forgotten target picture) across conditions. Children’s responses to each trial were 
coded as belonging to one of the following 4 mutually exclusive categories. As the 
parametric analyses revealed no effect of Familiarity, trial types were collapsed for 
Colour Photograph and Line Drawing trials.
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a) ‘Trial correct, memory correct’-  the child made an errorless retrieval (i.e. their first 
search was in the correct location and was unprompted) and selected the correct 
picture at the memory check. This response indicated that the child intentionally used 
the picture as a symbol to solve the task.
b) ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’-  the child did not make an errorless retrieval, but 
selected the correct picture at the memory check. This response indicated that the 
child failed to use the picture as a symbol to solve the task, but could remember the 
picture they were shown.
c) ‘Trial correct, memory incorrect’-  the child made an errorless retrieval, but they did 
not select the correct picture at the memory check. This response suggests that the 
child made a correct search by chance as they could not remember the picture.
d) ‘Trial incorrect, memory incorrect’-  the child did not make an errorless retrieval 
and did not select the correct picture at the memory check. This response suggests that 
the child failed to form a mental representation of the picture which could be used as a 
symbolic source of information to solve the task.
Colour Photographs
Out of 64 trials (4 per participant), children with ASD made 43 ‘Trial correct, 
memory correct’ responses (67.19%), 11 ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’ responses 
(17.19%), 4 ‘Trial correct, memory incorrect’ responses (6.25%) and 6 ‘Trial 
incorrect, memory incorrect’ responses (9.37%). By comparison, TD children made 
52 ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ responses (81.25%), 4 ‘Trial incorrect, memory 
correct’ responses (6.25%), 0 ‘Trial correct, memory incorrect’ responses and 8 ‘Trial 
incorrect, memory incorrect’ responses (12.5%). A chi square test of independence 
showed that there was no relation between Group (ASD, TD) and frequency o f ‘Trial
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correct, memory correct’ and ‘Trial incorrect, memory incorrect’ responses, providing 
further confirmation that both groups responded similarly in Colour Photograph trials. 
Line Drawings
Out of 64 trials, children with ASD made 31 ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ 
responses (48.44%), 10 ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’ responses (15.63%), 4 ‘Trial 
correct, memory incorrect’ responses (6.25%) and 19 ‘Trial incorrect, memory 
incorrect’ responses (29.68%). TD children made 39 ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ 
responses (60.94%), 8 ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’ responses (12.5%), 0 ‘Trial 
correct, memory incorrect’ responses and 17 ‘Trial incorrect, memory incorrect’ 
responses (26.56%). A chi square test of independence showed that there was no 
relation between Group and frequency of ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ and ‘Trial 
incorrect, memory incorrect’ responses.
Abstract Pictures
Out of 64 trials, children with ASD made 36 ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ 
responses (56.25%), 12 ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’ responses (18.75%), 3 ‘Trial 
correct, memory incorrect’ responses (4.69%) and 13 ‘Trial incorrect, memory 
correct’ responses (20.31%). TD children made 41 ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ 
responses (64.06%), 8 ‘Trial incorrect, memory correct’ responses (12.5%), 2 ‘Trial 
correct, memory incorrect’ responses (3.13%) and 13 ‘Trial incorrect, memory 
incorrect’ responses (20.31%). A chi square test of independence showed that there 
was no relation between Group and frequency o f ‘Trial correct, memory correct’ and 
‘Trial incorrect, memory incorrect’ responses.
4.1.3 Discussion
The present study investigated the ability of low-functioning children with 
ASD and language-matched TD children to contextualise pictorial symbols in a search
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task. A small toy character was concealed underneath one of four unique occluders 
that were individuated by familiar nameable objects or unfamiliar unnameable objects, 
and the hiding location was communicated to children via pictures that varied in 
iconicity. In order to solve this task, children needed to construct a meaningful 
“mental model” of the picture (Pemer, 1991), recognise that the picture related to a 
current situation, and use the symbolic information to guide their actions in reality 
(DeLoache & Bums, 1994). The results revealed zero between-group differences; 
neither children with ASD nor TD children were influenced by referent Familiarity, 
and both groups’ errorless retrieval rates were above-chance in all three Iconicity 
conditions. Performance was universally predicted by receptive language ability, and 
both groups displayed significantly greater success rates in the most-iconic Colour 
Photograph trials. Therefore, both low-functioning children with ASD and young TD 
children can contextualise mental representations of pictures and use them to 
adaptively guide their behaviour in real time and space. However, this ability is 
significantly influenced by receptive language development and the degree of 
perceptual similarity between picture and symbolised referent.
Importantly, this study has documented the first evidence that low-functioning 
children with ASD, who receive and benefit from PECS, can contextualise symbolic 
information communicated by pictures. These findings contrast somewhat with 
Preissler (2008) and Hartley and Allen (Experiment 1; in press (a)), who showed that 
children with ASD may have difficulty understanding the referential nature of 
pictures. However, these previous studies both employed tasks that involved teaching 
children word-picture relations, and then testing whether they would extend newly- 
leamed labels to referent objects. In these paradigms, children with ASD tended to 
map associative word-picture relations and rarely generalised labels to depicted
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objects, suggesting that they failed to recognise the intended picture-referent relations. 
One reason why children with ASD may perform atypically in these tasks, but succeed 
in the search task, is that their difficulties in the pictorial domain relate primarily to 
word-picture-object mapping, rather than picture-object mapping per se. More 
specifically, due to impairments in their referential understanding of language (Baron- 
Cohen et ah, 1997; Frith & Happe, 1994; Kanner, 1946; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & 
Carey, 2005), low-functioning children with ASD may not know intuitively what 
words relate to when paired with pictures. In support of this theory, there is growing 
evidence that children with ASD misunderstand the rules governing word-picture- 
object-relations; children with ASD map words onto pictures themselves (rather than 
depicted referents) when word-picture pairings are reinforced (Hartley & Allen, in 
press (a); Preissler, 2008), and in conditions that foster referential word learning, 
children with ASD are equally likely to map labels onto both the shape and colour of 
depicted objects (Hartley & Allen, in press (b)). However, in situations that do not 
involve word learning, such as the present search task and Experiment 2 of Hartley 
and Allen (in press (a)), children with ASD are able to perceive and correctly map 
picture-object relations.
Furthermore, these results demonstrate that greater iconicity facilitates picture 
comprehension in children with ASD and TD children when picture and referent are 
not viewed concurrently, and mapping is based on a mental representation of the 
depicted object. It is likely that errorless retrieval rates were highest in Colour 
Photograph trials because their corresponding mental representations could be 
matched to potential referents on two resemblance properties (shape and colour), 
whereas in Line Drawing and Abstract Picture trials they could only be matched to 
referents on one resemblance property (shape or colour respectively). Thus, the
128
greater degree of picture-referent resemblance in Colour Photograph trials may have 
increased the salience of symbolic relations, leading to an improvement in children’s 
ability to contextualise the depicted information. Interestingly, both groups performed 
equally in Abstract Picture trials and Line Drawing trials. I expected that the lack of 
shape-based resemblance in Abstract Picture trials would place increased pressure on 
children’s ability to infer picture-referent relations from the experimenter’s 
communicative intentions, leading to reduced performance in children with ASD. 
However, it is possible that their difficulties in intention-reading (e.g. Charman et al., 
1997; Griffin, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996) were offset by their heightened 
attention to perceptual detail (Mottron et al., 1999; O’Riordan et al., 2001; Plaisted et 
al., 1998), which may have enabled them to map picture-referent relations based 
purely on colour. Additionally, it may be that sameness of colour plays a more 
fundamental role in referential picture-object mapping in children with ASD (see 
Hartley & Allen, in press (a), (b)).
The finding that low-functioning children with ASD were most successful at 
contextualising colour photographs has important implications for picture-based 
communication interventions. Currently, there are no data-grounded guidelines 
regarding what types of pictures are best suited for interventions such as PECS, and it 
not uncommon for children with ASD to receive training with relatively abstract 
black-and-white line drawings and symbols (see Participant information; also see 
Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). Although picture comprehension of children with ASD 
in the present study was not contingent on a high degree of iconicity, the associated 
benefit was statistically significant. Moreover, previous research has shown that iconic 
colour pictures promote the extension of verbal information to referent objects in 
children with ASD (Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). Thus, because iconic colour
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pictures facilitate both picture-object and word-picture-object mapping, there may be 
benefits to their use when implementing picture-based communication training with 
low-functioning children with ASD. Indeed, future training studies should directly 
assess whether iconic colour pictures facilitate symbolic understanding within the 
context of the PECS training programme.
Alongside iconicity, the results clearly identify receptive language as a factor 
that mediates children’s ability to contextualise pictorial symbols. Both groups’ 
errorless retrieval rates were significantly predicted by receptive language in all three 
Iconicity conditions, with higher receptive language eliciting more errorless retrievals. 
The lack of a referent Familiarity effect for either children with ASD or TD children 
suggests that neither group relied exclusively on labelling depicted objects as a 
strategy for solving the task. Therefore, it is likely that children’s general 
understanding of language had a passive, yet critical, impact on their ability to utilise 
pictures in the search task. Socio-cultural theorists, such as Callaghan and Tomasello 
(Callaghan, 2000, 2008; Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 1999, 2003) argue that 
language, the most important and privileged symbol system, develops first from early 
dyadic and triadic social behaviours (e.g. gaze following, imitation, pointing, 
declarative gestures), and subsequently mediates the acquisition of other symbol 
systems. Indeed, studies specifically investigating how linguistic and pictorial 
development interrelate have confirmed that language emerges before picture 
comprehension, and also predicts children’s ability to create representational drawings 
(Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2012). In the context of the present study, 
those children with higher receptive language may have approached the search task 
with a more nuanced understanding of how objects in the world can be represented 
through pictures. By contrast, those children with lower receptive language, and
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therefore a potentially weaker scaffolding base for their pictorial understanding, may 
have been increasingly reliant on perceptual resemblance when mapping picture- 
referent relations.
Of course, alternative accounts for the performance of children with ASD and 
TD children must be addressed. One explanation for the lack of a referent Familiarity 
effect is that children may have labelled the colours of occluders, rather than the 
individuating objects, meaning that linguistic scaffolding was possible in both 
Familiar and Unfamiliar trials. If children were relying on this strategy, errorless 
retrieval rates would have been significantly lower in the non-colour Line Drawing 
trials than in the two colour picture conditions. As performance rates were equal in 
Line Drawing and Abstract trials, and significantly higher in Colour Photograph trials, 
it is clear that children were attending to both the shape and colour of depicted 
occluders when these cues were selectively available. Regarding the influence of 
receptive language on children’s ability to contextualise pictures, perhaps those 
participants with low receptive language simply did not understand the requirements 
of the task. However, contrary to this reasoning, Suddendorf (2003) demonstrated that 
TD children aged just 24-months could perform above-chance in an arguably more 
complex search task, and every participant in the present study had a receptive 
language age of at least 24-months.
It is possible that symbolic understanding in the low-functioning children with 
ASD was facilitated by the extremely favourable experimental conditions. It is clear 
from the low rates of perseverative responding across groups and conditions that the 
carefully designed stimuli effectively minimised proactive interference from prior 
representations of hiding locations, and encouraged children to approach each trial as 
if it was a novel problem that demanded the computation of a novel solution (Aguiar
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& Baillargeon, 2000). Furthermore, each trial included an extensive Orientation Stage 
in which the experimenter highlighted the iconic correspondence between the real and 
depicted occluders and clearly asserted the intended purpose of the pictures. Thus, the 
instructions received by participants were optimally conducive of correct task 
understanding (Salsa & Peralta de Mendoza, 2007). Future studies of symbolic 
understanding in children with ASD should examine how the manipulation of search 
task features (e.g. instructions, similarity of hiding locations within and between trials, 
explicit labelling of pictures and hiding locations) impacts on their errorless retrieval 
rates.
Overall, the present study has shown that low-functioning children with ASD 
can contextualise symbolic information communicated by pictures in favourable 
experimental conditions. I have reported evidence that greater iconicity facilitates 
picture comprehension in both children with ASD and language-matched TD children 
when picture and referent are not viewed simultaneously, and mapping is based on an 
internal representation of the viewed symbol. Furthermore, regression analyses 
highlighted receptive language skills as an important predictive influence on pictorial 
understanding in children with ASD, as they are for TD children (Callaghan &
Rankin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2012). Together with previous research (Hartley & 
Allen, in press (a), (b)), these findings provide a data-grounded rationale for utilising 
iconic colour symbols when delivering picture-based communication interventions, 
such as PECS.
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Chapter Five: Intentions vs. resemblance: Understanding pictures in typical
development and autism.9
Little is known about picture comprehension in autism, and the question of 
how TD children and children with ASD map pictures to objects remains unanswered. 
Some theorists contend that resemblance (i.e. similarity of perceptual features) defines 
picture-referent relations (e.g. Hopkins, 1995, 1998; Hyman, 2006; Peacocke, 1987), 
while others claim that a picture’s referent is determined by the intentions of the artist 
and that intention-monitoring skills are critical to picture comprehension (e.g. Bloom, 
1996; Bloom & Markson, 1998; Preissler & Bloom, 2008; Taylor, 1998). The purpose 
of the present study was to establish which of these two theories best explains how TD 
children and low-functioning children with ASD map picture-object relations; do they 
relate pictures to objects based exclusively on shape, or do they map pictures to 
objects that they are intended to represent? A novel way of teasing apart these 
hypotheses is to compare how TD children and low-functioning children with ASD, 
who often have difficulty understanding the intentions of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; 
Kanner, 1943), comprehend abstract pictures that relate to referents only by virtue of 
representational intent. Given the social-cognitive deficits experienced by many 
children with ASD, this comparison may yield the first evidence that TD children and 
children with ASD derive meaning from different cues when mapping picture-object 
relations. Mapping abstract pictures to objects based on resemblance, despite its 
inadequacy as a cue to intended referential meaning, would be consistent with nai've
9 Based on Hartley, C., & Allen, M. (2014). Intentions vs. resemblance: Understanding pictures in 
typical developmental and autism. Cognition, 131, 44-59. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.009.
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realism -  a non-intentional theory of picture interpretation that privileges perceptual 
similarity and neglects external sources of meaning that are not immediately 
perceptible (e.g. the artist’s intentions, whether the picture was created accidentally, 
expectations of the viewer; Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995).
Several studies have examined young children’s sensitivity to referential 
intentions when comprehending pictures. Bloom and Markson (1998) asked 3- and 4- 
year-olds to draw pairs of objects that closely resembled each other, such as a balloon 
and a lollipop. The pairs of pictures were virtually indistinguishable, and therefore 
could not be accurately matched to their original referents based on resemblance 
alone. When asked to name their drawings after a distracter task, both 3- and 4-year- 
olds correctly and consistently discriminated based on their original representational 
intentions. Even more remarkably, 2- and 3-year-old children have been shown to 
perform mentalistic reasoning when interpreting ambiguous pictures created by others. 
In one study, Gelman and Ebeling (1998) showed 2- and 3-year-olds a series of line 
drawings roughly shaped like familiar nameable objects (e.g. a kite). Some children 
were informed that the pictures had been created intentionally (e.g. someone painted a 
picture), while others were told that the pictures had been created accidentally (e.g. 
someone spilled some paint). Children were more likely to name the ambiguous 
pictures according to shape (thus regarding them as symbolic representations) when 
they believed the pictures were intentional creations. In another study, 2-year-olds 
watched an experimenter produce an ambiguous line drawing that looked equally like 
two unfamiliar objects (Preissler & Bloom, 2008). When asked to extend a novel label 
from the picture, the majority of children generalized the word to the object that the 
artist had been gazing at whilst drawing, suggesting that they perceived this object to 
be the picture’s intended referent. Together these studies indicate that, by 2-years of
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age, TD children consider intentional information when comprehending pictures 
created by themselves and by others.
Although TD children are capable of using intentional information to decipher 
ambiguous visual representations, it is undeniable that resemblance plays a vital role 
in children’s picture comprehension. Numerous studies have demonstrated that young 
children’s ability to map picture-referent relations is facilitated by high levels of 
iconicity -  the extent that a picture resembles its referent (Callaghan, 2000; Ganea et 
al., 2008; Simcock & DeLoache, 2006). Intentional theorists, such as Bloom and 
Markson (1998), claim that iconicity is beneficial because resemblance provides a 
window to an artist’s intentions -  “children might call a picture that looks like a bird 
“a bird” not merely because it looks like a bird, but because its appearance makes it 
likely that it was created with the intent to represent a bird” (Bloom & Markson, 1998, 
p. 203). However, there is some evidence that children’s picture comprehension is 
governed primarily by resemblance, including when a picture’s appearance is in 
conflict with its creator’s intentions. When Browne and Woolley (2001) presented 4- 
year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults with a puppet show in which the protagonist 
announced his intention to draw a bear, but actually produced a picture resembling a 
rabbit, all groups named the picture according to its appearance (e.g. a rabbit) rather 
than the artist’s stated intentions (e.g. a bear; also see Richert & Lillard, 2002).
The preceding results suggest that if a picture is sufficiently recognisable, 
resemblance rather than referential intent detennines what it represents for both 
children and adults. However, as it is extremely irregular to encounter a drawing that 
is intended to represent X, but uniquely resembles Y, participants in these studies may 
have disregarded the artists’ intentions in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting cues. 
While it is doubtful that an artist would draw one thing whilst intending to represent
135
something else, it is culturally acceptable to assign meaning to pictures that do not 
have a clearly recognisable referent (e.g. abstract art, infantile scribbles). Therefore, 
studying how children interpret abstract pictures can provide a more ecologically 
valid method of assessing the relative importance of resemblance and representational 
intent to picture comprehension.
To date, very few studies have examined children’s comprehension of abstract 
pictures, with Bloom and Markson (1998) being a notable exception. In their “Size 
Task”, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown pairs of differently-sized scribbles that had 
been ‘drawn’ by a child with a broken arm. For each pair of scribbles, the 
experimenter explained that the artist had attempted to draw two objects, such as an 
elephant (large) and a mouse (small). Crucially, the pictures looked nothing like the 
named objects, and could only be matched to their intended referents based on relative 
size. At test, children mapped labels for large and small objects to the abstract pictures 
based on relative size, which the authors interpreted as evidence for TD children 
inferring the artist’s representational intent. However, a more stringent test of 
intention reading in the domain of pictures would require children to map pictures to 
actual referent objects in the absence of resemblance.
Research investigating the development of pictorial understanding has shown 
that social-cognitive skills (e.g. intention reading and imitation) enable TD children to 
learn about pictures through interactions with symbolically-experienced adults 
(Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2004;
Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). However, many low-functioning children with ASD 
show deficits in the social-cognitive skills that underlie pictorial development (Baron- 
Cohen, 1989, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & 
Willoughby, 1996). If a nonverbal child with autism is unable to infer representational
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intentions from a social partner’s communicative actions involving pictures, they may 
fail to learn that pictures are symbolic. Instead, that child may treat pictures as signs, 
perhaps learning that viewing a certain picture precedes receiving a certain object and 
that particular pictures can be used to direct others’ behaviour in different ways, 
without understanding that pictures symbolise their referents. As a result, low- 
functioning children with ASD may not realise that information directed at pictures 
(e.g. verbal labels) actually relates to their real-world referents. Indeed, when the 
degree of resemblance between picture and referent is low, this population tends to 
form associative mappings between pictures and verbal labels (Preissler, 2008). 
However, when a picture is highly-iconic (e.g. a colour photograph), children with 
ASD are much more likely to treat it as a symbol (Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). Thus, 
it appears that picture comprehension in low-functioning children with ASD may be 
contingent on a high-degree of perceptual resemblance.
If low-functioning children with ASD rely on resemblance to guide their 
mapping of picture-referent relations, we would expect to observe differences in the 
way these individuals comprehend abstract pictures. Whereas TD children might infer 
an artist’s intentions when iconicity is a poor cue to a picture’s referential meaning, 
the social-cognitive deficits that characterize autism (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Charman et 
al., 1997; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne & Moll, 2005) may prevent low-functioning children with ASD from utilising 
this strategy. Children with ASD also demonstrate a strong tendency to focus on 
localised perceptual elements when processing visual stimuli (Frith, 2003; Happe, 
1999; Happe & Frith, 2006; Mottron et al., 2003; Mottron et al., 2006). Theoretically, 
an impaired ability to reason about others’ mental states coupled with a preference for 
fine-grained detail would make the comprehension of abstract pictures extremely
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difficult. Consequently, it may be that children with ASD derive meaning from 
abstract pictures based entirely on resemblance, despite its inadequacy as a referential 
cue.
As yet, no research has investigated how children with ASD comprehend 
abstract pictorial representations. However, Allen (2009) examined how children with 
ASD interpret ambiguous pictures that could not be matched to referents based on 
resemblance alone. Participants with a mean mental age of 4.5-years watched an adult 
turn towards one of two objects and produce a drawing. The representation resembled 
both objects on the table equally. When asked to label the picture, children with ASD 
named the object that was in the experimenter’s line of sight on just 25% of trials, 
whereas TD children made the same response on 75% of trials. These findings 
suggest that, unlike TD children, children with ASD do not use intentional 
information to decode the referents of ambiguous pictures drawn by others.
The objective of the present study was to establish whether low-functioning 
children with ASD and young TD children derive referential meaning from abstract 
pictures based on resemblance or communicative intentions. While adults may call an 
arbitrary shape “an elephant” if they believe that its creator intended the image to 
represent an elephant, it is currently unknown whether these developmental 
populations also hold the view that representational intent, rather than resemblance, 
determines the referents of non-iconic pictures. In Experiment 5, participants received 
a modified version of Bloom and Markson’s (1998) Size Task, which assessed 
whether they would map words and objects to abstract drawings based on intentional 
cues. Test trials comprised of a Picture Selection Stage (based on Bloom and 
Markson’s original procedure) followed by a novel Object Selection Stage. At the 
Picture Selection Stage, children were required to map object names to abstract
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pictures based on inferred referential intentions, in the absence of resemblance. Based 
on previous findings, it was predicted that TD children would reliably use intentional 
cues to guide their mapping of words to abstract pictures (Bloom & Markson, 1998; 
Gelman & Ebeling, 1998; Preissler & Bloom, 2008). By contrast, low-functioning 
children with ASD were expected to have difficulty mapping correct word-picture 
relations in the absence of resemblance. At the Object Selection Stage, children were 
asked to link an abstract picture to a real 3-D referent. Participants selected from an 
‘Intended Referent’ (an object that matched the artist’s representational intentions), a 
‘Perceptual Referent’ (an object that resembled the picture) and a distracter. If, as 
Bloom and Markson (1998) suggest, 3-year-olds understand that resemblance is not 
necessary for a picture-referent relation to exist, we would expect TD children to 
select the object that corresponds with the artist’s intentions and ignore the closer 
perceptual match. Contrastingly, I anticipated that resemblance would guide picture- 
object mapping in children with ASD, and that they would more frequently select the 
Perceptual Referent regardless of the artist’s intentions, making them naive realists 
(Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995).
Experiments 6 and 7 rule out alternative explanations for the response patterns 
of TD children and children with ASD on the Size Task and provide further evidence 
that these populations differ in their understanding of pictorial representations. 
Importantly, the results of these experiments will contribute to our understanding of 
symbolic development by clarifying whether TD children and children with ASD 
derive meaning from abstract pictures using different cues.
139
5.1 Experiment 5 
5.1.1 Method
Participants
Fifteen children with ASD (15 male; M age: 9.7 years, range: 5.3-13.8 years) 
and fifteen TD children (10 males, 5 females; M age: 3.3 years, range: 2.5-5.3 years) 
were matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997).10 Children were recruited from 
a preschool, a mainstream school and two specialist schools in Kendal and Preston, 
United Kingdom. All children with ASD received a diagnosis of autism from a 
qualified educational or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised; 
Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert judgment. Autism diagnoses were 
confirmed via the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler et al., 1980), 
which was completed by each participant’s class teacher (M score: 42.7, range: 31.5- 
55.5).
Materials
Pictures in the Abstract condition were black-and-white line drawings of four 
different shapes. Two versions of each shape were created -  one small ( 4 x 4  cm) and 
one large (10 x 10 cm). Pictures in the Realistic condition were detailed black-and- 
white line drawings of 8 different objects (see Fig. 11). Four depicted large objects
10 Nine children with ASD achieved BPVS scores with standardised age equivalents (M  ability: 3.8 
years, SD: 1.1) which were matched to those o f TD children as closely as possible (M  ability: 3.7 years, 
SD: 0.9). The BPVS scores o f 3 children with ASD did not have age equivalents (they were too low), 
and so they were matched to 3 TD children based on their raw scores. Another three children with ASD 
were unable to complete the BPVS due to behavioural issues, thus they were conservatively matched to 
3 TD children who each had a receptive language age of 3-years. Although it would have been 
desirable to acquire a measure o f receptive language from every autistic child, it is important to note 
that this research is particularly relevant to nonverbal individuals who tend to have difficulty with 
standardardised assessments, display challenging behaviours, and receive picture-based communication 
training.
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(an elephant, a house, a tree, a car) and four depicted small objects (a mouse, a dog, a 
spider, a flower). Drawings of large and small objects were roughly the same size as 
the large and small shapes in the Abstract condition. Pictures were printed on 






Figure 11. Sample abstract and realistic pictorial stimuli used in Experiment 5; a) 
abstract large, b) abstract small, c) realistic large, d) realistic small.
Several objects were used as stimuli in both conditions. Eight objects were 
detailed models of the large and small objects depicted in the realistic pictures (see 
Fig. 12). Dimensions of models were equivalent to their pictorial counterparts. 
Another eight objects were 3-dimensional versions of the Abstract shapes (e.g. a 
sphere, a pyramid, a cuboid and an ovoid; see Fig. 12). Large and small versions of 
each 3-D shape were created. Large and small 3-D shapes approximately matched the 
dimensions of their pictorial counterparts. Eight familiar household objects were 








Figure 12. Sample object stimuli used in Experiment 5; a) abstract large, b) abstract 
small, c) realistic elephant, d) realistic mouse, e & f) example distracters.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in their own schools. They were seated 
opposite the experimenter and the materials were placed within their reach. The 
Abstract condition was always administered first, followed by the Realistic condition 
approximately one week later. The rationale behind this fixed order was that children 
would be expected to succeed in the Realistic condition regardless o f whether it was 
received first or second, whereas it is possible that children’s responding in the 






Each condition consisted of 4 trials and trials included two stages: Picture 
Selection immediately followed by Object Selection. Prior to receiving the Abstract 
condition, participants were given the same introduction as children in Bloom and 
Markson’s (1998) original study. The experimenter informed children that they would 
be shown some pictures that had been drawn by a little boy or girl (same sex as the 
child) who had a broken arm. The experimenter explained that the artist had tried very 
hard to draw good pictures, but because of their broken arm, their pictures did not 
always look how they had wanted.
Abstract Picture Selection. Following the procedure of Bloom and Markson 
(1998), before each trial, the experimenter informed the participant that they would be 
shown pictures of a pair of objects which were named twice, once in each order (e.g. 
“Louise has drawn pictures of an elephant and a mouse. I’m going to show you her 
pictures of a mouse and an elephant”). Crucially, one object in each pair was relatively 
large, and the other was relatively small (mouse-elephant, dog-house, tree-spider, 
flower-car). The experimenter then presented the Abstract pictorial stimuli -  one large 
and one small line drawing of the same abstract shape (e.g. a rectangle) -  and 
announced the names of the referents two more times, once in each order (e.g. “Look, 
Louise has drawn an elephant and a mouse. These are drawings of a mouse and an 
elephant”). At this point, the procedure deviated slightly from that of the original 
study; in order to make the paradigm accessible to nonverbal children with ASD, the 
experimenter pointed to the pictures and asked the participant to identify which one 
represented either the small or the large named object (e.g. “Can you show me a 
mouse?”), rather than to generate their own verbal descriptions of the pictures. The 
phrasing of this test question was based on the prompts used by Bloom and Markson 
(1998) when children in their study did not respond spontaneously. If the
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experimenter named the small (large) referent, a correct response would be to select 
the small (large) shape. The size of the named object was counterbalanced between 
trials. If the participant produced the correct response, the experimenter issued praise 
and confirmed the referential identity of the target picture. If the participant 
responded incorrectly, the experimenter explained that the other picture represented 
the named object and reinforced its referential identity (e.g. “Actually, this is a mouse. 
Can you touch the mouse? Well done, you touched the mouse!”). The experimenter 
then removed the non-named picture from the child’s view so that its presence did not 
interfere with the following Object Selection stage.
Abstract Object Selection. Participants were presented with an array 
consisting of three objects. One object was a 3-D representation of the ‘Intended 
Referent’ (e.g. a model mouse). Another object was a ‘Perceptual Referent’ -  a 3-D 
size-matched representation of the pictured shape (e.g. a small cuboid). The final 
object was a familiar household item which served as a distracter. The positioning of 
the objects in the array was counterbalanced. Whilst pointing to the array and the 
target picture, the experimenter asked the child “What was Louise trying to draw?”
The participant’s response was recorded and the next trial was initiated (starting with 
the Picture Selection stage).
Realistic Condition. Trials in the Realistic condition followed the “Picture 
Selection before Object Selection” format described above. The only differences were 
that the initial instructions did not state that the artist had a broken arm and the 
pictures were detailed depictions of their intended referents (i.e. the same pairs of 
objects that were named in the Abstract condition). This condition was included to 
confirm that participants could discriminate between pictures that resembled the
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The number of trials (out of 4) in which participants selected the correct 
picture (e.g. large shape if the large object was requested) was calculated. TD 
children used relative size to identify the picture of the named object on 88% of trials 
(M= 3.53, SD = 0.92; see Fig. 13), significantly greater than chance, £(14) = 6.49, p  < 
.001, d=  1.66. Surprisingly, children with ASD selected the correct picture on 68% of 
trials (M= 2.73, SD = 1.27; see Fig. 13), a rate that also significantly exceeded 
chance, £(14) = 2.22, p  = .044, d = 0.57. TD children tended to select the correct 
picture more frequently than children with ASD, but this trend only bordered on 
significance, £(28) = 1.97, p  = .059, d = 0.74. Performance was not significantly 













Figure 13. Mean number o f correct responses by typically developing children (TD) 
and children with autism (ASD) at the Picture Selection stage o f the Abstract 
condition and Realistic condition (Experiment 5). Bars represent standard error o f the 
mean.
Abstract Object Selection
The number o f Intended Referent and Perceptual Referent responses were 
summed, yielding two scores per participant (both out o f 4). In the 60 trials received 
by each group, children with ASD failed to respond on 5 trials (8%). While the TD 
children responded on every trial, they selected the distracter object on 4 trials (7%). 
The fact that the distracter object was never selected by the children with ASD and 
selected very rarely by the TD children suggests that the numerical difference in 
response choices between the Picture Selection (2 choices: large or small picture) and 
Object Selection (3 choices: Intended referent or Perceptual Referent or distracter) 
stages had no effect. It is likely that children ignored the distracter when deciding on
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their response, as there is no theoretically-relevant reason why participants would 
select it. Hence, these very infrequent responses were excluded from the subsequent 
statistical analyses.
TD children selected Intended Referents on 85% of trials (M= 3.4, SD = 0.91) 
and Perceptual Referents on 8% of trials (M= 0.3, SD = 0.62; see Fig. 14). By 
contrast, children with ASD selected Intended Referents on 27% of trials (M= 1.07, 
SD = 1.28) and Perceptual Referents on 65% of trials (M= 2.6, SD = 1.24; see Fig.
14). The proportion of trials in which children selected the Intended Referent was 
calculated by dividing the number of Intended Referent responses by their total 
number of valid responses. These proportion data were entered into an independent 
samples t-test (participant Group was the between-subjects factor), which revealed 
that TD children selected the Intended Referent significantly more often than children 
with ASD who, by extension, selected the Perceptual Referent significantly more 
often than TD children, £(28) = 6.55, p  < .001, d = 2.36. Single sample t-tests on the 
proportion data showed that TD children selected the Intended Referent significantly 
above-chance (and therefore selected the Perceptual Referent significantly below - 
chance), £(14) = 7.94,p  < .001, d=  2, while children with ASD selected the Intended 
Referent significantly below-chance (and therefore selected the Perceptual Referent 
significantly above-chance), £(14) = -2.82,/? = .014, d=  -0.72. Together, these 
findings clearly illustrate two contrasting response patterns; TD children selected the 
Intended Referent much more frequently than the Perceptual Referent, while children 
with ASD selected the Perceptual Referent much more frequently than the Intended 
Referent. Chronological age was not correlated with proportion of Intended Referent 









Figure 14. Mean number o f Intentional and Perceptual Referent responses made by 
typically developing children (TD) and children with autism (ASD) at the Object 
Selection stage o f the Abstract condition (Experiment 5). Bars represent standard error 
o f the mean.
Realistic condition
TD children and children with ASD selected the correct picture in 100% (M  = 
4, SD  = 0) and 97% o f trials {M =  3.87, SD  = 0.35) respectively (see Fig. 13), 
indicating that both groups comprehended the test question correctly and could 
discriminate the 8 named objects. Children with ASD selected the correct picture 
significantly more often in the Realistic condition than in the Abstract condition, t(14) 
= -3.24, p  = .006, d = 0.95. The between-condition difference was borderline and in 
the same direction for TD children (p = .07). TD children and children with ASD 
selected the correct 3-D referent o f requested pictures on 97% and 95% o f trials
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respectively, demonstrating that both groups could match pictures to their intended 
referents when the symbolic relation was transparent.
5.1.3 Discussion
Experiment 5 investigated whether TD children and low-functioning children 
with ASD derive meaning from abstract pictorial representations based on intentional 
information or perceptual resemblance. The results indicate that TD children reliably 
assign verbal labels to abstract pictures based on intentional cues, which subsequently 
direct their mapping of picture-object relations. Surprisingly, children with ASD 
assigned labels to abstract representations based on intentional information, but then 
mapped picture-object relations based on resemblance.
At the Picture Selection Stage of the Abstract Condition, both TD children and 
children with ASD appropriately mapped labels for large and small objects to abstract 
pictures based on relative size (e.g. large drawing as elephant and small drawing as 
mouse when presented together). Although a predictable result for the TD children 
(based on Bloom & Markson, 1998), it was surprising that children with ASD could 
also make this distinction. Given the impairments that many children with ASD have 
in intention-monitoring (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Bloom, 2000; Charman, 2000; 
Griffin, 2002), which may be particularly severe in a low-functioning population as 
tested here, it is possible that these children used a different strategy to discern the 
identity of the pictures. For example, it may be that children with ASD recognised the 
parallel between the relative sizes of the named objects and the sizes of the abstract 
drawings, then, when asked to show the experimenter the named object, they simply 
selected the appropriate size match without considering the artist’s referential 
intentions.
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While it is possible that TD children and children with ASD solved the task 
through intentional and non-intentional reasoning respectively, the Picture Selection 
data do not allow us to make this distinction. The Object Selection data do, however, 
allow this comparison. The results show that TD children form relations between 
abstract pictures and real-world referents based on artists’ intentions, even when they 
conflict with perceptual resemblance. This supports Bloom and Markson’s (1998) 
claim that children understand the intentional origins of pictures by 3-years, and 
argues against both Browne and Woolley (2001) and Richert and Lillard (2002). It 
should be noted that the latter two studies employed iconic pictures that 
unambiguously resembled familiar nameable objects other than their intended 
referents, thus presenting participants with an unusual and potentially confusing test 
situation. This problem is avoided here by using non-iconic abstract pictures. In 
summary, TD children acknowledged that a picture’s communicative meaning is 
determined by notional external properties, namely the referential intentions of the 
artist, rather than properties of resemblance which are highly salient and immediately 
perceptible.
By contrast, children with ASD were much more likely to select a 
resemblance-based match when asked to link an abstract picture with an object. The 
fact that children with ASD had difficulty using artists’ intentions to map picture- 
object relations is consistent with prior empirical work documenting their impaired 
ability to infer referential intent when mapping words to objects (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005) and interpreting drawings (Allen, 2009). These results 
indicate that, for low-functioning children with ASD, picture-object relations are 
determined by resemblance rather than referential intentions (e.g. if a picture 
resembles X, it is X, even if the artist meant to draw Y). This non-intentional
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interpretation of pictures conforms to the theory of nai've realism (Freeman, 1991; 
Freeman & Sanger, 1995), suggesting that children with ASD and TD children differ 
in their fundamental understanding of pictorial representation.
However, there are alternative explanations for the differing response patterns 
of children with ASD and TD children at the Object Selection Stage. One may 
contend that TD children generally consider artistic intentions, but at the Object 
Selection Stage they adopted the less demanding strategy of simply selecting the 
referent that matched the verbal label. Experiment 6 addresses this possibility by 
testing whether TD children use intentional cues to assign referential identities to 
abstract pictures that have not been verbally labelled. In this experiment, children 
observed an artist with a (supposedly) broken arm create abstract pictorial 
representations of pairs of visible objects that differed in size. As in Experiment 5, 
children were required to reason that the large abstract picture was intended to 
represent the large object and the small abstract picture was intended to represent the 
small object. However, unlike in Experiment 5, the objects were not named, thus 
preventing children from adopting a word-picture matching strategy. Instead, they had 
to abstract the intended referential relations from other cues, namely the inferred 
communicative intentions of the artist. Data from the children with ASD will be 




Participants were fourteen typically-developing 3-year-olds (6 males, 8 
females; M age: 3.3 years, range: 3.0-3.6 years), with a mean BPVS receptive 
language age of 3.7 years (SD: 0.57). TD children in Experiment 6 did not differ from
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TD children in Experiment 5 on chronological age (t = 0.24, p  = .81), or receptive 
vocabulary (t = - \ .44, p  = . 16). Children were recruited from a day nursery in Kendal, 
United Kingdom.
Materials
Object stimuli were the large and small Intended Referents (3-D objects) used 
in Experiment 5, plus two differently-sized unfamiliar objects (large: Aztec musical 
wind instrument; small: garden hose pipe connector). Pictorial stimuli were created 
during the test session using white A4 paper and a black felt-tip pen. The 
experimenter wore a triangular arm sling during test sessions.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in their own schools. They were seated 
opposite the experimenter and the materials were placed within their reach. Testing 
was completed in a single session lasting approximately 10 minutes.
The test session comprised of two stages: an Introduction Stage, followed by a 
Test Stage. The purpose of the Introduction Stage was to highlight that the 
experimenter was unable to produce realistic drawings due to their “broken arm”.
After introducing himself, the experimenter conveyed his passion for drawing and 
directed the child’s attention to the sling they were wearing on their right arm (e.g. “I 
love to draw things! Drawing is my favourite thing to do and I make drawings every 
day. In fact, I’m going to make some drawings now! But oh no, I’ve broken my arm 
and I can’t draw very well. I’ll try really hard to draw good pictures, but because of 
my broken arm, my pictures might not look right...”). The experimenter then stated 
that he would create a drawing of his “mummy” (mother). The resulting picture 
resembled a scribble and the experimenter emphasised its referential identity (e.g.
“This is my mum! It’s not very good because of my broken arm, but it’s still my
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mum!”). The Test Stage began after this point. The experimenter stated that he would 
make some more drawings, and administered 5 trials in which he produced abstract 
pictures of pairs of objects that differed in size. At the start of each trial, the 
experimenter presented 2 objects -  one was relatively small and one was relatively 
large -  and positioned them side-by-side (approx. 15cm apart) in front of the child. In 
the first 4 trials, children were presented with the same pairs of familiar objects as in 
Experiment 5 (elephant-mouse, dog-house, tree-spider, car-flower). In the fifth trial, 
they were presented with two differently-sized unfamiliar objects. These were 
included to rule out the possibility that children’s performance was related to object 
familiarity. The presentation order of the four pairs of familiar objects was 
randomised, and the positioning of small and large objects to the left and right was 
counterbalanced. The experimenter then stated that he would draw the two objects that 
were present (e.g. “I’m going to draw these!”). The experimenter proceeded to create 
two differently-sized scribbles roughly resembling familiar nameable shapes, one 
above the other on the same sheet of paper. The drawings were positioned in this way 
to prevent children from making inferences about referential identity based on relative 
positioning of pictures and objects. While drawing, the experimenter gazed between 
the two objects so that children were not provided with an additional intentional cue to 
picture-referent relations that was not present in Experiment 5. The order in which the 
small and large objects were drawn by the experimenter was counterbalanced, as was 
their positioning on the page. Once the drawings were complete, the experimenter 
held up the sheet of paper, pointed to each picture in turn and asked the child “what is 
this?” If the child did not respond immediately, either by pointing to their chosen 
referent or verbalising their answer, the experimenter drew the child’s attention to the
153
pair of objects and asked again “what is this?” Once children had identified a referent 
for the two pictures, the experimenter removed the objects and began the next trial.
5.2.2 Results
Children were scored on the number of times they correctly matched the 
experimenter’s scribbles to their intended referents. For example, on an elephant- 
mouse trial, a child would score 2 if they correctly identified the large scribble as “an 
elephant” and the small scribble as “a mouse”. The maximum scores for familiar and 
unfamiliar objects were 8 and 2 respectively. Remarkably, in trials involving familiar 
objects, children mapped 96% of the experimenter’s scribbles to their intended object 
referents (M= 7.71, SD = 0.83). Children correctly decoded 100% of the 
experimenter’s scribbles of unfamiliar objects.
5.2.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 6 conclusively demonstrate that TD children are 
both able and willing to map picture-object relations based purely on intentional cues, 
in the complete absence of perceptual resemblance. It is apparent that, by 3-years of 
age, TD children understand that pictures are created with the intention of 
representing real-life referents, even if it is unclear what those referents actually are. 
Although the abstract pictures shared more perceptual features with familiar nameable 
shapes than the objects that were present during drawing, children almost always 
identified them as representations of the objects that were perceived to be their 
intended referents. Thus, when iconicity is an inadequate cue to a picture’s referent,
TD children will spontaneously derive meaning by inferring the communicative 
intentions of the artist. It is likely that the communicative intentions underlying the 
abstract pictures in this experiment were more salient than in Experiment 5, as 
children observed the picture creation process. Furthermore, these findings suggest
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that TD children who selected the Intended Referent in Experiment 5 may have been 
reflecting on the symbolic picture-referent relation, rather than simply following a 
label-object matching strategy.
The preferential selection of the Perceptual Referent by children with ASD in 
Experiment 5 allows us to rule out explanations based on label-object matching and 
chance responding (the group selected the Perceptual Referent significantly more 
often than the two other objects). One possibility is that children with ASD selected 
Perceptual Referents because they find coloured 3-D geometric shapes novel and 
interesting. This, however, is unlikely because these objects were never selected in the 
Realistic condition where they were included as distracters. Two further explanations 
for the preferential selection of the Perceptual Referent by children with ASD 
implicate perseveration and associative word learning respectively. Previous research 
has shown that children with ASD can have difficulty disengaging from previously 
reinforced responses due to impairments in frontal lobe functioning (e.g. Shu et al.,
2001). Thus, it is possible that children with ASD selected the Perceptual Referent 
because they had just received reinforcement for selecting a picture that was the same 
shape, without reflecting on the symbolic picture-referent relation. Alternatively, the 
well-documented tendency of children with ASD to associate words and stimuli that 
are experienced simultaneously (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Frith & Happe, 1994; 
Kanner, 1946; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005) may have caused the 
temporary re-mapping of object labels. Repeatedly hearing the word “elephant” paired 
with a rectangle during the Picture Selection Stage may have taught children with 
ASD to associate the label with objects resembling the abstract picture (e.g.
“elephant” was re-mapped to rectangular objects). Although the Realistic Condition 
demonstrated that children with ASD knew what all of the named objects looked like,
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and each array included an object that resembled the conventional referent of the label 
(e.g. a model elephant) which could have cued the correct word-referent relation, 
associative word learning cannot be definitively rejected.
The primary objective of Experiment 7 was to conclusively rule out 
perseveration and associative word learning as explanations for resemblance-based 
picture-object mapping in children with ASD. In this experiment, a new sample of 
low-functioning children with ASD received a modified version of the paradigm in 
Experiment 5 that included controls for these two phenomena. A secondary objective 
of Experiment 7 was to corroborate my argument that performance of children with 
ASD at the Object Selection Stage could be due to impairments in understanding 
intentionality. This goal was addressed by assessing participants on a separate, well- 
established, measure of intention reading. The task was based on a procedure 
developed by Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello (1998) to assess typically-developing 
infants’ ability to discriminate intentional from accidental actions, which has since 
been administered with young children with ASD with delayed language development 
(D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007). In this task, TD children as young as 14-months 
selectively imitate actions that are perceived to be intentional and thus meaningfully 
related to the model’s goal (Carpenter et al., 1998; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005; 
D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007). By contrast, young children with ASD reproduce 
intentional and accidental actions at equal rates, often mimicking the two-action 
sequences exactly as modeled, regardless of whether one action was accidental 
(D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007). These findings indicate that children with ASD are 
oriented towards reproducing goals, but unlike TD children, they are not sensitive to 
the intentions underlying goal-directed actions.
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The selection of this particular intention-reading task was motivated by several 
factors. One problem with alternatives, such as the unfulfilled intentions task (see 
Meltzoff, 1995), is that children can produce target actions without reflecting on the 
model’s intentions (see Carpenter, Pennington & Rogers, 2001). The imitation task 
negates the possibility that children succeed due to limited affordances of objects, or 
because the model “spotlights” particular actions. It is also suitable for nonverbal 
children and places low cognitive demands on participants, making it ideal for 
children with ASD. Also, by using the imitation task, I can draw direct comparisons 
with an existing body of literature that already documents differences in the 
responding of TD children and children with ASD (Carpenter et al., 1998; 




Participants were 17 low-functioning children with ASD (all male; M  age: 9.7 
years, range: 4.1-16.1 years) recruited from a specialist school in Preston, United 
Kingdom. None of these children participated in Experiment 5. All children received a 
diagnosis of autism from a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, using 
standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism 
Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert 
judgment. Diagnosis was confirmed using the CARS (Schopler et al., 1980), which 
was completed by a class teacher (M score: 41, range: 31.5-51.5). Children’s 
receptive vocabulary was measured by the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997; M ability: 3.6
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years, SD: 1.3).11 Children with ASD in Experiment 5 and Experiment 7 did not differ 
on chronological age (t = 0.01 , p  = .99), receptive vocabulary ( t -  - \ , p  = .325) or 
CARS score (t = 0.64, p  = .53). Also, children with ASD in Experiment 7 and TD 
children in Experiment 5 did not differ significantly on receptive vocabulary (t = - 
0.49, p = .  63).
Materials
Size Task. Stimuli were the same abstract pictures and referent objects as 
used in Experiment 5. Four familiar household objects were used as distracters.
Imitation Task. Two training objects and six test objects were made from 
metal boxes as per D’Entremont and Yazbek (2007). The test objects and one training 
object had two moving components (e.g. buttons, dials, switches) and the other 
training object had a single moving component (a button). All eight objects had a 
reward outcome (e.g. a flashing light, a spinning propeller, a small balloon inflating). 
The outcomes of the two training objects and four test objects were activated via a 
remote control button box. The outcomes of the other two test objects (inflating party 
balloons) were activated by squeezing a turkey baster, which pumped air down a 
length of plastic tubing. All objects were activated secretly by the experimenter, thus 
providing full experimental control over which action sequences elicited reward 
outcomes. See Table 4 for descriptions of individual toys and their outcomes.
11 The BPVS scores o f 4 children with ASD were marginally below the lowest raw score with a 
standardised age equivalent (of 2.3-years). Consequently, we conservatively assigned these 4 children a 
receptive language ability o f exactly 2-years.
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Table 4
Descriptions o f objects, actions performed and reward outcomes in the Imitation Task
Object Actions Reward Outcome
Practice objects
Green button box Press large green button Light switches on
Spinning bunny box Turn dial/press button Rabbit picture spins
Test objects
Blue balloon box Press button/flick switch Balloon inflates
Red balloon box Turn dial/flick switch Balloon inflates
Propeller box Press green button/press red button Propeller spins
Lighthouse Turn knob/flick switch Light switches on
Kitten box Press button/flick switch Cat picture spins
Apple box Press button/flick switch Image lights up
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on two different days (approx. 1 week 
apart) in their own schools and were always accompanied by a familiar adult. They 
were seated at a table opposite the experimenter and the materials were placed within 
their reach. Participants received the Size Task in the first session and the Imitation 
Task in the second session.
Size Task. The Size Task was a modified version of the Abstract Condition 
described in Experiment 5. Children completed 4 trials, with each trial involving two 
stages: Picture Selection immediately followed by Object Selection. The task began 
with the experimenter informing the child that they would be shown some pictures 
that had been drawn by a little boy or girl (same sex as the participant) who had a 
broken arm. The Picture Selection Stage was exactly as described in Experiment 5, 
and the only difference in the Object Selection Stage was the number of questions 
asked by the experimenter. Participants in this experiment were asked 3 questions
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(Perseveration Control, Test Question, Associative Learning Control) in one of two 
possible orders (order A and order B). Both question orders began with the 
Perseveration Control -  children were first asked to identify the familiar distracter 
object (e.g. “show me the spoon”) in order to rule out the possibility that their initial 
object selection was perseverative. Children receiving question order A were then 
asked the Test Question followed by the Associative Learning Control, whereas 
children receiving question order B were asked the Associative Learning Control 
followed by the Test Question. Questions were asked in the same order in all 4 trials. 
Nine children received question order A over 4 trials, and 8 children received order B. 
These groups did not differ on chronological age (t = 0.56, p  = .59), receptive 
language ability (t = -0.04,p  = .97) or CARS score (t = 0.23,/? = .82). The Test 
Question was the same as in Experiment 5 -  children were asked to identify the 
intended referent of the abstract picture (e.g. “what was Joe/Louise trying to draw?”). 
The Associative Learning Control asked children to identify the referent of the verbal 
label assigned to the abstract picture (e.g. “show me an elephant”), and was included 
to rule out the possibility that children had re-mapped the object name to the 
Perceptual Referent. If the responding of children with ASD is due to differences in 
their understanding of artistic intentionality rather than associative word learning, we 
would expect them to select the Perceptual Referent in response to the Test Question 
and the Intended Referent in response to the Associative Learning Control.
Imitation Task. The general procedure involved an experimenter modelling a 
two-action sequence on an object that included either an accidental action and an 
intentional action, or two intentional actions. There were three within-subjects 
conditions -  Accidental-Intentional (A-I), Intentional-Accidental (I-A) and 
Intentional-Intentional (I-I). If children understand the intentions underlying goal-
160
directed actions, in the A-I and I-A conditions they should only reproduce intentional 
actions, regardless of whether they are performed first or second. The I-I condition 
was included to reduce the frequency of consecutive accidents, and to further test 
children’s ability to discriminate intentional and accidental actions. If children 
reproduced both actions at an equivalent rate across all three conditions, this would 
indicate an inability to discriminate intentional from accidental actions. For every 
child, two objects were randomly assigned to each condition. The order of conditions 
was randomised, with the stipulation that the same condition was not experienced 
consecutively. The two actions modelled on each object were always the same, but 
their order and condition (accidental or intentional) were randomised. Accidental 
actions were vocally marked by the exclamation “Whoops!” and intentional actions 
were marked by the declaration “There!”, both accompanied by appropriate facial 
expressions. Each object was involved in two successive trials (i.e. the experimenter 
modelled the two-action sequence, allowed the child to respond, modelled the two 
actions again in the same order and manner, and then gave the child another 
opportunity to respond). In total, children completed 12 test trials (4 trials per 
condition).
The imitation task began with a Training Stage during which the experimenter 
modelled one- and two-action sequences on two training objects. None of the actions 
modelled during the Training Stage were vocally marked, but it was clear that all 
actions were intentional. The first training object, the “green button” toy (a white box 
with a large green button and a light bulb on its surface) was placed in front of the 
child and the experimenter said “Watch, I’m going to show you how this works”. The 
experimenter then pressed the green button and secretly activated the light bulb using 
a remote control button box concealed underneath the table. Once the light had
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switched off, the experimenter encouraged the child to interact with the object (e.g. 
“Now you try. Can you make it work?”). All children in the current sample 
reproduced the correct action immediately. The experimenter then retrieved the first 
object and replaced it with the second object. The experimenter then demonstrated a 
two-action sequence (turned the dial and pressed the button) before activating the 
outcome via the remote control button box. The child was then asked to make the 
object work. In order to activate the outcome, children were required to perform both 
actions in the correct sequence (i.e. dial first, button second). Overall, the Training 
Stage familiarised children with the general procedure and confirmed that children 
could reproduce two-action sequences, without eliciting a one- or two-action response 
bias.
Twelve test trials immediately followed the second training trial. The 
experimenter presented the first test object and modelled a two-action sequence that 
corresponded to one of the three experimental conditions (I-A, A-I, I-I). The 
experimenter activated the reward outcome within one second of completing the 
second modelled action. Thus, for the I-A and A-I conditions, children had to 
decipher which one of the two actions was responsible for activating the reward 
outcome. In the I-I condition, children had to recognise that the reward outcome was 
contingent on both actions being performed in the correct order. After the 
demonstration, children were encouraged to respond (e.g. “Can you make it work?”).
If children did not respond immediately, they were prompted verbally and nonverbally 
to interact with the object (this was required for very few trials). Activation of the 
reward outcome following children’s actions varied slightly across conditions. In I-A 
and A-I conditions, the outcome was activated if the child reproduced the intentional 
action, irrespective of whether or not they also reproduced the accidental action. For I-
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A trials, activation of the reward outcome occurred after a 2s delay, thus giving the 
child time to produce the second accidental action. In I-I trials, the outcome was 
activated after the child’s second action, but only if they correctly reproduced the two- 
action sequence in the modelled order. After the child’s first response, the 
experimenter provided a second demonstration of the same two-action sequence, 
before giving the child another opportunity to respond. Thus, for each of the 6 objects, 




Picture Selection. The number of trials (out of 4) in which participants 
selected the correct picture (e.g. large shape if the large object was requested) was 
calculated. Children with ASD selected the correct picture on 81% of trials (M= 3.24, 
SD = 0.9), a rate that significantly exceeded chance, £(16) = 5.64,p  < .001, d — 2.82. 
The success rate of children with ASD in Experiment 7 was not significantly different 
from the success rate of children with ASD (M= 2.73, SD = 1.27; £(30) = -1.29, p  = 
.21) or TD children (M= 3.53, SD = 0.92; £(30) = 0.93,p =  .36) in the Abstract 
Condition of Experiment 5. As in Experiment 5, performance of children with ASD 
was not significantly correlated with age.
Object Selection. Four scores were calculated for every child. One score 
corresponded to the number of times (out of 4 trials) they responded correctly to the 
Perseveration Control (i.e. by selecting the familiar household item when requested). 
One score corresponded to the number of times (out of 4 trials) they responded 
correctly to the Associative Learning Control (i.e. by selecting the Intended Referent 
when asked to identify the referent of the verbal label). The remaining two scores
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(both out of 4) corresponded to the number of Intended Referent and Perceptual 
Referent responses to the Test Question. All children responded to all three questions 
on every trial.
Children with ASD responded correctly to the Perseveration Control on 97% 
of trials (M= 3.88, SD = 0.33), a rate significantly greater than chance, £(16) = 31.81, 
p  < .001, d = 15.91. This finding suggests that the selection of Perceptual Referents by 
children with ASD in Experiment 5 was not caused by an inability to disengage from 
a reinforced response.
Children with ASD responded correctly to the Associative Learning Control 
on 94% of trials {M — 3.76, SD = 0.66), a rate that significantly exceeded chance, £(16) 
= 15.18,/? < .001, d=  7.59. This finding suggests that the Picture Selection Stage did 
not direct children with ASD to re-map the object name onto the depicted shape 
through associative pairing.
In response to the Test Question, children with ASD who received question 
order A (Test Question first, Associative Learning Control second) selected Intended 
Referents on 22.3% of trials (M= 0.89, SD = 1.36) and Perceptual Referents on 77.7% 
of trials (M= 3.11, SD = 1.36). Children with ASD who received question order B 
(Associative Learning Control first, Test Question second) selected Intended 
Referents on 25% of trials (M= 1, SD= 1.51) and Perceptual Referents on 75% of 
trials (M= 3, SD = 1.51). The proportion of trials in which children selected the 
Intended Referent was calculated by dividing the number of Intended Referent 
responses by their total number of valid responses. These proportion data were entered 
into an independent samples t-test (Question Order was the between-subjects factor), 
which confirmed that question order had no influence on children’s responding to the 
Test Question. A single sample t-test was performed on the proportion data (question
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order conditions were collapsed), which showed that children with ASD selected the 
Intended Referent significantly below-chance (and therefore selected the Perceptual 
Referent significantly above-chance), £(16) = -3.14,/? = .006, d = -0.74. This finding 
replicates the response pattern of children with ASD in Experiment 5. Chronological 
age was not correlated with proportion of Intended Referent selection for children 
with ASD in this experiment.
Imitation Task
Every child completed 4 trials in each of the 3 conditions (Intentional- 
Accidental, Accidental-Intentional, Intentional-Intentional). For I-A and A-I trials, 
children’s responses were allocated to one of the following categories: Intentional 
Action Only (only the intentional action reproduced), Accidental Action Only (only 
the accidental action reproduced), Intentional-Accidental (child reproduced the 
intentional action followed by the accidental action), or Accidental-Intentional (child 
reproduced the accidental action followed by the intentional action). For I-I trials, 
children’s responses were allocated to one of the following categories: Intentional 1 
Only (only the first intentional action reproduced), Intentional 2 Only (only the second 
intentional action reproduced), Intentional 1 -Intentional 2 (child reproduced the first 
intentional action followed by the second intentional action), or Intentional 2- 
Intentional 1 (child reproduced the second intentional action followed by the first 
intentional action). Every response made by children in this experiment could be 
unambiguously allocated to one of these categories.
Every child reproduced the single action required to pass Training Trial 1 at 
their first attempt. Nine children correctly reproduced the two-action sequence 
required to pass Training Trial 2 at their first attempt. The remaining 8 children
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required between 2 and 5 (M= 2.75) experimenter demonstrations before they 
reproduced the two-action sequence correctly.
My analyses parallel those reported by Carpenter et al. (1998) and 
D’Entremont and Yazbek (2007). The first analysis compares the tendency of children 
with ASD to reproduce intentional and accidental actions in general. I-I trials were 
omitted as no accidental actions were modelled in this condition. The frequencies of 
intentional and accidental actions reproduced by children in I-A and A-I trials were 
calculated, yielding four scores per child, each out of 4 (the experimenter modelled 4 
intentional actions and 4 accidental actions in each condition). In I-A trials, children 
with ASD reproduced 85.3% of intentional actions (M= 3.41, SD = 0.94) and 88.2% 
of accidental actions (M= 3.53, SD = 0.62). In A-I trials, children with ASD 
reproduced 89.7% of intentional actions (M= 3.59, SD = 0.8) and 86.8% of accidental 
actions (M= 3.47, SD = 1.01). These data were entered into a 2(Condition: I-A, A-I) x 
2(Reproduced Actions: Intentional, Accidental) repeated measures ANOVA. There 
was no effect of Condition (F=0.17,p = .68), Reproduced Actions (F = 0 , p  = 1), and 
no interaction (F= 0.23, p  = 0.64). These results show that children with ASD were 
just as likely to reproduce intentional and accidental actions, regardless of their 
modelling order.
The second analysis examined the prevalence of different response categories 
across the three conditions. If participants understood the model’s intentions, they 
should not reproduce accidental actions. The mean number of trials in each condition 
that children with ASD produced each response type are displayed in Figure 15. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the frequencies of each response category in I- 
A trials showed that children with ASD made significantly more Intentional- 
Accidental responses than Intentional Action Only (z = -2.9, p  = .004), Accidental
1 6 6
Action Only (z = -2.5, p  = .013) and Accidental-Intentional responses (z = -2.36,p  = 
.018). In A-I trials, children with ASD made significantly more Accidental-Intentional 
responses than Intentional Action Only (z = -2.59,/? = .01), Accidental Action Only (z 
= -2.71,/? = .007) and Intentional-Accidental responses (z = -2.16, p  = .031). In I-I 
trials, children with ASD made significantly more Intentional 1 -Intentional 2 
responses than Intentional 2-Intentional 1 (z = -3.13,/? = .002), Intentional 1 Only (z = 
-3.37,/? = .001) and Intentional 2 Only responses (z = -3.04,/? = .002).
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Figure 15. Response rates o f children with ASD in the Imitation Task (Experiment 7). 
Bars represent standard error o f the mean.
Overall, these responses suggest that children with ASD were mimicking the 
m odel’s actions without reference to his intentions. In all three conditions, the 
statistically most frequent response was to copy exactly the two-action sequence
A-I condition I-I conditionI-A condition
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demonstrated by the experimenter. The frequencies of these mimicking responses 
were not statistically different across conditions -  children with ASD were just as 
likely to reproduce a two-action sequence that included an accidental action, as one 
that was completely intentional. Furthermore, the rates of mimicking responses 
observed here are highly similar to those reported by D’Entremont and Yazbek 
(2007). In their study, children with ASD produced 53% of Intentional-Accidental 
responses in the I-A condition, 60% of Accidental-Intentional responses in the A-I 
condition and 62% of Intentional 1 -Intentional 2 responses in the I-I condition.
5.3.3 Discussion
The objectives of Experiment 7 were to rule out perseveration and associative 
word learning as explanations for resemblance-driven picture-object mapping in 
children with ASD, and to provide additional evidence that children with ASD have 
specific difficulties understanding the intentions of others. These goals were addressed 
by testing a new sample of low-functioning children with ASD on a modified version 
of the Size Task that included controls for perseveration and associative word 
learning, and by assessing children on a separate measure of intention-reading.
As in Experiment 5, children with ASD showed an unexpected aptitude at the 
Picture Selection Stage of the Size Task; in the absence of perceptual resemblance, 
they appropriately mapped labels for large and small objects to pictures based on an 
intentional cue (relative size). Indeed, the Picture Selection performance of children 
with ASD in Experiment 7 was not statistically different from that of TD children in 
Experiment 5. However, at the Object Selection Stage, children with ASD mapped 
abstract pictures to objects based on perceptual resemblance rather than the artist’s 
symbolic intentions. This response pattern mirrored that of children with ASD in 
Experiment 5, and contrasted with the responding of TD children, who formed
168
relations between abstract pictures and objects based on artistic intentions. The 
Perseveration Control at the start of the Object Selection Stage showed that children 
with ASD could disengage from selecting objects that matched the abstract picture’s 
shape. This suggests that children with ASD in Experiment 5 were not selecting the 
Perceptual Referent simply because they had received reinforcement for selecting a 
similarly-shaped picture. Likewise, the Associative Learning Control confirmed that 
the Picture Selection Stage did not direct children with ASD to re-map object names 
onto depicted shapes. Despite hearing the word “elephant” repeatedly paired with a 
rectangle, children with ASD clearly retained their correct understanding of the word- 
referent relation, rather than re-associating the label with rectangular-shaped entities. 
Thus, selection of the Perceptual Referent by children with ASD in Experiment 5 
cannot be explained by associative word learning.
The Imitation Task revealed that children with ASD in Experiment 7 were 
equally likely to reproduce intentional actions and accidental actions, regardless of 
their modelling order. Across all three conditions, their most frequent response was to 
reproduce two-action sequences exactly as demonstrated, suggesting that children 
with ASD do not reflect on the intentions underlying the goal-directed behaviour of 
social partners. These results were remarkably similar to those reported by 
D’Entremont and Yazbek (2007), suggesting that the inability to discern intentionality 
from others’ social-communicative behaviour is a reliable characteristic of low- 
functioning children with ASD. By contrast, it is well-established that TD children as 
young as 14-months selectively imitate intentional actions in I-A and A-I trials, and 
produce significantly more two-action sequences in I-I trials (Carpenter et al., 1998; 
D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005), thus demonstrating 
an early sensitivity to intentions. Furthermore, the Imitation Task has provided
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explicit evidence that children with ASD in the present study have an impaired 
understanding of intentionality, supporting my argument that their resemblance-based 
comprehension of abstract pictures may be related to social-cognitive deficits.
5.4 General Discussion
This study investigated whether low-functioning children with ASD and young 
TD children derive referential meaning from abstract pictures based on resemblance 
or communicative intentions. Experiment 5 assessed whether these developmental 
populations would a) assign object names to abstract pictures based on an intentional 
cue (relative size), in the complete absence of resemblance, and b) map abstract 
pictures to real objects based on artists’ intentions or resemblance. Although both 
groups mapped object names to abstract pictures based on relative size, TD children 
mapped picture-object relations based on the artist’s intentions, while children with 
ASD disregarded the artist’s intentions and mapped picture-object relations based on 
resemblance.
This study is the first to directly compare how TD children and children with 
ASD form relations between abstract pictures, verbal labels, and real referent objects. 
The results from these experiments show that, when iconicity is a poor cue to a 
picture’s symbolic meaning, young TD children map relations to real-world referents 
based exclusively on artists’ intentions. This ability is not driven by a priori naming, 
as in Experiment 6, TD children spontaneously mapped abstract pictures to familiar 
objects in the absence of labelling. These findings support Bloom and Markson’s 
(1998) claim that, by 3-years of age, TD children understand that communicative 
intentions underlie the meaning of pictures, and diat resemblance is not necessary for 
a symbolic picture-referent relation to exist. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that 
resemblance is an important influence on children’s picture comprehension. The
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majority of pictures that children encounter (e.g. in picture books) look 
unambiguously like their intended referents, and can be interpreted based on 
appearance. Indeed, the appearance of a picture is often highly congruent with an 
artist’s referential intentions (e.g. if a picture is shaped like a car, it is probably 
intended to represent a car), making resemblance an excellent cue to symbolic 
meaning (Bloom, 2000; Bloom & Markson, 1998). However, in situations where 
resemblance is an inadequate cue (e.g. when an artist has a broken arm), young TD 
children are able to derive meaning exclusively from an artist’s intentions, and will 
selectively ignore any coincidental resemblance to non-intended referents.
In both Experiments 5 and 7, children with ASD appropriately mapped labels 
for large and small objects to abstract pictures based on an intentional cue, but 
subsequently mapped picture-object relations based on resemblance. The finding that 
children with ASD with intention reading difficulties (as confirmed in Experiment 7) 
can “solve” the Picture Selection Stage suggests that Bloom and Markson’s (1998) 
original paradigm may not require children to reflect on artists’ intentions. I propose 
that children with ASD were able to “hack out” a solution to the Picture Selection 
Stage using non-intentional reasoning -  an ability that is well-documented in the 
theory of mind literature (see Happe, 1995). This theory is supported by the fact that 
children with ASD failed to consider artists’ intentions when mapping picture-referent 
relations at the Object Selection Stage. Instead, they mapped abstract pictures to 
objects that were perceptually similar, despite the inadequacy of resemblance as a cue 
to referential meaning. The Imitation Task in Experiment 7 confirmed that children 
with ASD do not reflect on the intentions underlying goal-directed actions, and this 
deficiency may impact on their symbolic understanding of pictures. Creating a picture 
is a goal-directed action -  the goal being to communicate information about an
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independently existing referent -  but socio-cognitive impairments may inhibit 
children with ASD from considering the intentions that underlie the process of 
pictorial representation. Consequently, some low-functioning children with ASD may 
not reflect on pictures as creations of other humans with psychological relations to the 
world. To these individuals, pictures relate to objects because they resemble them -  
they do not consider the mind behind the symbol.
Unlike TD children, some children with ASD may comprehend pictures purely 
at face value, relying heavily (if not exclusively) on the analysis of immediately 
perceptible resemblance properties, without reflecting on factors external to the visual 
image (e.g. the artist’s intentions, whether the picture was created accidentally, 
expectations of the viewer). Thus, if a picture looks like X, it is X. This resemblance- 
based processing style conforms to the theory of naive realism (Freeman, 1991; 
Freeman & Sanger, 1995) which, when coupled with deficits in category formation 
(Tek et al., 2008), may impact on their ability to learn from pictures. For example, if a 
low-functioning child with autism learned that a photograph of a sailboat was “a 
boat”, they may not generalise the label to real boats that do not share key perceptual 
similarities with the picture (e.g. those without masts and sails). Alternatively, the 
inability to infer referential intentions could impact on pictorial development more 
fundamentally by preventing some children with ASD from understanding the 
representational nature of picture-referent relations (Preissler, 2008). Such a deficit 
may cause children with ASD to regard pictures as signs rather than symbols, which 
in turn may inhibit the generalisation of information from pictures to referent objects.
At present, there are no data-grounded guidelines regarding what types of 
pictures are best suited for educational and communication interventions, and it is not 
uncommon for children with autism to be taught using relatively abstract black-and-
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white line drawings that share few perceptual features with their intended referents 
(Hartley & Allen, in press (a)). However, the finding that children with ASD tend to 
map picture-object relations based exclusively on resemblance supports the argument 
that educators and therapists should deliver picture-based treatments using highly- 
iconic visual symbols, as these would appeal most to recipients’ picture-processing 
style.
As TD children and children with ASD in the present study were matched 
pair-wise on receptive language, their contrasting responses at the Object Selection 
Stage of the Size Task cannot be explained by general differences in language 
comprehension. If children with ASD could not understand the test question, it is 
likely that their responding would have been directed by the object name which they 
definitely could understand (e.g. matching the verbal label “elephant” to the model 
elephant). Preferential selection of the Perceptual Referent by children with ASD in 
both Experiments 5 and 7 confirms that they were reliably interpreting the test 
question, however, it is possible that the two populations interpreted the question 
differently. Critics may claim that, due to difficulties understanding intentional 
language, children with ASD may have been answering a different question, such as 
“what did Joe draw?” The test question was specifically worded to tap children’s 
understanding that social-communicative intentions underlie the act of drawing. 
Therefore, even if children with ASD interpreted the question as above, their selection 
of the Perceptual Referent indicates that they are not reflecting on pictures as 
intentional creations, and are instead viewing pictures from a realist perspective 
(Freeman & Sanger, 1995).
Again, I must caution against generalising the results of these experiments 
across the autism spectrum. Higher-functioning individuals with superior linguistic
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skills may develop a symbolic understanding of picture-object relations that is similar 
to typical development. However, it is important to state that the children with ASD 
who participated in this study are representative of a vast population of individuals 
with impaired language development who rely on pictures as an alternative means of 
functional communication. Thus, the finding that low-functioning children with ASD 
map picture-object relations based purely on resemblance informs theoretical 
knowledge of picture comprehension and also has valuable clinical and educational 
implications.
In summary, this study is the first to present evidence that low-functioning 
children with ASD and ability-matched TD children derive meaning from different 
cues when comprehending non-iconic pictures. From 3-years of age, TD children map 
abstract pictures to referent objects based on artists’ intentions, demonstrating then- 
understanding of the social-communicative function of pictorial symbols. By contrast, 
children with ASD map abstract pictures to referent objects based on resemblance, 
despite its inadequacy as a cue to referential meaning. Thus, resemblance is not 
criterial to picture comprehension in TD children, but it is vital for children with ASD. 
I propose that the inability of children with ASD to reflect on artists’ intentions is a 
consequence of social-cognitive impainnents that inhibit typical development of 
pictorial understanding. The finding that children with ASD are naive realists 
(Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995), who evaluate pictures based exclusively 
on their perceptual features, also has important implications for picture-based 
communication interventions.
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Chapter Six: The influence of representational status on children’s naming and 
drawing of pictures: Evidence from typical development and autism.12
As pictures are intended to symbolise real objects, it is the cultural norm to 
assign object names to 2-dimensional representations (i.e. real monkeys and monkey 
pictures can be referred to with the word “monkey”). Previous research has debated 
over the cues that direct word-picture mapping in developmental populations -  some 
theorists argue that children map labels to pictures based purely on shape (i.e. if a 
picture is shaped like a cat, it is “a cat”; Browne & Woolley, 2001; Richert & Lillard,
2002), while others claim that they name according to the artist’s referential intentions 
(i.e. a picture is “a cat” only if it was created with the intention of representing a cat; 
Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998).
Studies have sought to clarify the relative importance of referential intentions 
and shape to picture naming by pitting these cues in direct conflict. Browne and 
Woolley (2001) showed 4- to 7-year-old typically developing (TD) children and 
adults a puppet show in which the protagonist announced his intention to draw a bear, 
but actually produced a picture that resembled a rabbit. Subsequently, the majority of 
each age group named the picture according to its shape (e.g. a rabbit) rather than the 
artist’s stated intentions (e.g. a bear). In another study by Richert and Lillard (2002), 
TD children aged 4- to 8-years watched a toy troll create a picture that looked exactly 
like a fish, but were informed that the troll had neither seen nor heard of fish before. 
When asked whether the troll was drawing “a fish”, all but the eldest children 
responded in the affirmative, thus failing to consider the mental state of the artist (one
12 Based on Hartley, C., & Allen, M. (under review). Is children’s naming and drawing o f pictures 
mediated by representational status? Evidence from typical development and autism. Journal o f  
Cognition and Development.
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cannot draw a fish if one does not know what a fish is). Together, these studies 
suggest that when a picture is sufficiently recognisable, naming in TD children is 
directed by shape rather than intentions. However, by employing pictures that 
unambiguously resembled familiar nameable objects other than their intended 
referents, these studies presented participants with an unusual and potentially 
confusing test situation. As it is extremely irregular to encounter a drawing that is 
intended to represent X, but uniquely resembles Y, participants in these studies may 
have disregarded the artists’ intentions in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting cues.
Other studies show that shape alone does not determine the names assigned to 
pictures by TD children. Bloom and Markson (1998) asked 3- and 4-year-olds to draw 
pairs of objects that closely resembled each other, such as a balloon and a lollipop. 
Predictably, the pairs of pictures produced by the young children were virtually 
indistinguishable, and thus could not be accurately matched to their original referents 
based on shape. Nevertheless, when asked to name their drawings after a distracter 
task, both age groups correctly and consistently discriminated based on their original 
representational intentions. Bloom and Markson (1998) propose that “children might 
call a picture that looks like a bird “a bird” not merely because it looks like a bird, but 
because its appearance makes it likely that it was created with the intent to represent a 
bird” (p. 203). In other words, these authors claim that TD children name shape only 
insofar as it provides an index of representation.
Gelman and Ebeling (1998) tested Bloom and Markson’s (1998) theory by 
investigating whether children’s naming of depicted shapes depends on whether those 
shapes are intended to be representational. Two-and 3-year-old TD children were 
shown a series of line drawings roughly shaped like familiar nameable objects (e.g. a 
kite). Some children were informed that the pictures had been created intentionally
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(e.g. someone painted a picture), while others were told that the pictures had been 
created accidentally (e.g. someone spilled some paint). At test, children were asked to 
name the pictures. Children were more likely to name according to shape when they 
believed that pictures were intentional creations, and provided more literal non- 
symbolic responses (e.g. naming the materials used to create the pictures) when the 
pictures were made accidentally. Thus, the tendency of TD children to name a 
picture’s shape is influenced by representational status, which is ultimately 
determined by the intentions of its creator. That is, TD children are very likely to 
name a kite-shaped picture “a kite” if it was created with the intention of representing 
a kite, however, they are much less likely to name a kite-shaped paint spill “a kite” 
because it does not represent the object it happens to resemble.
It is notable that the studies reviewed above all tested the influence of 
resemblance and communicative intentions by asking children to label ambiguous 
figures. However, a novel and potentially insightful method of assessing the 
referential meaning derived from such images involves asking children to graphically 
reproduce stimuli. If a child believes an ambiguous collection of lines was created 
with the intention of representing a familiar object, they might embellish their copies 
with details that correspond with their associated mental representation, but are absent 
in the perceived stimuli. Increasing the level of resemblance between depiction and 
referent could be taken as further confirmation that the child genuinely regards the 
image to be a symbol, despite the relatively low degree of resemblance. Conversely, 
if a different child believed that the same collection of lines was created by accident, 
and therefore was not intended to be representational, their graphic reproduction may 
be more faithful to the perceived stimuli.
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There is also evidence that children’s graphic reproductions can be influenced 
by whether or not the to-be-copied items are named (Krascum, Tregenza &
Whitehead, 1996; Lee, 1989; Lewis, Russel & Berridge, 1993; Pickard & Vinter, 
1999). In one study, Lewis, Russell and Berridge (1993) asked 5-year-olds to draw a 
tankard from an unusual perspective (its handle was occluded), after an experimenter 
referred to the object as either “a mug”, “a glass” or “this”. They found that the label 
attached to the object significantly influenced the nature of children’s drawings; 
children included the occluded handle in their drawings on 69% of “mug” trials, 48% 
of “this” trials and 27% of “glass” trials. It is likely that the labels “mug” and “glass” 
directed children’s attention away from the perceived stimuli, and towards conceptual 
knowledge about the object referents of the labels (Toomela, 2002). Hence, children 
in the “mug” condition were more likely to make commission errors because a handle 
is a category-defining feature of a mug, whereas those in the “glass” condition were 
less likely to make commission errors because glasses do not usually have handles. 
Furthermore, once children acquire the goal of depicting a familiar named object, they 
may become conscious that viewers will not recognise the intended referent of their 
drawing unless they include the category-defining features associated with the label, 
regardless of whether they are visible in the present drawing situation (Bremner & 
Moore, 1984).
To my knowledge, no study has investigated whether children’s graphic 
reproduction of pictures is influenced by representational status or children’s own 
naming. However, given that referential meaning directly impacts on the visual 
realism of children’s drawing, a relation may exist. For example, if a child names an 
ambiguous figure “a sun” because they inferred that it was created with the intention 
of representing a sun, one may expect that the child would attempt to increase the
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resemblance between the stimuli and intended referent by creating a more canonical 
drawing.
If intention reading is an important process in children’s picture 
comprehension, one might predict that an impaired ability to understand intentionality 
would elicit differences in the pictorial domain. Autism is a pervasive 
neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised by profound social-cognitive 
deficits (Baron-Cohen, 1995; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994;
Frith, 2003; Kanner, 1943). Many children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
have great difficulty understanding the intentions of others (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1995; 
Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996) and, 
perhaps relatedly, there is growing evidence that this population may have an atypical 
understanding of pictures (Allen, 2009; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Hartley & Allen, in 
press (a), (b); Preissler, 2008). More specifically, it appears that referential word- 
picture-object mapping in children with ASD is contingent on a high degree of 
iconicity (the perceptual resemblance between a picture and referent), with colour 
being an important mapping cue (Hartley & Allen, in press (a); Hartley & Allen, 
under revision). One possibility is that picture comprehension in children with ASD 
conforms to the theory of naive realism (Hartley & Allen, 2014) -  a non-intentional 
theory of picture interpretation that privileges perceptual similarity and neglects 
external sources of meaning that are not immediately perceptible (e.g. the artist’s 
intentions, whether the picture was created accidentally, expectations of the viewer; 
Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995). That is, to a naive realist, a picture 
represents “a cat” because it resembles a cat, even if the artist intended to represent a 
dog.
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The objectives of the present study were a) to replicate Gelman and Ebeling’s 
(1998) finding that young TD children reflect on representational status when 
assigning labels to ambiguous pictures, b) to examine whether their graphic 
reproduction of 2-D shapes is influenced by representational status and/or naming, and 
c) to identify whether representational status influences how children with ASD, a 
population characterised by social-cognitive difficulties (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), 
name and reproduce ambiguous pictures. In Experiment 8, two groups of TD children 
(2-3 year-olds and 4-5-year-olds) received a modified version of Gelman and 
Ebeling’s (1998) paradigm. Participants were shown a series of line drawings roughly 
shaped like familiar nameable objects. Half the children in each age group were 
informed that the pictures had been created intentionally, and half were informed that 
the pictures had been created accidentally. At test, children were asked to name the 
pictures, and then to draw them.
It was predicted that, as in Gelman and Ebeling (1998), naming of shape in TD 
children would be influenced by whether or not those shapes were created 
intentionally, and thus inferred to be symbolic. Hence, I expected a high rate of shape- 
naming responses in the Intentional condition, and a reduced rate of naming responses 
(balanced by an increase in non-symbolic responses, such as “paint”) in the 
Accidental condition. In addition, the graphic reproductions of TD children could be 
influenced by 3 factors: chronological age, representational status of the to-be-copied 
picture, and children’s naming. Independent of other factors, I expected to observe an 
increase in the frequency of faithful drawings with age, as children begin to draw in an 
increasingly realistic manner (Luquet, 2001; Cox, 1992, 2005; Golomb, 2002, 2004; 
Jolley, 2010). Regarding representational status, I expected that children might create
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more canonical reproductions of symbolised referents when stimuli were believed to 
be intentional creations, and more faithful reproductions when stimuli were created 
accidentally and inferred to be non-symbolic. Lastly, it was anticipated that children’s 
naming of shape could induce the creation of more canonical reproductions of stimuli. 
In Experiment 9 ,1 investigate how children with ASD name and reproduce ambiguous 




Participants were typically developing children aged between 2- and 5-years of 
age. In one group were 32 2- to 3-year-olds (17 males, 15 females; M age = 3.1 years, 
range: 2.1-3.9 years, SD = 0.6), and in another group were 32 4- to 5-year-olds (16 
males, 16 females; Mage = 4.9 years, range = 4—5.8 years, SD = 0.5). Children were 
recruited from primary schools, nurseries and preschools in Kendal, United Kingdom. 
Half of the children in each age group were randomly assigned to the Intentional 
condition and half to the Accidental condition.
Materials
The stimuli were four black-and-white pictures (see Fig. 16) selected from the 
8 pictures used in Gelman and Ebeling’s (1998) Study 2. As children were required to 
draw each picture, more than 4 items would have been too demanding for participants 
in a single session. The drawings were scanned from the original paper onto a 
computer and made approximately 4 times larger. The digital stimuli were printed by 
a high-quality laser printer and laminated. Each drawing had two accompanying 
stories -  one for each condition. These were identical to those used in the original 
study, except for a small number of cultural adjustments (e.g. replacing ‘art class’ with
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‘art lesson’). In one story, it was suggested that the picture had been created 
intentionally. In the other story, it was suggested that the same picture had been 
created accidentally. As in the original study, the target picture was said to have been 
created using the same material in both stories. See Appendix B for a full listing of the 
stories.
The participants drew the pictures using a selection of coloured felt-tip pens and 
crayons on white A4 paper.
Figure 16. Ambiguous figures viewed by children in Experiment 8 and Experiment 9. 
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in their own schools and were always 
accompanied by a familiar adult. They were seated at a table next to or opposite the 
experimenter and the materials were placed within their reach. Children were 
reinforced throughout the session for attention and good behaviour, but the 
experimenter never indicated whether their responses were correct or incorrect.
Children received either the Intentional Condition or the Accidental Condition. 
Both conditions consisted of 4 trials. At the start of each trial, the experimenter read 










intentionally or accidentally (dependent on condition). The corresponding picture was 
then presented and the experimenter asked, “what is this?” If the participant responded 
with “I don’t know”, one additional prompt was provided. After their response had 
been recorded, the experimenter presented the participant with a piece of white A4 
paper and a packet of colouring pens and asked, “can you draw this?” Once the 
participant had finished drawing, the paper was removed from sight by the 
experimenter. The order in which the four items were presented was counterbalanced 
between participants.
6.1.2 Results
Two sets of analyses were conducted on children’s data. The first addresses 
children’s naming responses, while the second focusses on their drawing responses. 
Naming 
Coding
Following Gelman and Ebeling’s (1998) scheme, the verbal responses of 
children were coded as belonging to one of four mutually-exclusive categories:
a) ‘Naming’ -  the child named an object that was not mentioned in the 
experimenter’s story, and that corresponded to the shape of the picture (e.g. “a 
gingerbread man”, “a kite”, “a face”, “a sun”). This response indicated that the child 
regarded the picture as a symbol.
b) ‘Material’ -  the child named the material that the picture had supposedly 
been made from (e.g. “paint”, “mud”, “string”) or referred to it in non-symbolic terms 
(e.g. “a puddle”, “a splat”). This response indicated that child did not regard the 
picture as a symbol.
c) ‘Do Not Know’ -  the child indicated that they did not know what the picture 
was, or simply did not respond.
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d) ‘O ther’ -  the child mentioned physical resemblance (e.g. “it looks like a x”) 
or provided the name o f an object/material that was not mentioned in the 
experim enter’s story nor corresponded to the shape o f the picture (e.g. “kangaroo”). 
Analyses
All responses could be unambiguously allocated to one o f the four categories 
detailed above. For every child, the number o f responses belonging to each category 
was calculated (out o f 4). For ease o f interpretation, the descriptive statistics are 
presented in subsections corresponding to each age group (see Fig. 17).
M no. of 
trials
2- & 3-yrs 4- & 5-yrs ASD 
Intentional Condition
2- & 3-yrs 4- & 5-yrs ASD 
Accidental Condition
□ Naming I Material
Figure 17. Mean number o f trials (out o f 4) that typically developing children aged 2- 
3 years and 4-5 years (Experiment 8) and children with autism (ASD; Experiment 9) 
made Naming and Material verbal responses. Bars represent standard error o f the
mean.
2- and 3-year-olds. In the Intentional condition, children aged 2-3 years made 
Naming responses on 86% o f trials (M =  3.44, SD = 0.73), Material responses on 11%
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of trials (M = 0.44, SD = 0.63), Do Not Know responses on 1.5% of trials (.M=  0.06, 
SD = 0.25) and Other responses on 1.5% of trials (M= 0.06, SD = 0.25). In the 
Accidental condition, children aged 2-3 years made Naming responses on 47% of 
trials (M = 1.88, SD = 1.2), Material responses on 48.5% of trials (M= 1.94, SD = 
1.34), Do Not Know responses on 1.5% of trials (M= 0.06, SD = 0.25) and Other 
responses on 3% of trials (M = 0.12, SD = 0.34).
4- and 5-year-olds. In the Intentional condition, children aged 4-5 years made 
Naming responses on 82.8% of trials (M = 3.31, SD = 0.95) and Material responses on 
17.2% of trials (M= 0.69, SD = 0.95). In the Accidental condition children aged 4-5 
years made Naming responses on 65.7% of trials (M= 2.63, SD =1.31) and Material 
responses on 34.3% of trials (M= 1.37, SD = 1.31).
Given the low rates of Do Not Know and Other responses across age groups 
and conditions, these data were omitted from subsequent analyses. The proportion of 
trials in which children made Naming responses was calculated by dividing their 
number of Naming responses by their total number of valid responses. These 
proportion data were entered into a 2(Age: 2- to 3-year-olds, 4- to 5-year-olds) x 
2(Condition: Intentional, Accidental) univariate ANOVA. The analyses identified a 
main effect of Condition, F (l, 60) = 16.05, MSE = .08 ,p  <.001, rjp2 = .21, indicating 
that children across age groups made significantly more Naming responses in the 
Intentional condition (and therefore made significantly more Material responses in the 
Accidental condition). There was no effect of Age and no interaction.
Drawing
Coding
After labelling each ambiguous figure, children were asked to create their own 
graphic copy. Coding schemes were created for each figure that enabled raters to
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categorise children’s reproductions as either Representational (drawing more closely 
resembled the symbolised referent than the stimuli), Faithful (drawing more closely 
resembled the stimuli than the symbolised referent) or Uncodable (drawing resembled 
neither the stimuli nor the symbolised referent). Each coding scheme included a list of 
key features, and coders judged according to criteria whether or not a child’s drawing 
reproduced each feature in either a faithful or canonical fashion. This coding method 
yielded two scores per drawing (each out of 5) reflecting how 
Representational/Faithful it was. Drawings were categorised based on which score — 
Representational or Faithful -  was higher (i.e. if more features were represented 
canonically than faithfully, a drawing was categorised as Representational; see Fig. 18 
for example drawings). Not all features were weighted equally -  for each ambiguous 
figure a key detail was identified that served as a clear indicator of whether a child’s 
drawing was a Representational or Faithful reproduction (e.g. drawing the “mouth” of 
the face-like figure as a horizontal line curving upwards at both ends, as children tend 
to represent smiles, versus drawing a row of individual circular shapes as displayed in 
the stimuli), and this feature was allocated more Representational/Faithful points. An 
example coding scheme (for the ambiguous figure resembling ‘a man’) is described 
below (all coding schemes are documented in Appendix C).
Example coding scheme - Man
1. ‘Uncodable’
Drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either stimuli or 
symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed 
disconnected shapes). If the drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable 




a) Enclosed circular shape located at the top of the drawing. May be attached to a 
central shape or a vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point.
b) A single “protrusion” extends upwards from a centre point and is not individuated 
or enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
3. ‘Arms’
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend outwards from the sides 
of a central shape or a vertical line (one either side of centre). Score: 1 
Representational point.
b) Two protrusions extend outwards (one each side) of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
4. ‘Legs’
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend downwards from the 
bottom of a central shape or vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point.
b) Two protrusions extend downwards from the bottom of a central mass and neither 
are individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
5. ‘Face’
a) Drawing includes internal detail resembling a facial configuration (i.e. 2 eyes, nose 
and mouth). Detail must be located either in enclosed ‘head’ at the top of the drawing, 
or in the central shape if no ‘head’ is present. Score: 2 Representational points.
b) Drawing does not contain any internal detail. Score: 2 Faithful points.
As almost every drawing produced by 2-year-old participants was rated as 
Uncodable, this age group was omitted from the subsequent analyses. Thus, the 
drawings of 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds were compared. Every child from these three age
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groups produced drawings of all 4 ambiguous figures, with the exception of one 3- 











e ^ ( ~ )  °




Figure 18. Sample drawing responses from Experiment 8; a) Representational man,
b) Faithful man, c) Representational face, d) Faithful face, e) Representational sun, f) 
Faithful sun, g) Representational kite, h) Faithful kite.
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Reliability
Every drawing was coded by the first experimenter and an independent rater 
with postgraduate experience of coding children’s drawings. The second rater was 
blind to the objectives of the experiment and the details of each artist (e.g. their age, 
experimental condition, whether or not they named the stimuli). Reliability of coding 
schemes was assessed via Cohen’s Kappa, which was calculated based on the two 
raters’ categorical classifications (i.e. whether a drawing was Representational,
Faithful or Uncodable). High interrater reliability was achieved for all coding schemes 
(man: k  = .84, p < .001; face: k  = .93, p < .001; sun: k  = .84, p < .001; kite: k  =  .8, p < 
.001). Disagreements in categorical classifications (e.g. Faithful vs. Uncodable) were 
resolved by consensus between the two coders.
Analyses
In total, children produced 191 drawings. Of the drawings created by 3-year- 
olds, 46% were categorised as Representational, 8% were Faithful and 46% were 
Uncodable. For 4-year-olds, 48.5% of their drawings were Representational, 35.9% 
were Faithful and 15.6% were Uncodable. For 5-year-olds, 29.7% of their drawings 
were Representational, 64.1% were Faithful and 6.2% were Uncodable.
My first objective was to identify whether children’s creation of 
Representational and Faithful drawings varied as a function of Age or Condition. The 
proportion of trials in which children created Representational drawings of stimuli 
was calculated by dividing their number of Representational responses by their total 
number of valid (i.e. not Uncodable) responses. These proportion data were entered 
into a 3(Age: 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) x 2(Condition: Intentional, 
Accidental) univariate ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of Age, F{2, 42)
= 4.23, MSE = .09,/? = .021, r|p2 = .17. Pairwise comparisons subjected to the
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Bonferroni correction showed that 5-year-olds created significantly fewer 
Representational drawings (and therefore more Faithful drawings) than 3- (p = .02) or 
4-year-olds (p = .05), whose responding did not differ. There was also a main effect of 
Condition, F( 1, 42) = 9.44, MSE = .09, p  = .004, rjp2 = .18, indicating that across age 
groups, children created significantly more Representational drawings in the 
Intentional condition than the Accidental condition and, by extension, created 
significantly more Faithful drawings in the Accidental condition than the Intentional 
condition. There was no interaction between Age and Condition.
My second objective was to identify whether children’s creation of 
Representational or Faithful drawings was related to their previous verbal response. A 
4-way (Age x Condition x Verbal Response x Drawing Response) hierarchical 
loglinear analysis was conducted to determine which combination of interactions 
among the variables provided the best fit to the data. Drawings rated as Uncodable 
and those that were preceded by either a Do Not Know or Other verbal response were 
omitted, leaving 146 drawings in the analysis. The loglinear model is a widely-used 
and statistically-sound method of analysing contingency tables that include more than 
2 categorical factors (Stevens, 1992). Loglinear analysis involves an algorithmic 
search process, known as backward elimination, which sequentially removes terms 
from the most complex model until it provides the closest approximation to the data 
with the smallest number of parameters. With each iteration, the term that has the least 
effect on the fit of the model is removed. Backward elimination ceases when the
removal of another experimental terms would create a significantly worse-fitting
2 2model. The associated test statistic is likelihood ratio chi-square (G ); higher G 
values indicate poorer-fitting models, while lower values (with higher p values) 
indicate better-fitting models.
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Table 5 displays the partial chi-square for each effect. A significant partial chi 
square indicates that the effect explains significant variance beyond that explained by 
all other effects in the model. Table 5 shows that only 2 first order terms (Age, Verbal 
response) and 3 second order terms (Condition x Verbal Response, Age x Drawing 
Response, Condition x Drawing response) were significant. The subsequent 
explanation will focus on the second order effects, as these are most theoretically 
interesting. The final model is displayed in Table 6. This was the least complex model 
which did not differ significantly from the saturated model (which includes all terms 
and interactions).
Table 5
Partial Associations for all terms by loglinear analysis (Experiment 8)
Effect df Partial %2 Probability
A x C x VR x DR 0 0 1
A x C x  VR 2 2.29 .32
A x C x DR 2 3.39 .18
A x  V R xD R 2 0.6 .74
C x VR x DR 1 0.22 .64
A x C 2 0.68 .71
A x  VR 2 0.43 .81
C x  VR 1 5.81 .016*
A x  DR 2 26.74 <.001*
C x DR 1 4.45 .035*
V R xD R 1 .04 .84
A 2 9.52 .009*
C 1 .44 .51
VR 1 51.43 <.001*
DR 1 .69 .41
Note. A: Age (3, 4, 5 years); C: Condition (Intentional, Accidental); VR: Verbal 
Response (Naming, Material); DR: Drawing Response (Representational, Faithful). 
Statistical significance indicated by *
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Table 6
Final model: Difference estimation from saturated model (Experiment 8)
df Likelihood ratio G Probability
Model
A x DR, C x VR, C x DR 14 9.39 .81
Note. A: Age (3, 4, 5 years); C: Condition (Intentional, Accidental); VR: Verbal 
Response (Naming, Material); DR: Drawing Response (Representational, Faithful)
Explanation o f the model. 1) Age x Drawing Response (See Table 7): Three- 
year-olds produced relatively more Representational drawings and relatively few 
Faithful drawings. Four-year-olds produced roughly the expected frequencies of 
Representational and Faithful drawings. Five-year-olds produced relatively more 
Faithful drawings and relatively few Representational drawings. 2) Condition x 
Verbal Response (See Table 8): Children in the Intentional Condition produced more 
Naming and fewer Material responses than expected, while children in the Accidental 
condition produced fewer Naming and more Material responses than expected. 3) 
Condition x Drawing Response (See Table 9): Children in the Intentional condition 
produced more Representational drawings and fewer Faithful drawings than expected, 
while children in the Accidental condition produced fewer Representational drawings 
and more Faithful drawings.
In summary, the loglinear model captures the same key findings as the 
preceding parametric analyses: children’s naming of ambiguous pictures is influenced 
by whether or not they are created intentionally, and their graphic copying is also 
influenced by underlying intentionality and chronological age. Contrary to my
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expectations, the model did not identify a significant relationship between children’s 
verbal response and their drawing response.
Table 7
Significant loglinear analysis term: Age x Drawing Response (Experiment 8)
Age
Drawing
Response 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
Observed 28 31 19
Representational
Expected 17.1 28.8 32.1
Observed 4 23 41
Faithful
Expected 25.2 25.2 27.9
Table 8
Significant loglinear analysis term: Condition x Verbal Response (Experiment 8)
Condition








Significant loglinear analysis term: Condition x Drawing Response (Experiment 8)
Condition








The results of Experiment 8 suggest that picture comprehension in TD children 
is not mediated exclusively by shape; both their verbal and drawing responses were 
significantly influenced by representational status. The Naming analyses replicate the 
findings of Gelman and Ebeling (1998) almost perfectly. As in the original study, TD 
children provided more Naming than Material responses overall, however, their 
relative proportions varied between conditions. Children in the Intentional condition 
produced Naming responses very frequently and Material responses very rarely, while 
those children in the Accidental condition provided Naming and Material responses at 
similar rates. Hence, these data support the theory that children tend to name shape 
only in so far as it provides an index of representation (Bloom & Markson, 1998; 
Gelman & Ebeling, 1998). Children are very likely to name shape when they believe it 
to be a reliable cue to referential intentions, but they can refrain from naming the 
shape of images that they infer to be non-symbolic (e.g. children are much more likely 
to name a car-shaped drawing “a car” than a car-shaped paint spill).
195
The results of the Drawing analyses suggest that children’s graphic copying is 
mediated by both chronological age and the referential intentions underlying the to- 
be-copied picture. In keeping with previous drawing research documenting the realism 
of children’s drawings (see Cox, 1992), the data indicate that children increasingly 
focus on creating accurate copies of stimuli with age. Between the ages of 3- and 5- 
years, participants in this experiment transitioned from drawing what pictures 
symbolised, to drawing what they saw. However, the proportions of Representational 
and Faithful drawings produced by children were also influenced by representational 
status. Across age groups, children created a relatively higher proportion of 
Representational drawings in the Intentional condition (versus the Accidental 
condition), and a relatively higher proportion of Faithful drawings in the Accidental 
condition (versus the Intentional condition). Therefore, when children were copying 
pictures that were intentionally created, they were increasingly likely to draw more 
canonical representations of symbolised referents.
The findings reported above suggest that communicative intentions play an 
important role in children’s naming and reproduction of pictures. This is consistent 
with previous evidence that social-cognitive skills mediate the acquisition of pictorial 
understanding and picture-referent mapping in TD children (Bloom & Markson, 1998; 
Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2004; Rochat 
& Callaghan, 2005; Salsa & de Mendoza, 2007). Hence, in Experiment 9 ,1 expected 
that deficits in intention reading (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; 
Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996) coupled with an 
overreliance on picture-referent iconicity (Hartley & Allen, 2014; Hartley & Allen, in 
press (a)) would elicit differences in how children with autism name and draw 
ambiguous pictures.
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It was predicted that difficulties reflecting on the communicative intentions 
underlying pictures may cause children with ASD to respond in either of two ways at 
the naming stage of the paradigm. Firstly, the naive realist style of picture 
comprehension may cause some children with ASD to consistently name shape, 
irrespective of whether those shapes were created with the intention of representing 
the objects they resemble. Secondly, due to the low degree of picture-referent 
iconicity, some children with ASD may fail to map picture-referent relations at all, 
and instead name material consistently. Given that children with ASD have a strong 
tendency to focus on localised perceptual detail of visual stimuli (Frith, 2003; Happe, 
1999; Happe & Frith, 2006; Mottron et al., 2003; Mottron et al., 2006), I anticipated 





Participants were 20 children with autism (19 males, 1 female; M  age = 9.7 
years, range = 4.9-16.2 years) recruited from specialist schools in Kendal and Preston, 
United Kingdom. All children were functionally verbal and had varying degrees of 
expressive language ability, as is consistent with this clinical population. Every child 
received a diagnosis of autism from a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, 
using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism 
Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert 
judgment. Autism diagnoses were confirmed via the Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
(CARS; Schopler et al., 1980), which was completed by each participant’s class 
teacher {M score: 38.75, range: 31.5-51.5). In order to make ability-based
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comparisons with TD children in Experiment 8, children’s receptive language ability 
was measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997).13 
Mean receptive vocabulary of children with ASD was 4.3 years (range: 2-6.4 years), 
making this sample comparable in terms of ability to the TD children in Experiment 8.
Half of the children with ASD were randomly assigned to the Intentional 
condition and half to the Accidental condition. Children with ASD in the two 
conditions did not vary significantly on chronological age (Intentional: M =  10 years, 
SD = 3.3 years; Accidental: M =  9.4 years, SD = 3.8 years), CARS score (Intentional: 
M =  40.05, SD = 7.75; Accidental: M =  37.45, SD = 3.8) or receptive vocabulary 
(Intentional: M =  4.2 years, SD = 1.3 years; Accidental: M =  4.4 years, SD =1.2 
years).
Materials
The same pictures and stories were used as in Experiment 8.
Procedure




All responses could be unambiguously allocated to one of the four categories 
described in Experiment 8 (Naming, Material, Do Not Know, Other).
13 The BPVS score o f one child with autism was marginally below the lowest raw score with a 
standardised age equivalent (of 2.3-years). Consequently, we conservatively assigned this child a 
receptive language ability o f exactly 2-years.
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Analyses
For every child, the number of responses belonging to each category was 
calculated (out of 4; see Fig. 2 for descriptive statistics). In the Intentional Condition, 
children with ASD made Naming responses on 57.5% of trials (M = 2.3, SD = 1.16), 
Material responses on 37.5% of trials (M = 1.5, SD = 1.18) and Do Not Know 
responses on 5% of trials (M= 0.2, SD = 0.42). In the Accidental Condition, children 
with ASD made Naming responses on 52.5% of trials (M= 2.1, SD = 1.52), Material 
responses on 42.5% of trials {M — 1.7, SD = 1.49) and Do Not Know responses on 5% 
of trials (M= 0.2, SD = 0.63).
As in Experiment 8, the infrequent Do Not Know and Other responses were 
omitted from the following analysis. The proportion of trials in which children with 
ASD made Naming responses was calculated by dividing their number of Naming 
responses by their total number of valid responses. These proportion data were entered 
into an independent samples t-test (Condition was the between-subjects factor), which 
showed that Condition did not influence the Naming responses of children with ASD. 
In other words, the proportions of Naming and Material responses made by children 
with ASD did not differ between the Intentional and Accidental conditions. 
Furthermore, inspection of the descriptive statistics suggests that these children did 





Drawings were rated using the same coding criteria and in the same fashion as 
in Experiment 8. Three children with ASD provided verbal responses but refused to 
make drawings, and one more child did not draw the figure resembling a man. 
Reliability
As in Experiment 8, every drawing was coded by the first experimenter and an 
independent rater with postgraduate experience of coding children’s drawings. The 
second rater was blind to the objectives of the experiment and the details of each artist 
(e.g. their group, experimental condition, whether or not they named the stimuli). 
Reliability of coding schemes was assessed via Cohen’s Kappa, which was calculated 
based on the two raters’ categorical classifications (i.e. whether a drawing was 
Representational, Faithful or Uncodable). High interrater reliability was achieved for 
all coding schemes (man: k  = .83, p < .001; face: k  = .92, p < .001; sun: k  = .85, p < 
.001; kite: k  = .92, p < .001). Disagreements in categorical classifications (e.g. Faithful 
vs. Uncodable) were resolved by consensus between the two coders.
Analyses
Of the 67 drawings created by the children with ASD, 32.8% were 
Representational, 41.8% were Faithful and 25.4% were Uncodable. As in Experiment 
8, the first objective was to identify whether children’s creation of Representational 
and Faithful drawings varied as a function of Condition. The proportion of trials in 
which children created Representational drawings of stimuli was calculated by 
dividing their number of Representational responses by their total number of valid (i.e. 
not Uncodable) responses. These proportion data were entered into an independent 
samples t-test (Condition was the between-subjects factor), which proved to be non-
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significant (t = -.5,p  = .62). Thus, children with ASD created roughly the same 
proportions of Representational and Faithful drawings across conditions. Moreover, 
the descriptive statistics indicate that these children did not have a strong bias for 
creating either Representational or Faithful drawings in general.
As the verbal responding of children with ASD was not mediated by 
representational status, it is unsurprising that their drawings were not influenced by 
Condition either. However, it is possible that their drawings were related to their 
verbal responding. A 3-way (Condition x Verbal Response x Drawing Response) 
hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted to determine which combination of 
interactions among the variables provided the best fit to the data. Drawings rated as 
Uncodable and those that were preceded by either a Do Not Know or Other verbal 
response were omitted, leaving 49 drawings in the analysis.
Table 10 displays the partial chi-square for each effect, and shows that only 1 
second order term (Verbal Response x Drawing Response) was significant. The final 
model is displayed in Table 11. This was the least complex model which did not differ 
significantly from the saturated model (which includes all terms and interactions).
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Table 10
Partial Associations fo r  all terms by loglinear analysis (Experiment 9)
Effect df Partial yf Probability
C x V R x D R 0 0 1
C x  VR 1 0.57 .45
C x DR 1 .42 .52
V R x D R 1 11.72 .001*
C 1 1.00 .32
VR 1 2.49 .12
DR 1 0.51 .48
Note. C: Condition (Intentional, Accidental); VR: Verbal Response (Naming, 
Material); DR: Drawing Response (Representational, Faithful). Statistical significance 
indicated by *
Table 11
Final model: Difference estimation from saturated model (Experiment 9)
df Likelihood ratio G2 Probability
Model
V R x D R 4 1.9 .76
Note. VR: Verbal Response (Naming, Material); DR: Drawing Response 
(Representational, Faithful)
Explanation o f the model. 1) Verbal Response x Drawing Response (see Table 
12): After giving a Naming verbal response, children with ASD produced more 
Representational drawings and fewer Faithful drawings than expected. After giving a 
Material verbal response, children with ASD produced more Faithful drawings and 
fewer Representational Drawings.
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In summary, the loglinear model captures the same findings as the preceding 
parametric analyses: children with ASD were not sensitive to representational status 
when naming or drawing ambiguous pictures. However, the model did identify a 
significant relation between Verbal Response and Drawing Response. That is, children 
with ASD were significantly more likely to produce Representational drawings after 
naming shape, and Faithful drawings after naming material.
Table 12
Significant loglinear analysis term: Verbal Response x Drawing Response 
(Experiment 9)
Drawing Response








The Naming data suggest that children with ASD are equally likely to regard 
an ambiguous line drawing as a symbolic or non-symbolic object, irrespective of 
whether it was created intentionally or accidentally. In line with my predictions, 75% 
of children with ASD showed a preference for naming either shape or material 
(independent of condition). This suggests that some children with ASD consistently 
named shape without considering whether those shapes were intended to be 
representational, while others did not regard the perceptually ambiguous figures to be
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symbols at all (perhaps because the degree of picture-referent iconicity was 
insufficient). By contrast, TD children in Experiment 8 almost always regarded 
ambiguous pictures as symbols when they were intentional creations, and were 
increasingly likely to perceive them as non-symbolic objects when they were 
accidental. Thus, if a 2-D image is created intentionally, TD children infer that it is a 
symbolic representation and name it according to its shape (the best cue to referential 
meaning; Bloom & Markson, 1998). However, if the same image is created by 
accident, TD children are much less likely to adopt a symbolic perspective as they 
understand that the shape is not intended to represent the entity it resembles. Together, 
the results of Experiments 8 and 9 suggest that TD children are sensitive to the 
intentions underlying pictures created by others, whereas children with ASD are not.
As children with ASD often exhibit impairments in intention reading (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & 
Willoughby, 1996), it is unsurprising that their naming and copying of pictures were 
not mediated by the artists’ underlying intentions. Interestingly, however, the loglinear 
analysis revealed that the drawings of children with ASD were influenced by their 
verbal labelling. This response pattern contrasts with that of TD children in 
Experiment 8, who were influenced by inferred representational intentions, but not 
their own verbal labelling, when reproducing ambiguous pictures. The theoretical 
implications of these findings are addressed below in the General Discussion.
6.3 General Discussion
The present study investigated whether children’s naming and drawing of 
pictures is influenced by representational status, as determined by the artists’ 
underlying intentions. In Experiment 8, TD children aged 2-3 years and 4-5 years 
were shown a series of line drawings roughly shaped like familiar nameable objects,
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and children were informed that the pictures had been created intentionally or by 
accident. At test, participants were asked to name the pictures, and then draw them. 
Examination of the naming data showed that children in the Intentional condition 
made a significantly higher proportion of Naming responses (assigning object names 
that corresponded with shape) and a significantly lower proportion of non-symbolic 
Material responses (naming the materials that pictures were supposedly made from, 
e.g. paint) than children in the Accidental condition. The drawing data revealed that 
children tended to create more Faithful reproductions with age, however, children in 
the Intentional condition were more likely to produce Representational drawings than 
peers in the Accidental condition. In Experiment 9, verbal children with ASD were 
equally likely to name shape or material irrespective of Condition. Parametric 
analyses on the drawing data revealed no Condition differences, but a loglinear model 
identified that children with ASD were more likely to produce Representational 
drawings after naming shape, and Faithful drawings after naming material. Overall, 
the findings of these experiments suggest that representational status impacts on how 
TD children, but not children with ASD, name and draw ambiguous pictures.
At a theoretical level, the data suggest that TD children as young as 2-years 
reflect on whether a 2-D series of markings is intended to be representational before 
assigning an object name based on shape. When such markings are created by 
accident, TD children infer that they are not intended to be representational, and can 
refrain from naming shape. The effect of representational status on children’s picture 
naming replicates Gelman and Ebeling’s (1998) findings almost perfectly, and 
supports Bloom and Markson’s (1998) claim that TD children name shape only 
insofar as it provides an index of representation. In other words, TD children do not 
simply name shape -  they name the referents that those shapes are intended to
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represent. Conversely, this study argues against Browne and Woolley (2001) and 
Richert and Lillard (2002) who propose that picture comprehension in TD children is 
entirely resemblance-based. However, it is noteworthy that these studies employed 
iconic pictures that unambiguously resembled familiar nameable objects other than 
their intended referents, thus presenting participants with an unusual and potentially 
confusing test situation. This problem is avoided here by using ambiguous pictures; 
while each figure resembled a familiar nameable object, the degree of iconicity was 
low enough for it to be believable that resemblance was incidental. Consequently, 
children in the Accidental condition, who experienced conflict between shape and 
representational status, were not biased towards resemblance-based naming.
As predicted, and in line with previous descriptions of children’s drawing 
development (Luquet, 2001; Cox, 1992, 2005; Golomb, 2002, 2004; Jolley, 2010), TD 
children in Experiment 8 showed an age-related transition from drawing what they 
know to drawing what they see when reproducing ambiguous figures. It is well- 
documented that young toddlers tend to draw familiar objects independent of 
perspective (a drawing style known as intellectual realism; Luquet, 2001). That is, 
they will typically represent an object in its most canonical orientation, ensuring that 
all category-defining features are included, irrespective of their visibility from the 
child’s drawing perspective. However, by 5-years of age, children can create more 
visually realistic drawings of objects that only include details that are perceptible from 
a given viewpoint (Bremner & Moore, 1984; Lewis et al., 1993; Sitton & Light,
1992). In the present study, the 3-year-olds may have demonstrated a preference for 
intellectual realism by creating a much higher frequency of Representational drawings 
than Faithful drawings, while the 5-year-olds’ preference for visual realism may have 
elicited their creation of more Faithful drawings.
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In addition, the drawings created by TD children in Experiment 8 were 
influenced by the representational status of copied stimuli, but not children’s own 
naming. As anticipated, children were increasingly likely to draw pictures that more 
closely resembled the referents of ambiguous figures when they were believed to be 
intentional, symbolic, creations. Conversely, they were increasingly likely to produce 
Faithful drawings of stimuli when they were thought to be accidental, non-symbolic, 
creations. By effectively drawing the referents that shapes were intended to 
represented, rather than the shapes themselves, children provided converging evidence 
that they derive referential meaning from artists’ intentions. The fact that children’s 
verbal labelling did not mediate the way they represented pictures conforms with the 
theory that, by early childhood, children understand that a symbol’s meaning is 
determined by the intentions of its creator, rather than the perception of the viewer 
(Bloom & Markson, 1998; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008).
In stark contrast to TD children, children with ASD were not sensitive to 
representational status when naming or drawing ambiguous figures. Regardless of 
whether a picture was created intentionally or by accident, children with ASD 
provided similar frequencies of symbolic Naming responses and non-symbolic 
Material responses. The fact that intentionality did not increase shape naming in 
children with ASD suggests that this population may not understand that 
communicative intentions confer symbolic status to visual representations. Research 
investigating the acquisition of pictorial understanding has shown that social-cognitive 
skills (e.g. intention reading and imitation) enable TD children to learn about pictures 
through interactions with more experienced symbol-users (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; 
Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; Callaghan et al., 2004; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). 
However, many children with ASD show deficits in the social-cognitive skills that
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underlie pictorial development (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 
2002; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), possibly preventing them from 
inferring representational intentions from others’ communicative actions involving 
pictures. Therefore, if children with ASD cannot acquire pictorial understanding 
through social interactions, perhaps they develop an understanding of pictures via an 
alternative non-intentional pathway. More specifically, it may be that children with 
ASD learn how pictures relate to the world through the recognition of perceptual 
resemblances.
I propose that some children with ASD may comprehend pictures purely at 
face value, relying heavily (if not exclusively) on the analysis of immediately 
perceptible resemblance properties, without reflecting on factors external to the visual 
image (e.g. the artist’s intentions, whether the picture was created accidentally, 
expectations of the viewer; for further evidence see Allen, 2009 and Hartley & Allen, 
2014). Thus, if a picture looks like X, it is X. This resemblance-based processing style 
conforms to the theory of naive realism (Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995). In 
support of this account, there is growing evidence that successful picture 
comprehension in autism is dependent on a high degree of resemblance (Hartley & 
Allen, 2014; Hartley & Allen, in press (a); Hartley & Allen, under revision). Indeed, 
the reliance of children with ASD on resemblance would explain their relatively high 
rate of Material responses across conditions; perhaps the ambiguous figures were not 
iconic enough for children to recognise picture-referent relations. Also, the finding 
that the drawings of children with ASD were influenced by their verbal responding, 
rather than representational status, provides converging evidence that this population 
derive meaning from pictures in an egocentric, non-intentional, manner. Unlike TD 
children, who tended to create Representational drawings in the Intentional condition
208
(i.e. they drew a more face-like picture when they inferred that a figure’s creator had 
intended to represent a face), children with ASD tended to create Representational 
drawings after naming shape (i.e. they drew a more face-like picture when they 
themselves decided that a figure was a face).
Of course, the limitations of this study must be addressed. My sample sizes 
were fairly modest, and reduced in the drawing analyses by the frequencies of 
Uncodable drawings, so a replication with greater numbers of children could establish 
the reliability of these findings. It is also possible that children’s creation of 
Representational and Faithful drawings was more closely related to their interpretation 
of the test question “can you draw this?” than their understanding of the intentional 
origins of pictures. Those children who created Representational drawings may have 
taken the word this to mean the symbolised object (i.e. “can you draw a kite?”), while 
those who created Faithful drawings may have interpreted this more literally (i.e. “can 
you draw this specific picture that only slightly resembles a kite?”). Although the 
drawing data were not definitively clear-cut, the naming data unambiguously 
demonstrate that TD children understand that communicative intentions make a 2-D 
shape representational, while children with ASD do not.
Overall, the present study has shown that representational status significantly 
mediates how TD children, but not children with ASD, name and draw ambiguous 
pictures. The tendency of TD children to name a picture’s shape is influenced by 
whether or not the artist intended that shape to be representational. Additionally, TD 
children were increasingly likely to produce canonical drawings of symbolised 
referents when they believed that stimuli were intended to be symbolic, further 
demonstrating their sensitivity to referential intentions. Thus, picture comprehension 
in TD children is not driven entirely by shape-based resemblance -  the meaning of a
given shape is determined by the intentions of its creator. By contrast, the naming and 
drawing responses of children with ASD were not influenced by the social- 
communicative intentions underlying pictures. This finding strengthens my theory that 
picture comprehension in children with ASD is entirely resemblance-based, thus 
conforming with the naive realist account.
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Chapter Seven: General Discussion 
This thesis has investigated how low-functioning children with autism 
comprehend pictorial symbols. Chapters Two, Three and Four examined their ability 
to use pictures as a source for deducing information about the world, in particular, as a 
medium for learning novel words (Chapters Two and Three) and as contextualised 
cues about specific events (Chapter Four). Chapters Five and Six examined whether 
children with ASD and TD children differ in their understanding of what 
fundamentally relates a picture to its referent. More specifically, they addressed 
whether communicative intentions or resemblance guide children’s mapping of word- 
picture and picture-object relations (Chapter Five), and whether artists’ intentions 
influence children’s own naming and reproduction of pictures (Chapter Six).
In Chapter Two (pp. 47-81), referential word-picture mapping in children with 
ASD was facilitated by iconicity, but not verbal labelling. In Experiment 1, children 
were taught novel words paired with target pictures of unfamiliar objects that varied in 
iconicity. At test, they were asked to identify the referents of newly-leamed words 
when presented with target pictures paired with depicted objects and then differently- 
coloured category members. Children with ASD tended to form associative word- 
picture relations, however, they extended verbal labels to target objects (and 
sometimes differently-coloured category members) approximately twice as often in 
colour picture trials relative to non-colour picture trials (48.6% vs. 25.7%). By 
contrast, TD children almost always extended labels to depicted objects and also 
generalised those labels to differently-coloured variants matching on shape. In 
Experiment 2, children with ASD categorised a non-colour line drawing with its 
referent (rather than another picture), regardless of whether it was verbally labelled. 
This finding shows that children with ASD can map picture-object relations even
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when iconicity is low, and that verbal naming does not direct children with ASD to 
view pictures as symbols. By comparison, TD children tended to categorise line 
drawings with referent objects in the Labelled Condition and other drawings in the 
Unlabelled condition, thus demonstrating that verbal naming directs them to view 
pictures as symbols.
In Chapter Three (pp. 82-99), children with ASD formed referential relations 
between words and colour photographs in conditions that did not foster associative 
learning, however, they often generalised labels based on incorrect perceptual 
dimensions. Children were taught novel words paired with photographs of unfamiliar 
target objects and were required to sort items into two buckets according to whether or 
not they were also referents of the newly-leamed labels. Children with ASD almost 
always extended labels to items (pictures and objects) that matched depicted objects 
on shape and colour, but also frequently generalised to items that matched only on 
shape or colour (i.e. they did not demonstrate a shape bias). This atypical pattern of 
responding indicates that some children with ASD fundamentally misunderstand the 
rules that govern symbolic word-picture-object relations, perhaps due to deficits in 
category abstraction (Gastgeb et al., 2006; Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted, 2000; 
Tek et al., 2008). Contrastingly, TD children only generalised labels to items that 
belonged to the same category as depicted objects, as indicated by sameness of shape, 
rather than sameness of colour.
Chapter Four (pp. 100-131) examined whether children with ASD could solve 
a search task by contextualising symbolic information communicated by pictures. Out 
of the participant’s view, a small toy was concealed underneath one of 4 unique 
occluders that were individuated by familiar nameable objects or unfamiliar 
unnameable objects. Children were shown a picture of the hiding location (which
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varied in iconicity over sessions) and then searched for the toy. Unlike the paradigms 
employed in Chapters Two and Three, this task did not involve word learning and 
children could not simultaneously view depicted and real hiding locations while 
searching -  they had to generate a mental representation of the picture and then 
identify the corresponding 3-D referent. The results revealed zero group differences; 
neither children with ASD nor TD children were influenced by occluder familiarity, 
and both groups’ errorless retrieval rates were above-chance with all picture types. 
However, both groups made significantly more errorless retrievals in the most-iconic 
photograph trials, and performance was universally predicted by receptive language. 
Therefore, children with ASD can contextualise pictures and use them to adaptively 
guide their behaviour in real time and space, however, this ability is significantly 
influenced by receptive language development and pictorial iconicity.
Collectively, Chapters Two, Three and Four inform our understanding of how 
children with ASD comprehend pictures by highlighting the importance of iconicity 
and the role of verbal labelling. Experiment 2 (pp. 70-76) and the Line Drawing 
condition of Experiment 4 (pp. 109-125) demonstrate that children with ASD are able 
to map perceptual relations between objects and pictures of relatively low iconicity 
(e.g. black-and-white line drawings), however, greater iconicity facilitates both their 
ability to contextualise mental representations of pictures and their mapping of 
referential word-picture-object relations. It is likely that children with ASD were 
better able to contextualise iconic colour photographs because their corresponding 
mental representations could be matched to potential referents on two resemblance 
properties (shape and colour), whereas the less iconic pictures could only be matched 
to referents on one perceptual property (shape or colour). One reason why children 
with ASD were increasingly likely to generalise labels to objects depicted in colour
213
pictures is that sameness of colour makes picture-referent relations more transparent. 
For those children with ASD in Chapter Two, perhaps the viewing of a colour picture 
alongside its colour-matched referent served to highlight the symbolic relationship, 
increasing the likelihood that they would extend information from picture to referent 
in a manner consistent with symbolic understanding.
Although children with ASD in Chapter Two were twice as likely to generalise 
labels from colour pictures (relative to non-colour pictures), they generalised much 
less frequently than language-matched TD children. This between-group difference 
indicates that verbally labelling pictures has a contrasting effect on these two 
populations. In typical development, linguistic symbols are mastered earlier in 
development and henceforth serve as a scaffolding base for other symbolic domains 
(Kirkham et al., 2012). Once TD children learn that verbal labels refer to objects in the 
world, they may infer that pictures also relate to independently existing objects when 
they are named. Thus, when TD children in Chapters Two and Three heard a label 
paired with a picture, their attention may have been directed to its symbolic status, 
increasing the probability that they would successfully map the picture-referent 
relation. Indeed, in Experiment 2, a single word-picture pairing was sufficient to direct 
TD children to view a line drawing from a symbolic perspective and categorise it with 
its object referent, rather than another picture. By contrast, low-functioning children 
with ASD show profound linguistic impairments (Anderson et al., 2007; Lord, Risi & 
Pickles, 2004) and tend to learn words associatively rather than referentially (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1997; DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Frith & Happe, 
1994; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005). Consequently, one-off naming did not 
bias children with ASD towards viewing pictures from a symbolic perspective 
(Experiment 2, pp. 70-76), and they required significantly more pairings than TD
214
children to learn word-picture relations (Experiment 1, pp. 51-70). However, the 
repeated reinforcement involved in the training procedure of Experiment 1 may have 
narrowed the referential relation to the extent that the picture itself (rather than the 
depicted object) was considered the referent of the word.
Conversely, Chapter Three demonstrated that low-functioning children with 
ASD can learn referential word-picture relations. In this study, children heard labels 
paired with photographs multiple times, but children were not required to actively and 
repeatedly pair words and pictures themselves (nor did they receive reinforcement for 
doing so). It is likely that this difference in training procedure fostered the learning of 
non-associative word-picture relations, enabling children with ASD to generalise 
labels from pictures to other objects in the world. It is important to note that children 
with ASD in Chapters Two and Three were extremely similar in terms of 
chronological age and receptive language ability, so it is highly unlikely that the two 
samples differed in their fundamental understanding of pictures. In any case, although 
children with ASD in Chapter Three frequently generalised words from photographs, 
they often did so based on incorrect perceptual dimensions. More specifically, they 
generalised labels based on the non-adaptive cue ‘sameness of colour’ just as often as 
the adaptive cue ‘sameness of shape’. This finding suggests that deficits in category 
formation (Gastgeb et al., 2006), which prevent children with ASD from identifying 
shape as the key constraint underlying referential word-object relations (Tek et al., 
2008), also impact on their pictorial understanding.
Taken together, Chapters Two, Three and Four indicate that the difficulties of 
children with ASD in the pictorial domain relate primarily to woni-picture-object 
mapping, rather than picture-object mapping per se. Due to impairments in their 
referential understanding of language (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Frith & Happe,
1994; Kanner, 1946; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005), low-functioning 
children with ASD may not know intuitively what words relate to when paired with 
pictures. Chapter Three showed that children with ASD are just as likely to map labels 
onto the shape and colour of depicted referents, and Chapter Two documented that 
children with ASD tend to map labels onto pictures themselves (rather than 
symbolised referents) when learning conditions foster associative pairing. Although 
verbal labelling does not trigger shape-based referential mapping of picture-object 
relations in children with ASD, as it does for TD children, Chapter Four provided 
some evidence that language skills do influence their pictorial understanding. The 
ability of TD children and children with ASD to correctly search for a hidden toy 
using a picture as a cue was significantly predicted by receptive language; children 
with relatively low receptive language were less likely to make errorless retrievals. 
These findings suggest that language comprehension has an important influence on 
how children with ASD understand pictures, but naming does not directly scaffold 
their mapping of picture-object referential relations. It may be that those children with 
higher receptive language approached the search task with a more nuanced 
understanding of how objects in the world can be represented, while those with lower 
receptive language had a generally weaker understanding of representation, and may 
therefore have been increasingly reliant on picture-object resemblance.
From an applied perspective, the findings documented in Chapters Two, Three 
and Four have important implications for picture-based communication interventions, 
such as the Picture Exchange Communication System (Frost & Bondy, 2002). There 
are many symbol sets designed for use with PECS that provide graphic representations 
of vocabulary (e.g. Blissymbols, Picsyms, Picture Communication Symbols), but the 
pictures within and between these sets vary considerably along the continuum of
iconicity (Bloomberg, Karlan & Lloyd, 1990; Mirenda & Locke, 1989). At present, 
there are no guidelines regarding what types of pictures are best suited for PECS-like 
interventions, and it is not uncommon for children with ASD to be taught using 
relatively abstract black-and-white line drawings and symbols (see participant 
information in Chapters Two, Three and Four). Although it is clear that many children 
with ASD have general difficulties understanding symbols (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 
1993; Stanley & Konstantareas, 2007; Happe, 1995; Wetherby & Prutting, 1984; 
Preissler, 2008), this thesis has shown that their picture comprehension is facilitated 
by greater iconicity and, in particular, colour. Children with ASD were significantly 
better at contextualising colour photographs (Chapter Four), and they were much more 
likely to generalise labels to objects depicted in iconic colour pictures than non-colour 
pictures (Chapter Two; also see Chapter Three). Thus, because iconic colour pictures 
facilitate both picture-object and word-picture-object mapping, these findings provide 
educators and therapists with a data-grounded rationale for delivering picture-based 
communication training with highly-iconic colour pictures.
While this thesis has demonstrated that iconic colour pictures facilitate 
symbolic understanding in children with ASD under experimental conditions, it is 
important that future studies empirically validate the benefits of their use when 
delivering PECS (see below). It is possible that the repetition and reinforcement 
involved in the PECS protocol fosters extremely narrow, associative, word-picture and 
picture-object relations, thus limiting children’s ability to generalise from pictures 
irrespective of colour. Also, the findings of Experiment 3 demonstrate that 
photographs may not necessarily elicit adaptive referential mapping, as children often 
generalised on the incorrect basis of colour. Another issue that could reduce the 
applied value of these findings is that the studies reported in this thesis only
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investigated children’s understanding of pictures that symbolise concrete objects. 
Recipients of PECS training are required to comprehend pictures that symbolise verbs 
and adjectives which typically share fewer resemblance properties with their referents. 
Therefore, studies evaluating the influence of iconicity on PECS delivery could 
provide insight into children’s ability to comprehend these infrequently-studied 
picture types.
Chapter Five (pp. 132-173) investigated whether children with ASD and TD 
children hold the view that communicative intent, rather than perceptual resemblance, 
determines the referents of abstract pictures. In Experiment 5, children received a 
modified version of Bloom and Markson’s (1998) Size Task, which assessed whether 
they would map words and objects to abstract pictures based on resemblance or 
intentional cues. At the Picture Selection Stage, both children with ASD and TD 
children mapped familiar object names onto abstract pictures based on an intentional 
cue, however, they related the same representations to different 3-D referents at the 
Object Selection Stage; TD children linked abstract pictures to objects based on 
artists’ intentions, while children with ASD mapped picture-object relations based on 
resemblance, despite its inadequacy as a cue to referential meaning. Experiment 6 
showed that intention-based picture-object mapping in TD children was not directed 
by linguistic cues, and Experiment 7 confirmed that the resemblance-based 
responding of children with ASD was not due to perseveration or associative word 
learning. These findings suggest that resemblance is not criterial for picture 
comprehension in young TD children -  they understand the intentional- 
communicative function of pictures by 3-years of age -  but it is vital for children with 
ASD. It may be that social-cognitive impairments prevent children with ASD from
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reflecting on artists’ communicative intentions, making them nai've realists, who 
evaluate pictures based exclusively on their perceptual features.
Chapter Six (pp. 174-210) showed that representational status -  as determined 
by an artist’s communicative intentions -  significantly influences how TD children, 
but not children with ASD, name and reproduce ambiguous pictures. TD children and 
functionally verbal children with ASD were shown a series of line drawings roughly 
shaped like familiar nameable objects, and children were informed that the pictures 
had been created intentionally or by accident. The tendency of TD children to name 
pictures according to shape was influenced by whether or not the artist intended that 
shape to be representational. Additionally, TD children were increasingly likely to 
produce canonical drawings of symbolised referents when they believed that stimuli 
were intended to be symbolic, further demonstrating their sensitivity to referential 
intentions. By contrast, the naming and drawing responses of children with ASD were 
not influenced by the social-communicative intentions underlying pictures. Children 
with ASD provided similar proportions of symbolic and non-symbolic verbal 
responses irrespective of representational status, and they were more likely to produce 
canonical drawings after they themselves named shape, rather than when shapes were 
intended to be representational. These findings suggest that picture comprehension in 
TD children is not driven entirely by shape-based resemblance (the meaning of a 
shape is determined by the intentions of its creator), whereas picture comprehension in 
children with ASD is entirely resemblance-based, thus confonning with naive realism.
Together, Chapters Five and Six indicate that TD children and children with 
ASD fundamentally differ in their understanding of what relates pictures to referents 
in the world. Chapter Five showed that TD children will map object names to abstract 
pictures that correspond with their creator’s referential intentions, despite the lack of
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resemblance, and Chapter Six showed that TD children only evidence a preference for 
resemblance-based naming when pictures are intended to be representational. 
Furthermore, Chapter Five also demonstrated that TD children are willing to map 
picture-object relations based entirely on artists’ representational intentions. Thus, TD 
children can derive referential meaning from pictures in the complete absence of 
resemblance, based entirely on notional external properties -  namely the artists’ 
communicative intentions. In addition, TD children can reject resemblance as a cue to 
referential meaning when it is considered to be incidental. Overall, these studies 
suggest that picture comprehension in TD children is not driven exclusively by 
resemblance, as hypothesised by Browne and Woolley (2001) and Richert and Lillard 
(2002) (also see Hopkins, 1995, 1998; Hyman, 2006; Peacocke, 1987). From 2- to 3- 
years of age, TD children can reflect on the communicative intentions underlying 
pictures, and they privilege resemblance as a basis for word-picture-object mapping 
only insofar as it provides as reliable cue to intended symbolic meaning. Hence, 
young TD children understand that pictures are human creations with an intended 
communicative meaning and, in order to derive that meaning correctly, they are able 
to reflect on the mind behind the symbol.
However, it is important to contextualise these findings in terms of children’s 
general pictorial experiences, and it is indisputable that resemblance is an important 
influence on day-to-day picture comprehension. The majority of pictures that children 
encounter (e.g. in picture books) look unambiguously like their intended referents, and 
thus can be interpreted based on appearance. Indeed, the appearance of a picture is 
often highly congruent with an artist’s referential intentions (e.g. if a picture is shaped 
like a car, it is probably intended to represent a car), making resemblance an excellent 
cue to symbolic meaning (Bloom, 2000; Bloom & Markson, 1998). However, my
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studies have shown that in situations where resemblance is an inadequate or unreliable 
cue (e.g. when an artist has a broken arm, or an image is made by accident), young TD 
children are able to derive meaning from artists’ intentions, and can selectively ignore 
any incidental resemblance to non-intended referents.
By contrast, my findings show that artists’ intentions do not influence picture 
comprehension in children with ASD. Although children with ASD responded 
similarly to TD children at the Picture Selection Stage of the Size Task in Chapter 
Five, I argue that this component of the paradigm did not necessitate reflection on the 
artist’s intentions, enabling children with ASD to “hack out” a solution via non- 
intentional reasoning (see Happe, 1995). Had the responding of children with ASD at 
the Picture Selection Stage been driven by their consideration of the artists’ intentions, 
they would have surely responded based on those same intentions at the Object 
Selection Stage. Instead, when explicitly asked to consider the artists’ intentions, 
children with ASD mapped picture-object relations based on resemblance. For 
children with ASD in Chapter Six, intentional representational status did not increase 
shape-based naming or canonical drawing of symbolised referents. These findings 
provide converging evidence that artists’ social-communicative intentions do not 
influence the meaning that children with ASD derive from pictures.
Callaghan’s research investigating the mechanisms underlying pictorial 
development has shown that social-cognitive skills (e.g. intention reading and 
imitation) enable TD children to acquire the picture symbol system through social 
interactions with adults (Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Callaghan & Rochat, 2008; 
Callaghan et al., 2004; Rochat & Callaghan, 2005). However, many children with 
ASD show deficits in the social-cognitive skills that underlie typical pictorial 
development (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Charman et al., 1997; Griffin, 2002; Hobson,
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2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), perhaps preventing them from identifying the 
causal link between communicative intentions and the representational meaning of 
pictures. If children with ASD are unable to infer that a picture is a symbol for X 
because it was created with the intention of representing X, they may develop a non- 
intentional theory of how pictures relate to the world. Instead of reflecting on pictures 
as creations of other humans with psychological relations to the world, they may view 
pictures as non-intentional artefacts that relate to other objects purely by virtue of 
resemblance.
I propose that some children with ASD may comprehend pictures at face 
value, relying heavily (if not exclusively) on the analysis of immediately perceptible 
resemblance properties, without considering factors external to the visual image (e.g. 
the artist’s intentions, whether the picture was created accidentally, expectations of the 
viewer). Thus, if a picture looks like X, it is X, even if the artist intended to represent 
Y. This resemblance-based processing style conforms to the theory of nai've realism 
(Freeman, 1991; Freeman & Sanger, 1995). In support of this account of pictorial 
understanding, Chapters Two and Four report evidence that picture comprehension in 
children with ASD is significantly influenced by iconicity. Furthermore, the finding in 
Chapter Five that children with ASD tend to map abstract pictures to objects based on 
resemblance, despite its inadequacy as a referential cue, affirms the argument that 
picture-based communication interventions should be delivered with highly-iconic 
symbols, as these appeal most to recipients’ picture processing style. Indeed, it is clear 
from Chapters Five and Six that children with ASD find it more difficult to 
comprehend the intended meaning of less transparent visual symbols. It is also 
noteworthy that both nonverbal (Chapter Five) and verbal children with ASD (Chapter
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Six) failed to consider the communicative intentions underlying pictures, therefore 
strengthening the case that many children with ASD are nai've realists.
Of course, the theoretical conclusions drawn by this thesis must be weighed 
against its limitations. The samples of children with ASD involved in each experiment 
were fairly modest, ranging between 15 and 21 individuals. Many children with ASD 
who had consent to participate in these experiments were rejected either because they 
were too high-functioning relative to their peers, or because their cognitive 
development was too immature and they simply could not engage with the tasks. 
Additionally, some children were omitted due to extremely challenging and 
aggressive behaviours that made testing impossible. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that the individuals who did participate in these experiments were highly- 
representative of low-functioning children with ASD who receive and, typically 
benefit from, picture-based communication training (excluding those in Chapter Six 
who were verbal). Every child in Chapters Two to Five had impaired expressive 
language -  many had no functional language, while others could speak very short 
utterances -  and all children had received PECS training for varying timespans. 
Furthermore, the fact that each of these studies generated significant findings, despite 
the modest sample sizes, could be viewed as a testament to the robust nature of the 
effects in question.
Another issue associated with investigating a profoundly low-functioning 
population concerns standardised testing. In each study, it was impossible to ascertain 
an accurate measure of receptive language for a very small minority of children with 
ASD. This was either because a child’s BPVS score was marginally below the lowest 
score with a standardised age equivalent or, more rarely, because the child did not 
complete the measure due to challenging behaviour. While it would have been
223
desirable to acquire an accurate measure of receptive language from every child, this 
research is especially relevant to nonverbal children who have difficulty with 
standardised assessments, display challenging behaviours, and require alternative 
communication training. Relatedly, due to their linguistic difficulties, critics may 
question whether the children with ASD in these studies understood the instructions 
and contextual information provided by the experimenter (e.g. in Chapters Four, Five 
and Six). However, in each experiment, children with ASD and TD children were 
matched extremely closely on receptive language, making it difficult to attribute 
contrasting response patterns to between-group differences in language 
comprehension. Moreover, there is extensive evidence that very young TD children 
(e.g. aged 2-years and younger), with lower language comprehension abilities than the 
children with ASD tested here, can succeed in very similar paradigms (e.g. Ganea et 
al., 2009; Preissler & Bloom, 2007, 2008; Simcock & DeLoache, 2006; Suddendorf, 
2003).
It is possible that the results reported in this thesis are an effect of limited 
cognitive abilities rather than autism per se. I acknowledge that the inclusion of 
samples of children with major learning difficulties matched to children with ASD on 
nonverbal intelligence would have eliminated this confound. Importantly, the children 
with ASD who participated in these studies were representative of the population that 
this research is most relevant to: low-functioning individuals with impaired language 
development who receive picture-based communication training. Therefore, this 
research has both direct theoretical and applied value. It is, however, inadvisable to 
generalise the results of these experiments (particularly those reported in Chapters 
Two, Three and Four) across the autism spectrum. It may be that high-functioning 
children with ASD who are more linguistically developed have an understanding of
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word-picture-object relations that is similar to typical development. That being said, 
the results of Chapter Six suggest that even children with ASD who are functionally 
verbal may have a fundamentally different understanding of pictorial representation.
Lastly, I cite social-cognitive impairments and the absence of referential 
linguistic scaffolding as potential causes of atypical picture comprehension in autism 
without providing direct evidence of causal relations. This hypothesis is based on the 
fact that a) there is an extensive body of research documenting the mediating roles of 
imitation, intention-reading and language in pictorial development (Callaghan, 2000; 
Callaghan et al., 2004; Callaghan & Rankin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2012; Salsa & de 
Mendoza, 2007), and b) low-functioning children with ASD show impairments in all 
of these areas (Anderson et al., 2007; Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Griffin, 2002; Hobson, 2002; Lord, Risi & 
Pickles, 2004). Nonetheless, this explanation is hypothetical and requires validation in 
future research. The overarching objective of my studies was to simulate novel picture 
comprehension scenarios and to inform our understanding of how children with ASD 
derive meaning from pictures. Having demonstrated that picture comprehension in 
children with ASD is different in a number of important ways, definitively answering 
the question why is an objective that I intend to follow-up (see below).
Despite the popularity of picture-based communication interventions, and the 
ubiquitous use of visual supports in classroom settings, surprisingly little research to 
date has investigated how children with ASD comprehend pictures. Hence, there are 
numerous ways in which future research could build on the findings reported in this 
thesis. One avenue would be to investigate whether the PECS training programme is 
facilitated by the use of iconic colour photographs. A study could compare how 
rapidly children with ASD reach learning criterion for each stage of PECS training
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using photographs and less iconic picture types, and also include tests of symbolic 
understanding and generalisation to identify whether children genuinely understand 
the referential relation between pictures and the objects they represent. If it proved to 
be the case that progression through PECS training and symbolic understanding both 
benefited from the use of colour photographs, subsequent studies could assess the 
relative benefits of delivering training with personalised versus standardised 
photograph sets.
A second avenue for future research would be to examine whether it is 
possible to train symbolic understanding of pictures in children with ASD. Following 
Callaghan and Rankin’s (2002) training protocol, some children with ASD would be 
assigned to a treatment group that would receive weekly training sessions intended to 
facilitate picture comprehension and production over a 4-month period, while a 
control group would receive an equivalent number of “placebo” training sessions over 
the same time frame. In each training session, children in the treatment group would 
select objects which the experimenter would draw, before highlighting the picture- 
referent correspondences. By contrast, children in the control group would simply 
select objects and watch the experimenter position them in a line (i.e. they would not 
observe drawing). Children’s picture comprehension and production abilities would be 
assessed at monthly intervals. The original study reported that TD children in the 
treatment group experienced significant improvement in their picture comprehension 
and production after 2 and 3 months’ training respectively, demonstrating that 
pictorial development can be accelerated by providing children with frequent 
opportunities to infer the referential intentions of experienced picture-users. Given the 
social-cognitive deficits experienced by many children with ASD, it would be 
interesting to discover whether this population could deduce the knowledge and rules
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that underlie pictorial representation from the behaviour of others. Importantly, the 
lack of significant improvement in the treatment group would suggest that children 
with ASD may not acquire symbolic understanding of pictures from others as TD 
children do.
A third avenue for future research would be to investigate how the 
developmental trajectories of different symbolic domains interrelate in children with 
ASD, particularly when language is not available as a scaffolding mechanism. 
Following Kirkham, Stewart and Kidd (2012), a longitudinal study could measure 
children’s comprehension and production abilities in various symbolic domains (e.g. 
language, play and pictures) at intervals over an extended period and test for 
predictive relations at each time point. Furthermore, by taking additional 
measurements of the various social-cognitive skills that are known to be involved in 
typical symbolic development (e.g. imitation, gaze-following, intention reading, 
declarative pointing, joint attention; see Callaghan et al., 2011), it may be possible to 
identify which skills are most associated with relatively adaptive and maladaptive 
development in children with ASD. As many children with ASD suffer from profound 
linguistic impairments, and often perceive words to be non-referential auditory stimuli 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005), one might 
predict that the lack of conventional symbolic scaffolding directly impacts on 
development in other symbolic domains, such as pictorial understanding and play.
Collectively, the studies comprising this thesis have demonstrated that low- 
functioning children with autism and language-matched typically developing children 
differ in their symbolic understanding of pictures. Although children with ASD can 
recognise perceptual similarities between pictures and objects, they do not understand 
the rules that constrain symbolic word-picture-object mapping. Across studies,
iconicity emerged as an important factor that mediates their ability to contextualise 
symbolic information communicated by pictures and generalise labels to depicted 
objects. Furthermore, unlike their typically developing peers, children with ASD do 
not reflect on the social-communicative intentions underlying pictures when naming, 
drawing or identifying referent objects. Instead, they derive meaning based 
exclusively on resemblance, making them naive realists (Freeman, 1991; Freeman & 
Sanger, 1995). At a theoretical level, this thesis contributes to the field of psychology 
by informing how low-functioning children with ASD, an extremely under-researched 
population, comprehend relations between words, pictures and the objects they 
represent. The ability to transmit and derive information from symbols is at the core of 
human cognition, and this research has shown that children with ASD are 
fundamentally impaired in several key respects. Also, from an applied perspective, the 
results reported in this thesis (particularly those pertaining to iconicity) have important 
implications for the design and delivery of picture-based communication 
interventions.
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Appendix A. Detailed participation information for children with autism
_____________ Inclusion criteria for children with autism (ASD)____________
 Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 7 Experiment 9_________
Children with ASD in the final samples for these Children with ASD in the final sample o f this
experiments were characterised by the following experiment were characterised by the
criteria at the time o f testing: following criteria at the time o f testing:
a) Autism diagnosis -  children received a 
diagnosis o f autism from a qualified educational or 
clinical psychologist, using standardised 
instruments (e.g. Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised; 
Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and had this 
diagnosis confirmed via an above-threshold score 
on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; 
Schopler et al., 1980).
b) Severely impaired language -  children’s 
expressive language development was profoundly 
delayed. The majority o f children were 
functionally nonverbal. Some spoke short 
utterances between 1 and 3 words in length. A 
minority o f participants were capable o f producing 
non-echolalic utterances over 4 words in length, 
but the language of these children was heavily 
scaffolded by pictures, particularly when learning 
new concepts. There was also a large disparity 
between children’s receptive language level and 
their chronological age.
c) Current PECS-user -  due to the above criteria, 
all children were users o f the Picture Exchange 
Communication System (PECS). Children either 
used PECS as their only form of functional 
communication, or were heavily dependent on the 
system as a scaffold for their limited verbal 
utterances. There were no criteria concerning 
amount o f PECS experience or training progress.
d) Task completion -  in addition to completing the 
relevant experimental task(s), the child also i) 
achieved a standardised score on the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS), ii) achieved a 
BP VS raw score that was marginally below the 
lowest score with a standardised age equivalent, or 
iii) demonstrated an ability to comprehend and 
respond to the BPVS, but failed to complete the 
measure due to challenging behaviour.
* Note: There were no inclusion criteria relating to 
chronological age._____________________________
a) Autism diagnosis -  children received a 
diagnosis o f autism from a qualified 
educational or clinical psychologist, using 
standardised instruments (e.g. Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism 
Diagnostic Interview - Revised; Lord et al., 
2002; Lord et al., 1994) and had this diagnosis 
confirmed via an above-threshold score on the 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (Schopler et 
al., 1980).
b) Verbal naming ability -  children were able 
to spontaneously label the relevant stimuli 
using verbal language, in the absence of 
modelling.
c) Receptive language threshold -  children’s 
receptive language ability was comparable to 
the developmental level o f the TD children in 
Experiment 8.
d) Task completion -  children had to at least 
provide naming data, and i) achieve a 
standardised BPVS score, or ii) achieve a 
BPVS raw score that was marginally below the 
lowest score with a standardised age 
equivalent.
* Note: There were no inclusion criteria 
relating to chronological age.
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Exclusion criteria for children with autism
 Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 7 Experiment 9__________
Children were excluded from the final sample if  Children were excluded from the final sample
they met any o f the following criteria: if  they met any o f the following criteria:
a) Diagnosis -  a child’s CARS score was below 
the threshold for autism, thus failing to confirm 
their clinical diagnosis.
b) Language -  a child could speak fluently and/or 
had age-appropriate expressive or receptive 
language.
c) PECS use -  the child was not a current PECS- 
user.
d) Task completion -  the child could not 
understand the experimental task (or the BPVS) 
due to inadequate cognitive development.
a) Autism diagnosis -  a child’s CARS score 
was below the threshold for autism, thus failing 
to confirm their clinical diagnosis.
b) Task completion -  the child could not 
understand the experimental task (or the 
BPVS) due to inadequate cognitive 
development.
c) Behaviour -  the challenging/aggressive 
nature of the child’s behaviour made testing 
impossible and/or dangerous.
e) Behaviour -  the challenging/aggressive nature 
o f the child’s behaviour made testing impossible 
and/or dangerous.____________________________
Number of children with autism with parental consent excluded from each experiment
Basis of 
exclusion Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 7 Exp. 9
a)
Diagnosis 3 3 0 0 2 0 2
b)
Language 0 0 1 1 0 1 N/A
c)
PECS use 1 1 1 1 1 1 N/A
d) Task 
completion 7 7 5 5 7 5 36*
e)
Behaviour 1 1 1 2 1 1
2
* Note: The frequency of children unable to complete Experiment 9 was high due to 
the verbal responding demands. Many children who provided data for other 
experiments were unable to participate.
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Participation of children with ASD across multiple experiments
ticipant Exp.l Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 7 Exp.
1 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
2 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
3 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
4 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
5 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
6 ✓ ✓ X X X X X
7 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
8 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
9 ✓ ✓ X X X X X
10 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
11 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
12 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
13 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
14 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
15 ✓ ✓ X X X X X
16 ✓ ✓ X X X X X
17 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓
18 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
19 ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓
20 ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X
21 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
22 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
23 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
24 X X ✓ X X ✓ X
25 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
26 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
27 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
28 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
29 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
30 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
31 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
32 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
33 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
34 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
35 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
36 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
37 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X
38 X X X X X X ✓
39 X X X X X X ✓
40 X X X X X X ✓
41 X X X X X X ✓
42 X X X X X X ✓
43 X X X X X X ✓
44 X X X X X X ✓
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Appendix B. Stories corresponding to each ambiguous picture (I = Intentional; A =
Accidental) (see Fig. 16)
Picture 1 (man). I: When John was painting in an art lesson, he used some paint
to make something for his teacher. This is what it looked like.
A: When John’s dad was painting the house, John accidentally 
spilled some paint on the floor. This is what it looked like. 
Picture 2 (face). I: Tommy had peas with his dinner one night. He didn’t like the
way they tasted, so he pushed them around on his plate to make 
a picture. This is what it looked like.
A: Tommy had peas with his dinner one night. He tried to eat 
them with a fork, but some of them rolled off his fork onto the 
floor. This is what it looked like.
Picture 3 (sun). I: One day, while he was in an art lesson, Mike got to use mud
to make an art project. Mike carefully put the mud on the paper 
until he was finished. It looked like this.
A: One day, while he was playing, Mike saw a big puddle.
Mike jumped in the puddle and the mud splashed on his shirt. It 
looked like this.
Picture 4 (kite). I: While looking through a scrap box, Dave found some string
and decided to make an art project. It looked like this.
A: While walking through his front yard, David found some 
string caught on a bush. It looked like this.
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Appendix C. Coding schemes for children’s drawings
Picture 1 (man).
1. ‘Uncodable’ -  drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either 
stimuli or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed 
disconnected shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, 
proceed with coding.
2. ‘Head’
a) Enclosed circular shape located at the top of the drawing. May be attached to a 
central shape or a vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point.
b) A single “protrusion” extends upwards from a centre point and is not individuated 
or enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
3. ‘Arms’
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend outwards from the sides 
of a central shape or a vertical line (one either side of centre). Score: 1 
Representational point.
b) Two protrusions extend outwards (one each side) of a central mass and neither are 
individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
4. ‘Legs’
a) Two lines or separate enclosed shapes (e.g. ovals) extend downwards from the 
bottom of a central shape or vertical line. Score: 1 Representational point.
b) Two protrusions extend downwards from the bottom of a central mass and neither 
are individuated/enclosed. Score: 1 Faithful point.
5. ‘Face’
233
a) Drawing includes internal detail resembling a facial configuration (i.e. 2 eyes, nose 
and mouth). Detail must be located either in enclosed ‘head’ at the top of the drawing, 
or in the central shape if no ‘head’ is present. Score: 2 Representational points.
b) Drawing does not contain any internal detail. Score: 2 Faithful points.
Picture 2 (face).
1. ‘Uncodable’ -  drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either 
stimuli or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed 
disconnected shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, 
proceed with coding.
2. ‘Eyes/nose’
a) Three markings (e.g. combination of circles, ovals, lines and dots) positioned in an 
inverted triangle configuration. If the top two markings are circles, they must include 
internal detail (e.g. dots). Score: 1 Representational point.
b) Three circles positioned in an inverted triangle configuration. Circles contain no 
internal detail. Score: 1 Faithful point.
3. ‘Mouth’
a) An unbroken line is positioned below the inverted triangle markings. The line 
curves upwards at both ends. Score: 4 Representational points.
b) An unbroken line is positioned below the inverted triangle markings. The line is flat 
(horizontal). Score: 2 Representational points.
c) A row of individual, enclosed, rounded shapes or dots are positioned in a row 
below the inverted triangle markings. The row is flat (horizontal). Score: 2 Faithful 
points.
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d) A row of individual, enclosed, rounded shapes or dots are positioned in a row 
below he inverted triangle markings. The row is horizontal and curves upwards at both 
ends. Score: 4 Faithful points.
Picture 3 (sun).
1. ‘Uncodable’ -  drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either 
stimuli or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed 
disconnected shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, 
proceed with coding.
2. ‘Central shape’
a) Central shape is uniformly rounded (e.g. circle, oval) with no internal detail or 
detail resembling a facial configuration. Score: 1 Representational point.
b) Central shape is not smoothly rounded (i.e. it’s “dented”) and contains no internal 
detail. Score: 1 Faithful point.
3. ‘Outer shapes’
a) The outer shapes are wiggly or straight lines that extend outwards from the central 
shape. Score: 4 Representational points.
b) The majority of the outer shapes are roughly circular and are attached to the central 
shape. Score: 2 Representational points.
c) The majority of the outer shapes are roughly circular and are detached from the 
central shape. Score: 2 Faithful points.
d) The majority of the outer shapes are ovals or tear-drops and are detached from the 
central shape. Score: 4 Faithful points.
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Picture 4 (kite)
1. ‘Uncodable’ -  drawing does not, in any way, share perceptual similarity with either 
stimuli or symbolised referent (e.g. drawing is a scribble or series of randomly-placed 
disconnected shapes). If drawing does not fulfil criteria for Uncodable classification, 
proceed with coding.
2. ‘Kite’
a) Drawing includes an enclosed shape that does not have 4 sides (e.g. circle, oval). 
Must be connected to a line extending away/downwards from the shape. Score: 3 
Representational points.
b) Drawing includes an enclosed shape that has 4 straight sides. Must be connected to 
a line extending away/downwards from the shape. Score: 3 Faithful points.
3. ‘String
a) Line extending downwards from enclosed shape is straight. Score: 2 
Representational points.
b) Line extending downwards from enclosed shape has 1-2 undulations. Score: 2 
Faithful points.
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